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ABSTRACT 
 
Brazil and South Africa were both part of the global “third-wave” of democracy, the 
beginnings of their democratic transitions occurring in 1985 and 1994 respectively.  
Despite having been formerly subjected to decades of authoritarian rule, both countries 
experienced a modicum of democratic practice, however limited in franchise, under the 
previous regimes.  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the levels of support for democracy in Brazil 
and South Africa since democratic transition. Two types of political support are identified 
as crucial for democratic sustainability: diffuse support, or support for democracy’s 
intrinsic principles, and specific support, support which is conditional on the positive 
evaluation of the regime institutions and incumbents. These two types of political support 
are conceptualized as encompassing five levels or objects of political support, according 
to the Norris model: the political community, regime principles, regime performance 
(diffuse support), regime institutions and political actors (specific support).   
 
This study proposes that because vestiges of democratic norms and practices have been 
present within these countries’ political systems for some time, it is possible that they 
will manifest trends in support similar to much older, more established democracies. 
These global trends indicate that diffuse support for democracy is being maintained while 
specific support for democracy is waning.         
 
A longitudinal quantitative study was conducted, using consecutive waves of World 
Values Survey to operationalize support for democracy in terms of the five 
abovementioned political objects and the results of South Africa and Brazil compared. 
These results show that both case studies could be interpreted as having fairly high levels 
of diffuse support and decreasing levels of specific support for democracy. It is however 
acknowledged that results are not conclusive and further research is required, especially 
with respect to how respondents conceptualize the term ‘democracy’.      
 
OPSOMMING 
 
Brasilië en Suid-Afrika was albei deel van die globale “derde golf” van demokrasie, met 
die aanvang van hulle oorgang na demokrasie onderskeidelik in 1985 en 1994. Ten spyte 
daarvan dat hierdie twee lande voormalig aan dekades van outoritêre gesag onderwerp is, 
het albei, hoewel beperk in stemreg, ’n mate van demokratiese praktyk onder ’n vorige 
bestel ervaar. 
 
Die doel van hierdie studie is om die steunvlakke vir demokrasie in Brasilië en Suid-
Afrika sedert hulle oorgang na demokrasie te ondersoek. Twee soorte politieke steun 
word geïdentifiseer as deurslaggewend vir demokratiese volhoubaarheid: verspreide 
steun – of steun vir die intrinsieke beginsels van demokrasie – en spesifieke steun – steun 
wat van die positiewe evaluering van die regime se instellings en ampsbekleders afhang. 
Hierdie twee soorte politieke steun word deur vyf konsepte voorgestel wat die vyf vlakke 
of voorwerpe van politieke steun volgens die Norris-model dek: die politieke 
gemeenskap, regimebeginsels, regimeprestasie (verspreide steun), regime-instellings en 
politieke akteurs (spesifieke steun). 
 
Hierdie studie stel voor dat, aangesien spore van demokratiese norme en praktyke vir ’n 
geruime tyd binne hierdie lande se politieke stelsels teenwoordig was, dit moontlik is dat 
hulle steuntendense sal toon wat aan baie ouer, meer gevestigde demokrasieë soortgelyk 
is. Hierdie globale tendense toon dat verspreide steun vir demokrasie gehandhaaf word 
terwyl spesifieke steun vir demokrasie aan die kwyn is. 
 
’n Longitudinale kwantitatiewe studie is onderneem wat van opeenvolgende siklusse van 
die “World Values Survey” gebruik maak om steun vir demokrasie in terme van die vyf 
bogenoemde politieke voorwerpe uit te beeld. Die resultate van Suid-Afrika en Brasilië is 
daarna vergelyk. Uit hierdie resultate sou afgelei kon word dat redelik hoë vlakke van 
verspreide steun en dalende vlakke van spesifieke steun vir demokrasie in beide gevalle 
voorkom. Daar word egter erken dat resultate nie beslissend is nie en dat verdere 
navorsing nodig is, in besonder met betrekking tot respondente se begrip van die term 
‘demokrasie’.  
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Chapter One : Introduction and Outline 
______________________________________________________ 
1.1 Introduction 
The third-wave1 of democracy has swept the world (Huntington, 1996). Following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in the East and several authoritarian or military regimes in the 
South, such as those of South Africa and Brazil, the argument for the “End of History” 
(Huntington, 1993:23; Dalton, 2002:235) seems to become ever more robust. The post-
conflict institution of “free and fair” elections, the universally recognized symbol of 
political liberalization, is increasingly seen, not as a means to an end (i.e. the 
establishment of democracy), but simply as an end in itself. Without help in the 
consolidation of democratic political norms, however, this situation can be described as 
what Bratton (2002:14)2 terms: “the fallacy of electoralism, namely the danger that a 
formal façade of multi-party contests will mask a persistent atmosphere of human rights 
violations”. 
 
The misperceptions alluded to above are arguably symptomatic of the way that the West 
has come to see democracy. Consequently this is the way it is propagated to the masses 
of the world, particularly in developing countries. Inherent in this conception of 
democracy are two assumptions. The first is that democracy is assumed to be firmly 
established following the holding of national elections, and the second is that democracy 
promises “a better life for all”3.   
 
The populations of many Third-world countries, engaged in struggles for political 
freedom, are thus often wrongly led by their liberators to believe that democracy and 
elections will be a panacea for all the social evils suffered under an oppressive regime 
                                                 
1 As our study encompasses both an African country and a Latin American country, it must be noted that 
the “Third wave” in fact refers to African democratization, whereas the “Second-wave” took place in Latin 
America. Nevertheless, Brazil’s re-democratization in 1985 is also considered part of the third wave (Fuchs 
& Klingeman, 1995:3; Huntington, 1996).   
2 Bratton (2002:14) also suggests that there is a fallacy of liberalisation, implying that it is possible that 
many citizens of neo-democracies believe that, with the institution of freedom of speech, the battle has 
been won. This mirrors the misperception of many aid organisations that fail to realise that democratisation 
is an ongoing, long-term political process. See below for further discussion.    
3 This is a slogan which the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa has used in all three national 
elections (1994, 1999, 2004) to great effect. 
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(Gasiorowski, 1997:266; Bresser Pereira, 1990:199; Przeworski, 1995:41). It is not 
explained that these are merely tools which will eventually enable the gradual 
improvement of socio-economic circumstances through the institution of a more 
accountable government (Marx, 1998:272). It is thus small wonder that public opinion in 
many newly democratic countries remains sceptical about such political transformation 
(Diamond et al., 1999:41). Compounding the problem is that fact that a democratic 
government, unlike an authoritarian regime, needs the support of the people to maintain 
its legitimacy and is thus more susceptible to “populist demands and critiques” (Emmett, 
2000:510). Political legitimacy is absolutely dependent on popular support4 (Bratton & 
Mattes, 2000b). 
 
 Inglehart (1990:17) also points out that a stable and thus effective democracy does not 
depend on democratic institutions alone. It requires a political culture conducive to 
democracy, implying the socialization of democracy. It is by definition almost impossible 
for fledgling democracies to have a deeply engrained democratic political culture5 
(Bratton & Mattes, 2000b). Should a gulf open between state and society in a country 
with a history of political violence, which according to Emmett (2000:515) is not 
uncommon after elections, those who do not believe that they can rely on the government 
will resort to violence, believing it to be their only recourse (Emmett, 2000:511).   
 
Indeed, quite apart from the masses’ understanding of democracy, political scientists 
themselves have not come far in reaching consensus regarding the definition of 
democracy. It seems that the more research that is done in this regard, the more complex 
the task becomes (Elgström, 2002:1; Parry & Moran, 1994a:10; Inoguchi et al, 1998:1; 
Edwards, 1994:90; Cammack, 1994:176). The only points of agreement are that 
democracy is indeed a multidimensional concept (Norris, 1999a:1; Thomassen, 
                                                 
4 This idea will be developed in Chapter Two, the theoretical framework.   
5 This study will examine two exceptions to this rule. Brazil, which has been under military rule since 1964, 
has always maintained a semblance of democratic practice, however deeply distorted (Lamounier, 
1999:165). Similarly, it has been argued that South Africa never abandoned pluralist politics completely 
(Friedman, 1995:531). This line of argument will be incorporated into our main proposition, see below.      
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1995:349) and that it is a variable6 and a process. Democracies will vary with time along 
a continuum, rendering comparative studies eminently appropriate (Dalton, 1988:127).   
 
Ironically, true democracy can never be achieved (Parry & Moran, 1994a:3; Wokler, 
1994:21; Schmitter, 1998:23). It is merely a political ideal. Embarking upon the process 
of democratization thus introduces a great deal of uncertainty into the political equation. 
This is the case not least because regime change and democratic institutional reform, both 
inherently destabilizing processes, are part of the democratization process (Schmitter, 
1998:29). This is known as the transitional phase; thus the Brazilian abertura7 and the 
South African dismantling of apartheid marked the beginning of democratic transition for 
both of these countries.  
 
Unfortunately, very often the introduction of democratic norms and institutional 
transformation during the transition is not the end of the process. Indeed, Schmitter 
(1998:27) claims that the conditions which render the end of authoritarianism possible are 
not necessarily equally conducive to democracy’s ‘taking hold’. Przeworski (1995:2) 
alludes to the fact that the weakness of the authoritarian centre may give rise to separatist 
movements within multinational states, which include most developing countries. 
Furthermore, democratic transition is a very unstable period that cannot be endured 
indefinitely by the political elite or the masses8. 
 
It is not, however, the democratic transition which gives politicians the biggest headache. 
It is what is known as the consolidation of democracy (Randall & Theobald, 1998:40). 
This is the case because without such consolidation a reversal of the entire democratic 
process commonly occurs (Broderick, 2000:1). Schmitter (1998:24-27) describes 
democratic consolidation as the firm establishment of a set of institutions that engenders 
                                                 
6 The Freedom House rankings can be used to attest this. See www.freedomhouse.org  
7 “Abertura” literally “the opening” in Portuguese, is the term used to refer to the gradual process of 
reforms initiated by the Brazilian military government in 1974 under President Geisel in preparation for re-
democratization. 
8 A manifestation of this social unrest is the significantly increased crime levels observed during the time of 
democratic transition in both South Africa and Brazil (Landman, 2003).  
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trust and reassurance, allowing the uncertainties of democracy to be ‘normalized’9. 
Essentially the processes and principles of democracy must be accepted by both the 
politicians and the masses. Most importantly, it must be agreed that future conflict will be 
resolved within the framework set out by this set of institutions, which Linz & Stepan 
(1998:49-50) describe as “the only game in town”. Of course, there is no set point at 
which this state of consolidation is reached. Even mature democracies are required to 
adapt and change in order to survive (Fuchs & Klingeman, 1995:438). It is, however, 
generally accepted that the longer democratic norms exist, the longer they will persist10 
(Schmitter, 1998:33).           
   
Neo-democracies, or democracies which have only recently undergone transformation, 
are thus arguably much more vulnerable to regime retrogression than those which have 
prevailed for decades. As many countries party to “Third-wave democratization” find 
themselves in this precarious situation, it is argued that democracy in the developing 
world should be explored in more depth in order to understand their vulnerabilities.  Two 
case studies have been selected whose democratic regimes are not more than 15 years 
old. The first is Brazil, whose democratic transition is recognised as beginning in 1985 
(Sansone, 2003:25; Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:471). The second is 
South Africa, whose first democratic elections were held in 1994.  
 
1.2 Two Comparable Countries: South Africa and Brazil    
The choice of these two states for comparison11 is appropriate firstly because remarkable 
similarities are discernable in their political histories. Both countries were under 
extremely oppressive authoritarian regimes for most of the 20th century. Following a term 
of military rule from 1889 to 1894 and the personal dictatorship of General Getulio 
Dornelles Vargas (1930-1954), which preceded ten years of inept civilian rule, a military 
coup once again placed Brazil under military control for over twenty years, from 1964 
                                                 
9 Laïdi (2002:76) describes this process as balancing the uncertainties inherent in procedural democracy 
with the certainties inherent in the institutionalization of democratic behaviour and norms. 
10 Doh & McDonough’s (1999) case study of Korea supports this as, with the passage of time, the 
democratic regime garnered more support. Considering the nature of democracy, an increase in support for 
democracy is assumed to contribute to its continuation. Chapter Two will elaborate on this.        
11 The World Values Survey will be used to enable quantitative comparison. The methodology, both of the 
survey in question and its use in this study, will be described below.     
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until 1985 (Marx, 1998:169-172). South Africa, similarly, was governed by the infamous 
apartheid regime of the National Party from 1948 until the democratic elections of 1994. 
It is also widely recognized that both democratic transitions were elite pacts negotiated 
between the incumbent regime and organized opposition12 (Schmitter, quoted in 
Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:12).  
 
It is acknowledged that the political unrest characteristic of South Africa’s history was 
not present in Brazil13. Nevertheless, the demographic similarities between these two 
countries and the socio-economic problems which they share continue to give their 
respective governments the most cause for concern. Competing with each other for the 
dubious honour of possessing the highest levels of inequality in the world14, socio-
economic standing and class distinctions are similarly superimposed over racial 
categorization in both countries (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:5). 
This is often due to deliberate state policies, although the nature of these policies has 
varied15. 
 
Despite these considerable socio-economic obstacles, South Africa and Brazil remain the 
most influential states in their geographical areas. They are both considered regional 
                                                 
12 Many deny that these transitions can be called pacts, considering the official inequality of status of the 
bargaining partners (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:13). It is argued here that, while 
the opposition may not have possessed officially recognised status equivalent to that of the state 
government, it possessed enough legitimacy through the support of the population to warrant sufficient 
respect from the ruling regime for that regime to concede to negotiation (Gillespie, 1990:54; Friedman, 
1996:48). 
13 Indeed the former’s comparatively bloodless political past is hailed as a national triumph, see Marx, 
1998.      
14 According to the World Development Report (2003), South Africa’s Gini coefficient stood at 0.593 and 
Brazil’s at 0.607. In the same report, it came to light that in the mid- to late 1990s in both Brazil and South 
Africa, 11.5 % of the population survived on $1 a day or less. (See 
http://www.ssc.uwo.ca/economics/grad/626a-001/324_626inequalityoverheadsNov03.pdf)   
15 South Africa legalized racism through apartheid and the imposition of the colour bar. The Brazilian 
government created a state ideology of non-racialism, refusing to recognize race, despite the inherent 
prejudices suffered by blacks. As a result, the constructed social desirability to be white imposed the same 
barriers to social mobility for blacks in Brazil as it did in apartheid South Africa, as the Brazilian state 
afforded blacks no protection and led them to believe that they needed none. (For more in-depth discussion 
see Sansone, 2003). James and Lever (2001:29) dispute the fact that race and class lines converge so neatly 
in either country. While these cleavages have admittedly softened in the post-democratisation period, they 
are still considered to be a grave socio-economic problem.        
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hegemons because of their political importance and economic clout (Business Day, 
10/03/04). 
 
A second reason for the choice of the two countries in question is that both, in terms of 
democracy, have reached a turning point in their political progression. South Africa 
recently celebrated a decade of democracy. This is lauded as a significant achievement in 
view of its non-democratic legacy, as well as a poignant moment for reflection. In the 
same year, 2004, it held its third national democratic elections, signifying the African 
National Congress’s (ANC) third consecutive term in power and President Mbeki’s 
second and final term of office. This notwithstanding, and despite the ANC government’s 
commendable efforts to address delivery of basic services to the most under-privileged 
sectors of South African society, the government has been criticised for its poor service 
delivery record (Cape Times Business Report, 2/03/04; Mail & Guardian, 17-23/10/03). 
Exploring the levels of support for democracy in South Africa after ten years of majority 
rule would thus be highly appropriate. 
 
Brazil, on the other hand, while soon to celebrate 15 years of freedom from direct 
military rule, experienced a remarkable development in the national elections in 2003. 
Luíz Inacío (“Lula”) da Silva of the Partido de Trabalhadores16 (PT) was voted in as 
president, marking the first ever election of a citizen of working-class background to such 
a prominent political position in Brazil. Despite the democratic transition, politics had 
remained the realm of the social elite in Brazil (Mail & Guardian, 9-15/01/04; Roett, 
1999:18, McDonough, 1981).  Given the neo-liberal nature of former president Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s economic reforms, Lula’s election has been seen by many as a public 
reaction to the jobless growth now experienced in Brazil and a call for state policy 
direction to change (Mail & Guardian, 2/03/2004).  Although the absence of the  required 
data17 prevents the study from encompassing the most recent developments in Brazilian 
                                                 
16 The Workers’ or Labour Party. 
17 While Brazil was incorporated into the 1990 and 1995 waves of the World Values Survey, to be used in 
secondary data analysis in this study, it was not included in the most recent (2001) wave, which means that 
analysis cannot extend beyond 1995.   
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politics, evidence of such dramatic developments suggests a need to examine events 
leading up to Lula’s election.  
 
A third reason for a comparative study, from a slightly different angle, is that Brazil and 
South Africa have for a number of years been fostering closer relations with each other. 
Both have as an integral part of their foreign policies the intention of increasing their 
international profiles. They have been heavily engaged in multilateral negotiations, most 
notably as intermediaries for North-South dialogue18 (Business Day, 15/12/03). The latest 
development in this regard has been the controversial alliance between Brazil, South 
Africa and India (IBSA19) (Business Day, 11/11/03). Comparison of two of these 
countries, in terms of democracy, is thus appropriate, considering the prominence their 
international profiles will accord them and the importance placed by the international 
community on democracy. 
 
It is arguable that the incongruity of comparing two countries over disparate time periods, 
albeit using the same survey (World Values Survey) throughout, detracts from the quality 
of the comparison. This argument may be settled by two considerations. Firstly, although 
the time-spans are slightly different, the event marking the beginning of the respective 
periods to be compared is remarkably similar, as has been mentioned above, and the 
actual difference in years is not too great. Secondly, due to the oppressive nature of the 
previous regimes in both countries, these states were systemically ostracized globally 
(Cloete, 1990:29; Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:36; Roett, 1999:123; Hurrell, 199620). 
For this reason and the fact that both regimes were intensely growth orientated, both 
followed policies of import substitution to attain relative autarky (Friedman & De 
Villiers, 1996:263; Fredrickson, 2001:16-21). It can thus be argued that, while it is 
impossible to be completely immune to global phenomena, the relative de-linking that 
occurred prior to democratic transition lessened the impact any such phenomena might 
                                                 
18 An example here is the WTO Cancun rounds, Brazil’s support and leadership of the developing countries 
and South Africa’s rhetoric (Business Day, 31/03/04).  
19 The IBSA partnership’s anagram literally stands for India, Brazil and South Africa  
20 Hurrell (1996) in fact makes a strong case for the fact that Brazil experienced remarkably little foreign 
interference in her domestic politics, despite her geographic proximity to the United States of America.  
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have had21. In any event, the nature of the global system is to affect similarly those states 
grouped together collectively as “the developing world”22.   
 
A further potential criticism of this study would question the claim that a “decade of 
democracy” is going to be analysed. South Africa has barely experienced ten years of 
democratic rule, ruling out the possibility of analysis of this period on the basis of the 
World Values Survey, as this survey has not to date covered ten years of South African 
democratic rule in its survey waves. On the other hand, Brazil, having undergone 
abertura in 1985, is well on its way to a second decade of democratic government. 
Several arguments are offered to qualify claims made by this study.  
 
Despite the formal recognition of democratic transition in a given year, it is widely 
accepted that democracy is a process, and by virtue of this it is itself a variable (Kaase & 
Newton, 1995:127). With this as a point of departure, many South African analysts 
regard 1990 as the beginning of democratic transition, with the release of Nelson 
Mandela and many other prominent political prisoners in February of that year and the 
capitulation of the apartheid government that this act implied (Cloete, 1990:29; 
Schlemmer, 1991:2; Rhoodie, 1991:510). The spirit of the four years leading up to the 
1994 elections was one of compromise and willingness to negotiate. The fact that bitter 
political enemies were able to come to an agreement on South Africa’s future over the 
negotiating table undermines the accusation that South African society was starkly 
polarised (Friedman, 1995:547). The attitudes of the South African mass public that were 
measured by the 1995 and 2001 World Value Survey waves have thus been influenced by 
the inevitability of impending universal franchise and majority democracy since 1990. 
Furthermore, following the 1994 elections for the government of national unity and the 
second of national elections in 1999, these survey waves (1995 and 2001) were neatly 
able to record two sets of attitudes towards democratic support which had had 
approximately one year of incubation each.     
                                                 
21 Whitehead (1996:408) also offers the interesting argument that ostracizing of a state leads to the 
perpetuation of the behaviour which led to the pariah status in the first place. 
22 This was still certainly so in the build up to the collapse of the Soviet Union as both the USSR and USA 
wished to expand their ‘spheres of influence’. In latter days, however, foreign investors tend literally to 
treat emerging markets, regardless of geo-strategic position as a single bloc.      
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 Brazil, in contradistinction, has arguably not experienced open democracy for as long as 
officially claimed, although this would not appear to be the case. Indeed, motions for 
democratic reform were initiated under President Erneste Geisel in the mid-1970s 
(Lamounier, 1999:133). As in the South African case, the transition was essentially an 
elite pact, hammered out between two parties formed under new legislation: the Partido 
do Movimento Democrático Brásileiro23 (PMDB) under Ulysses Guimarães, and the 
Partido Democrático Social24 (PDS), the party of the military government. Some 
commentators, such as Roett (1999), would thus argue that this was merely a 
continuation of the patrimonial politics so characteristic of Brazil. The death of Tancredo 
Neves of the PMDB, the president-elect on the eve of his inauguration, was nevertheless 
a terrible blow to the Brazilian democratic process and it very nearly unravelled 
completely25. The fact that José Sarney, the government party’s successful candidate for 
deputy-president elect, had to be sworn in subsequently as the chief executive officer, 
despite the fact that the deputy president is elected on a separated ticket, and had to 
switch party loyalty, did not sit well with either party. Neither trusted or respected him, 
and democratic reform was effectively halted (Martinez-Lara, 1996:51-52).  
 
To further cast doubt on the authenticity of Brazil’s democratic transition, which was 
supposed to have occurred as early as 1985, is the fact that universal franchise as it is 
recognised today was extended to the Brazilian population only in 1988/9, during the 
gubernatorial elections of that year26. Whereas all literate people were obligated to vote, 
illiterates were for the first time given the option of doing so27.  According to Lamounier 
                                                 
23 Peviously  Moviemento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB).  
24 Previously  Alliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA). 
25 Neves’s death would arguably have been tantamount to Nelson Mandela’s death on the eve of the 1994 
presidential inauguration. Martinez-Lara (1996:49) particularly emphasizes the importance not only of 
Neves’s personal leadership and moderate stance for internal balance within  the newly formed 
government, but also of the fact that he had concluded many secret conciliatory deals with prominent 
government party members to ease the transition, all of which were of course unknown and thus  not 
honoured by his successor.       
26 Roett (1999:26) maintains that this move on the part of the still authoritarian government was not 
undertaken in good faith as no voter education was provided, thus the electoral process was flooded with 
millions of uninformed, easily influenced potential voters.   
27 Brazil was the last country in South America to remove the literacy prerequisite from voting franchise 
(Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:30). 
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(quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:31), only 22% of the Brazilian population was 
literate in 1985, thus seriously undermining the legitimacy of this “democratic” election. 
In an ironic comparison, a higher percentage of the South African population was able to 
vote during the era of P.W. Botha’s much scorned tri-cameral parliament system28, 
instituted in 1983. From this it is concluded here that the first fully democratic 
presidential elections in Brazil were held in 1990, leading to the election of PMDB’s 
candidate Fernando Collor de Mello29 as president. Thus, for the purposes of this study, 
Brazil has also arguably experienced little more than a decade of ‘true’ democracy. 
 
1.3 Theoretical Background: An Introduction 
It has been argued by many that the performance of the government of the day, especially 
in terms of the economy, influences support for the regime, regardless of its type (Ember 
et al., 1997:110; Inglehart, 1990:253; Muller, 1997:133). This would perhaps be 
especially so in terms of developing countries. South Africa and Brazil both have high 
unemployment rates (30%-40% and 13%-29% respectively) (Landman, 2003:48) and at 
least roughly 40% the population of each country is considered to be living in absolute 
poverty (Friedman & De Villiers, 1996: 314, 328). This being the case, for the majority 
of the population material welfare is of primary importance and they are dependent on 
state welfare policies and policies of socio-economic amelioration. Thus views on the 
performance of the current government, if it is democratic, will influence perceptions of 
and support for democracy, just as failure by the democratic regime to provide materially 
for the masses will erode their confidence in democracy30 (Muller, 1997;136; Broderick, 
2000:21).  
 
 Yet it has been established that the above is too simplistic a view of support for 
democracy in any country, regardless of the need for socio-economic amelioration 
                                                 
28 In 1984 in South Africa whites = 13%, coloureds= 9% and Asians= 3%, totalling 25% of the total 
population (Friedman, 1995:531).      
29 While many conclude that the subsequent impeachment of Collor de Mello points to Brazil’s democratic 
development in its ability to procedurally oust a prominent political figure, others cynically point out that 
Collor de Mello’s fate was the result of the fact that he didn’t “play by the rules”. For further discussion, 
see Roett (1999).   
30 This is especially relevant in terms of South Africa, according to Bratton and Mattes (2000b). The thesis 
will return to this point in order to compare the findings of this study to those of the Afrobarometer.  
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(Norris, 1999a). It has generally been established that democratic support is a 
multidimensional concept, manifested in terms of both diffuse and specific support 
spread among three levels of political association (Easton, 1965). This theory has 
subsequently been expanded to incorporate five levels (Norris, 1999a; Dalton, 2002), 
which will be explored and applied below.  Briefly, although this latter theory has been 
applied more often to advanced Western democracies than to the newer democracies 
(Dalton, 1988, 2002), it is argued that the support for general principles upheld by a 
democratic regime (‘democracy in principle’), known as ‘diffuse support’ differs from 
support for the democratic regime’s institutions and incumbents (‘democracy in practice’) 
known as ‘specific support’31 (Norris, 1999a:10-13; Doh & McDonough, 1999). Both 
are, however, important components of democratic support. As such, different aspects of 
political life in both case studies will have to be considered in order to explore and 
understand fully the nature of democratic support in each of the two case studies. 
 
In terms of diffuse support for democracy and the enculturation of the abstract principles 
of democracy in each society, aspects such as political culture and national unity will 
have to be examined. Although the quality of investigation is limited to questions in the 
World Values Survey, many such studies have been conducted using this particular 
source of secondary data. Indeed, some question batteries were specifically structured to 
measure these concepts and successfully used in various studies32. 
 
1.4 The Purpose of this Study and Possible Research Questions            
The problem statement hinges on the assumption that support for democracy will 
contribute to the perpetuation of democratic norms and thus to democratic consolidation. 
While there is admittedly an ontological problem here, as many would argue that 
democratic consolidation itself leads to support for democracy, suggesting a circular 
relationship, it is sufficient for our study to be able to assume a positive relationship 
between support for democracy and democratic consolidation. Mass support, after all, is 
crucial to lend legitimacy to democratic actors, without which they must theoretically 
                                                 
31 For a more complete definition and conceptualization of these two critical terms, see Chapter Two.    
32 See Kaase and Newton (1995), and Klingeman and Fuchs (1995).  
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step down. As Broderick (2000:17) states: “… political leaders may be vital in the 
transition stage, but it is ultimately the masses that determine consolidation”33. The 
purpose of this study is therefore an investigation of the levels of support for democracy 
over the last decade in two developing countries which have recently experienced a 
democratic transition and are thus in the process of democratic consolidation, namely 
South Africa and Brazil.  
 
With the political legacy and socio-economic consequences of both Brazil and South 
Africa in mind, there are various aspects that must be examined and several questions 
that must be posed in order to establish an appropriate research strategy for unpacking the 
nature of democratic support for South Africa and Brazil over the past decade.  
 
The changing of the socio-economic and of the political environment of both countries is 
an important aspect to consider in a study of this nature. While the latter has changed 
dramatically, the former has arguably changed little at all, if it has not in fact worsened 
considerably (Landman, 2003). Inextricably linked to both is the issue of race relations 
and the history of racism in both countries. While racism is a delicate issue, often 
difficult to analyze in terms of quantitative data, its influence in the context of this study 
cannot be denied. This is above all because of the racialization of both countries’ socio-
economic strata and the resulting influence this phenomenon has on opinions about the 
government and institutional performance. While this study has not made race and race 
relations a primary focus, their implications will be suggested and explored through 
describing the historical context of this study. This will be especially relevant in terms of 
the demographics of democratic support. 
 
Nevertheless, as has been suggested above, support for the government and confidence in 
the institutions of democratic government are based on perceptions of government 
success. In the case of new democracies, this is perhaps even more so, because the onus 
is on the new democratic regime to prove that democracy is beneficial, as democratic 
                                                 
33 This is especially relevant in the case of South Africa and Brazil as both democratic transitions were elite 
negotiated pacts. (For further discussion see Broderick [2000]). 
 12
principles have neither yet proven their worth nor had enough time to be firmly 
embedded within the newly transformed political culture34. 
 
Following this, it will be important to compare perceptions of the ‘old’ versus the ‘new’ 
in terms of pre-and post-transitional regimes35. Coupled with this is the need to 
consequently explore the mass public’s trust in both the government and the institutions 
of government which render its functioning democratic36.     
 
Pertinent to each of the aspects considered above is a set of research questions posed 
which will lead to propositions to be explored within the context of this study.  
 
In terms of support for democracy itself:  
• How has this changed in the past decade under study? What are the visible trends?  
• How do the trends in diffuse support for democracy and specific support for 
democracy differ, and what are the implications and consequences of this? 
 
As regards demographics37, in terms of both case studies: 
• What is the relationship between the level of education among respondents and 
support for democracy?  
• What is the relationship between race and level of support for democracy?  
• What is the relationship between income and support for democracy?  
• How have the above trends changed over time?  
 
                                                 
34 Doh & McDonough (1999) in their study of democratic support in the Republic of Korea found that 
democratic support increased gradually only as Koreans had favourable experiences with the new regime 
change. 
35 This has been an important aspect of the study of new democracies (Doh & McDonough, 1999; 
Broderick, 2000)   
36 Both these aspects relate to respective levels of democratic support, which will be explained in more 
detail in Chapter Two in the discussion of the theoretical framework used as a point of departure in this 
study.  
37 So-called social background variables (age, income, education and gender), these have been found to be 
associated with variations in political attitudes (Norris, 1999b:226). For a discussion on how they are seen 
to influence political values in part, see Bratton & Mattes (2003). See also further clarification in Chapter 
Three of this study.  
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Neither the data nor the statistical procedures necessary to establish conclusive evidence 
regarding causal relationships between these variables are present. For the purposes of 
this study it will be considered sufficient to establish the direction of the relationship (if 
any) and to provide possible explanations in terms of historical and political context. This 
will be an attempt to arrive at a basic understanding of these trends and will hopefully 
supply a springboard for further research in this direction. 
 
From the proliferation of studies on support for democracy in Western publics (Dalton, 
1988; Kaase & Newton, 1995; Fuchs & Klingeman, 1995; Inoguchi et al, 1998; Norris, 
1999c) following the claims that democracy was facing a ‘crisis’ (Dalton, 1988; 
Huntingdon, 1993), it has been established that, while support for incumbent 
governments and specific leaders has waned, as a consequence of the rise of the so-called 
“critical citizen”, levels of diffuse support have remained fairly constant (Norris, 1999a; 
Inglehart, 1999:236)38. Less certain, however, are the trends of democratic support in 
developing countries. To direct this study, a proposition has been formulated. 
 
In terms of the two case studies one might be tempted to assume that because the 
democratic transitions are relatively recent, democratic norms have not yet permeated the 
national political culture. Nevertheless, following an examination of the political histories 
of these two countries, the contention here is that the opposite is in fact true39. It is thus 
proposed that, despite their status as developing countries, both South Africa and Brazil 
will show the same trends as manifested by Western publics in terms of diffuse and 
specific support.    
 
1.5 Research Design 
Taking the similarities of their political legacies into account, a “most similar case”40 
approach has thus been used in comparing the two cases studies, South Africa and Brazil. 
                                                 
38 See Chapter Two, theoretical framework.  
39 See Chapter Two, historical perspective. 
40 While this is logically the most appropriate choice of technique for this study, controversy surrounds this 
approach and it is acknowledged that the approach is not without its problems. Landman (2000:52) 
summarizes these succinctly. Furthermore, Hyden (2002a:139) emphasizes that a qualitative approach must 
be combined with statistical analysis for this technique to be correctly applied. This will be discussed 
further in Chapter Three.    
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This is an attempt to facilitate comparison and to eliminate the influence of several 
antecedent variables such as the nature of the previous regime, socio-economic 
inequalities and race relations. Edwards (1994) discusses the problems that arise in an 
attempt to investigate the phenomenon of democracy generally, i.e. cross-nationally. The 
“most similar case” method, while far from perfect, is the most widely used method to 
attempt to control as many external variables as possible in order to render cross-national 
comparison as valid as possible.   
 
This study’s source of data is the World Values Survey, a large-scale co-operative project 
co-ordinated by Ronald Inglehart41. The South African survey was conducted by 
Markinor and the Brazilian survey by the Gallup Institute42. The field work for the 
respective waves used in this study was conducted in October 1991-January 1992 
(n=1782) and in October 1995 (n=1149) in Brazil. It was conducted October 1995 
(n=2935) and March-May 2001 in South Africa (n=3000). Probability sampling was 
used, in that all respondents of the age of 16 years and above theoretically had an equal 
chance of being selected to participate in the survey. The sample was stratified, meaning 
that respondents were drawn from constructed homogenous subsets of the population.  
 
Two sets of the World Values Survey43 will be used in each case to quantify the change 
through time of our identified independent variable, popular attitudes and political 
participation in terms of support for democracy. In the Brazilian case the 1990 and 1995 
sets are used and in the South African case the 1995 and 2001 sets are used. The choice 
of sets is obvious in terms of the chronological relationship with the official beginnings 
of democratic transition in each case (1985 in terms of Brazil and 1994 in terms of South 
Africa). The sets are thus the next two surveys waves held immediately after these 
political watersheds. 
 
                                                 
41 The actual number of countries surveyed in each WVS wave has varied: 1990 (n=43), 1995 (n=39), 2001 
(n=25).   
42 Instituto Gallup de Opinião Publica (Sao Paulo).  
43 A more in-depth description of the World Values Survey will be given in Chapter Two under research 
design.   
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While there are many advantages to using this data source for secondary data analysis, 
several disadvantages are inherent in its use. Despite its use allowing access to a wealth 
of data on a national level, the fact that the questions were not designed with this specific 
study in mind at times poses methodological challenges in terms of operationalization. 
Necessary concessions to the sponsors of the survey, in terms of the questions included in 
the questionnaire, also dictate the scope of available indicators (Klingeman, 1999:35).  
Similarly, while the nature of the World Values Survey allows trends in support for the 
various levels of democracy to be examined longitudinally, the separate survey waves at 
times differ slightly. In this case, while the 1995 and 2000 waves are very similar, the 
1990 wave differs markedly, increasing the limitations imposed on the study by the data 
source. Nevertheless, these problems are not insurmountable and merely call for more 
flexibility on the part of the researcher and encourage caution in terms of the conclusions 
drawn.         
 
Support for democracy, the independent44 variable under examination will be 
conceptualized and operationalized according to Easton’s (1965) and Norris’s (1999a) 
theoretical framework outlined briefly above45. In some cases indexes have been 
constructed, as the variable measured is deemed composite in nature. The indicators will 
be computed in a principal components analysis to check for the validity of their use in 
measuring the concepts outlined above46. Aside from measuring the frequency of these 
variables across both countries, the indicators will be cross-tabulated with demographic 
variables in an attempt to provide a description of democratic support in both countries. 
The results will be analysed and, in the light of the findings, suggestions for further 
research will be provided.      
 
 
                                                 
44 As this study is not concerned with causal relationships, in the present context support for democracy 
will be considered an independent variable. 
45 This theoretical framework is described in more detail in Chapter Two.   
46 This will determine whether respondents do indeed distinguish between the various levels of democratic 
support in their response patterns. The value of this study is thus increased as cognitive differentiation 
between these levels, which shows that the public does distinguish the incumbents from the regime, bodes 
well for the sustainability of democracy. The masses will not thus blame democracy itself for the present 
authorities’ shortcomings. This will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Two.      
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1.6 Rationale: The Significance of this Study  
The ubiquitous response to the above carefully laid out proposal is, of course, simply 
“Why?” What does it matter? In fact, there are several factors contributing the 
significance of this study.  
 
As with any research on the developing world, the most obvious rationale for it is that it 
has not yet been done. While research on the development of Western democracies and 
inherent trends is prolific, there is a paucity of research on support for democracy as 
manifested in the developing world. It could be argued that this is due to democracy’s 
fairly recent development in these parts of the world, as well as to their often intransient 
nature, or merely to the Eurocentrism prevalent in social sciences for the better part of 
this century. Whatever the case may be, research in this regard remains important, 
especially so as democracy is only in the first stages of consolidation.  
 
Choosing South Africa and Brazil as case studies in order to explore the development of 
democracy in the developing world allows the “most similar cases”47 approach to be 
utilized. This means that more emphasis can be laid on exploring the trends in democratic 
support in developing countries, as the potential influence of many variables that occur in 
both case studies can be more or less eliminated. As mentioned above, both are high-
middle-income countries displaying marked similarities demographically, socio-
economically and geo-politically. Both countries are among those with the highest levels 
of inequality globally. They are both large states, geographically and in the context of 
regional politics, they were both under very oppressive and authoritarian regimes, and 
both have recently democratised through an elite pact.  
 
Furthermore, South Africa and Brazil have come to extremely interesting junctures in 
their paths of democratic development, suggesting further advantages in the specific 
comparison of these two states as case studies.  
                                                 
47 As mentioned previously, this technique is often used in comparative politics and involves selecting case 
studies with a large number of shared characteristics in order to control for the influence these may have on 
the proposed aspect of study. It is reasoned that, as each characteristic is present in both cases, any 
influence each may wield is ‘cancelled’ out (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:257).     
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 Particularly timeously for this study, South Africa has recently (2004) celebrated 10 years 
of democracy. While the last couple of years are not covered by the WVS data, with the 
most recent wave used for South Africa being the one conducted in 2001, it seems fitting 
to assess support for democracy in South Africa in the spirit of reassessment and re-
evaluation of ‘democracy in practice’ currently sweeping this country. Brazil, on the 
other hand, recently (2003) elected the first president in its history to come from a 
working-class background (Luiz Inacio da Silva). This is a dramatic departure from the 
patrimonial and elitist politics which remain a part of Brazil’s political dispensation, 
despite democratic transition (Roett, 1999:17). As in the South African case, the absence 
of data prevents statistical analysis of the years immediately preceding this event, but 
such a radical break with political precedent suggests a need to examine the years leading 
up to this change. Lula’s election was, incidentally, preceded by President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s double term, which, according to Norris’s theorizing (1999:12), 
implies a decline in specific support on the part of the Brazilian voter and the 
manifestation of their right to “throw the rascals out”.      
 
It is even more important to consider the contribution this study could make towards 
studying the actual consolidation of democracy in developing countries, perhaps possible 
only now because the ‘third-wave’ of democracy is such a recent phenomenon.  
 
In many developing regions, especially Latin America, democracy’s regimes have 
already shown a decline in support (Norris, 1999a:18; Latinbarometro, 2001). On the 
assumption that it is the goal of democratic countries to consolidate48 their democratic 
regimes, the tracking of democratic support and a descriptive analysis of its support base 
will open up research avenues for assessing the progress of democratic consolidation thus 
far. Should levels of democratic support prove to be low, this investigation raises 
questions about the political legitimacy of the current regime. It is thus important to 
                                                 
48 As previously mentioned, it is considered impossible to make a country’s political system ‘fully 
democratic’ (Landman, 2003:58). Consolidation implies the institutionalization of democratic norms within 
the political structure (Parry & Moran, 1994a:3;11).  
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establish and explore the trends in political support of democratic countries in an attempt 
to understand possible consequences and their implications.  
 
Furthermore, regardless of the length of time that a regime’s democracy has been 
established, further studies of even the much-analysed Western democracies are now 
necessary, given the recent global trends in democratic consolidation. This only 
emphasises the importance of promoting research in developing countries, as what is 
known about them in terms of democratic regime trends is still so limited. Norris 
(1999a:7) has emphasised this: 
“The twentieth century has therefore experienced periodic cycles of hope and 
fear about the state of popular support for democratic government. We need 
to re-examine this issue because understanding trends has important 
implications for explaining the causes of this phenomenon”.  
 
1.7 Outline of the Study   
Our point of departure has been set out above, introducing the study by way of a brief 
contextualisation and the variables we shall be principally concerned with. Chapter Two 
will expand on the theoretical frameworks used as a point of departure for this study, as 
well as drawing on prior research on support for democracy. The conceptualization of the 
most important concepts to be used in this study will also be dealt with. In order to fully 
understand the nature of both the state and society in our two case studies, further 
contextualisation is required. Chapter Two will therefore also provide a historical 
perspective, pointing out similarities between the two case studies. Chapter Three will 
operationalize the key variables identified in the previous chapter. This chapter will in 
addition explore the various research techniques available for a study of this nature, 
considering their advantages and limitations, and focusing on secondary data49 analysis. 
It will also explain the use of the variables selected from the World Values Survey. A 
description of the World Values Survey series in question will also be provided and the 
                                                 
49 Secondary data greatly simplify the procedure of acquiring raw data to use as the survey data have 
already captured and are ready to be analyzed. Its use is nevertheless limiting in that often the means for 
operationalizing and measuring the specific variables of one’s own study are not included in the survey 
framework. This forces one to improvise using data that capture only an approximation of what was 
originally intended to be measured (Neuman, 2000:305). This will be explained further in Chapter Two.      
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methodology of this study explained. Chapter Four will present the data analysis of this 
study. As the World Values Survey is quantitative in nature, this chapter will contain 
graphic representations of the results found and descriptions of the processes used50.  
 
Chapter Five provides an analysis and interpretation of the data, exploring similarities as 
well as disparities, and placing these within a historical, political and socio-economic 
context. It also offers conclusions based on the analysis of the data and considers the 
implications of the findings. While an extension of the application of these conclusions to 
all democratic developing countries would be implausible, the similar position held by 
both South Africa and Brazil as regional hegemons within the so-called Third World 
suggests that the implications of the findings of this study could be far reaching. This is 
especially so in the context of the most recent political developments in both countries 
and their consequent impact on state policy and the role of the state in the eyes of the 
population. On the basis of the conclusions reached, avenues for further research will be 
suggested.                    
 
1.8 Conclusion 
 This study thus proposes to explore the progress of possible democratic consolidation in 
developing countries through the analysis of the case studies of South Africa and Brazil. 
These two countries have been carefully chosen for the inherent similarities between the 
two cases politically and socio-economically and for the similar time-frame during which 
they experienced democratic transition. What is intriguing is that their respective 
historical legacies suggest that, despite having been under authoritarian rule for many 
decades, vestiges of democratic norms and institutions remained a part of their political 
make-up.  
 
In measuring and comparing the level of support for democracy in Brazil and South 
Africa, it is proposed that the presence of these democratic norms, however slight, may 
have sufficiently permeated the political culture of South Africa and Brazil to affect 
positively the levels of support for democracy. Thus, despite democracy having been 
                                                 
50 These will include frequencies, cross-tabulations and index constructions. 
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established for barely a decade in South Africa and Brazil, it is suggested that levels of 
support for democracy in the two case studies may be remarkably similar to those of 
Western publics. 
 
Any study proposing to use quantitative secondary data analysis requires a solid 
theoretical foundation as well as historical insight. These aspects are addressed in the 
following chapter.    
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Historical Perspective 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Following the outline of this study in Chapter One, this chapter provides, firstly, the 
theoretical basis from which the study proceeds. The key theoretical constructs, such as 
democracy, political culture, political support and the various levels of political objects of 
support1, will be described and conceptualised. This is in order to explain the complex 
interrelationships between these conceptual constructs and how they fit into the research 
design of this study. Secondly, a brief political history of both the case studies will be 
provided in order to allow contextualization of the data which will be analysed in Chapter 
Four. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical point of departure used in this study is that initially developed by Easton2 
(1965) and later expanded by Norris (1999a). Easton, in the spirit of behaviouralism, 
endeavoured to deconstruct the political system, and look at it as a scientific process 
consisting of inputs, outputs and feedback loops3. He described support for the political 
system as “the major summary variable in linking a system to its environment” (Easton, 
1965:154). Easton identified two types of support, diffuse and specific, applicable to 
three object levels he attributed to the political system, namely the political community, 
the regime and the political authorities. Easton (1965:60) maintained that it was 
necessary for each object level to sustain a critical minimum level of support from the 
most significant and influential sectors of society4 in order to prevent the collapse of the 
current political system.  
                                                 
1 These, according to the model used in this study, are the political community, regime principles, regime 
performance, regime institutions and political actors (Norris, 1999a; Easton, 1965). 
2 Easton (1965) has made many contributions towards explaining the political system. But he is not without 
his critics (Kaase & Newton, 1995; Klingeman & Fuchs, 1995). Nevertheless, his work on political support 
must be acknowledged as having pioneered research in this particular field.  
3 For a fuller description, see Easton (1965). 
4 This definition would seem to imply that only elite support is important, whereas it is mass opinion that is 
being measured in this study. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the democratic regime depends on a majority 
of mass support (Kaase & Newton, 1995:60; Broderick, 2000:18). Consequently, in the case of democracy, 
it could be argued that mass support is critical in the case of democracy, thus warranting the investigation 
undertaken by this study.  
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 As this study is limited to the exploration of democratic political systems, “political 
support” would seem to imply “democratic political support” 5 . Nevertheless, it is 
arguable that this distinction cannot be made so early in the analysis for a number of 
reasons outlined below, especially when examining political support in the context of this 
study.  
 
2.1.1 Political Support 
Firstly, in referring to “political support” Easton (1965) and Norris (1999a) are 
considering support for the actual political system and its norms in use in any given 
country, whereas democratic political support measures support for democracy per se. 
The problem arises in the event of the rise of several so-called democracies whose 
procedures do not conform to democratic norms. O’Donnell (1996:50) uses the term 
particularism to distinguish this distortion of the universally accepted democratic norms. 
Consequently, political support can arguably only be termed democratic political support 
once the regime has been classified as democratic. Essentially, it is arguably the masses’ 
conceptualization of democracy which will ascertain whether the regime is democratic or 
not, because should the regime be truly democratic, it is their support on which it depends 
for consolidation through legitimization (Diamond, 1994:48; Edwards, 1994:98; Bratton 
& Mattes, 2000b:1). This immediately raises methodological problems, as gauging the 
masses’ definition of democracy is a complex task, let alone trying to do so with 
secondary data which have not been specifically designed to address this delicate issue6 
(Bratton & Mattes, 2000b; 2003).  
 
It is, nevertheless, believed that despite the controversy surrounding the debate, the term 
democracy has at least entered into the vocabulary of Africans and is understood in terms 
                                                 
5 While this is perhaps implicit in Norris’s (1999) work, the distinction is not made as clearly in Easton 
(1965). It is recognised that Easton’s model could in some cases be applied to authoritarian systems  
(Easton, 1965:58).  
6 The limitations of secondary data usage are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.  
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of “the standard liberal ideas of civil and political rights”7 (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:4. 
See also Ake, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2000a:2). According to research done by the 
Latinobarometro, the same is true of South Americans8 (Lagos, 2000:167). This at least 
allows this study a measure of validity in the understanding that the comparison of the 
two countries’ support for democracy is not based on dramatically different definitions of 
the term.  
    
It is the purpose of this study to measure support levels for democracy in the two stated 
case studies. In order to do so, it must be pointed out that the assumption has been made 
that these countries are in fact democratic. This could pose a problem, however, as 
although both have experienced recent democratic transitions and have constitutions 
based upon the tenets of democracy, the fact that they are indeed democracies does not 
necessarily follow. The literature does recognize that both South Africa and Brazil are 
democracies: what it disputes is that they are in fact consolidated democracies, which 
raises an entirely new debate (Schmitter, 1996b, 1998; Friedman, 1995:541; Hillard & 
Notshulwana, 2001; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Lowenthal, 1997:61; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 
1998; Giliomee & Simkins, 1994).  Be that as it may, while it is recognised that political 
support and democratic political support are not the same, both South Africa and Brazil 
are considered democracies (albeit unconsolidated democracies) here. Political support 
for their regimes thus implies democratic political support.    
 
Before elaborating on the different types of political support as theoretically defined by 
Easton’s (1965) and Norris’s (1999a) model, it is first necessary to explore political 
support per se within the political system and the role it plays in this context.  
 
                                                 
7 According to research conducted by the Afrobarometer, Africans can at least recognise and identify a 
democratic country if not actually volunteer a meaningful definition of the term ‘democracy’ (Bratton & 
Mattes,2000b:4; 2000a:2).   
8 According to the 2001 Latinobarometro, however, 56% of Brazilians surveyed did not or could not 
supply a meaning for democracy, the highest rate of ‘don’t know’ responses in Latin America. While this is 
worrying, meanings volunteered through both open and closed questions included ‘freedom of expression’, 
‘regular, clean and transparent elections’, ‘an economy that ensures a decent income’ and ‘equality and 
justice’ (Lagos, 2003). See also www.latinobarometro.org    
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This study proposes to use attitudinal measures9, through survey research, to gauge levels 
of political support for the political systems of both case studies, ostensibly democracies. 
While this study only purports to observe support through respondents’ attitudes, others 
claim there is an established link between political attitudes and political support. Indeed, 
while manifested attitudes do not necessarily lead to political action, Kaase and Newton 
(1995:36) emphasize the importance of mass attitudes in terms of democracy. Dalton 
(1988:177) also points out that in Western publics recent trends show that social 
characteristics and agents of socialization 10  are much less influential in terms of 
explaining voting patterns. It is in fact the attitude of the individual regarding certain 
issues which has become more important. This ties in with Inglehart’s (1990) hypotheses 
regarding the cognitive mobilization of the mass publics leading to a weakening of 
traditional political ties (to social class and political parties) and growing scepticism 
about the state (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995). While it is evident that neither of the case 
studies falls under the title of “Western public”, these emerging trends demonstrate the 
growing importance of attitudes within the political context.  
 
Political attitudes, and consequently, political support are even more relevant when 
applied to the democratic system. According to Kaase & Newton (1995:60), trust, 
support, confidence and legitimacy are all closely related. This is especially so in terms of 
a democratic system, whereby the political support of the people is by definition 
mandatory for the legitimacy of the regime. Thus, without political support the incumbent 
regime loses the legal right to govern (Broderick, 2000:18; Dasgupta & Maskin, 1999:69; 
Saward, 1994:15; Kaase & Newton, 1995). Diamond’s (1996:119) description of 
democracy as the process whereby citizens assert themselves (through voting) but submit 
to the government emphasizes the idea that these citizens support the political process 
they are buying into by participating in it11.  
                                                 
9 See Chapter Three.  
10 These include the church, the family etc. It must be noted that such elements as the church and family 
values still play a large socialization role in both South Africa and Brazil (Hurrell,1996:153; 
Friedman,1995:540.)  
11 It is here that the ability of the citizen to distinguish between the political incumbents (specific support) 
and the political system itself (diffuse support) becomes relevant, so that a lack of the former does not 
affect the latter in the medium to short term (Kaase & Newton, 1995:75). This will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
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 Mass political support is therefore essential in theory to a democratic regime’s legitimacy. 
Before clarifying the various types of political support that have been identified, however, 
it is necessary here to make some mention of what is known as political culture.    
 
Diamond (1994:48) describes political culture as: 
“…a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments and 
evaluations about the political system of its country and the role of the self in 
that system.”  
 
This is taken from Almond and Verba’s (1980:26) original definition of political culture: 
“…as consisting of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations to 
political phenomena, distributed in national populations or subgroups….” 
 
Thus, in order for political support for the regime to be garnered, it is logical that the 
political culture must support the same principles as those upheld by the regime 
(Przeworski, 1995:42). This is what Easton (1965:159) terms “covert support” 12 . 
Broderick, 2000:58) describes political culture as comprised of “subjective orientation” 
(values and beliefs) and “objective phenomena” (behavioural patterns established through 
historical experience). Of course, in many countries, especially those which have 
experienced a transition from largely non-democratic regimes, such as South Africa and 
Brazil13, a political culture conducive to democracy does not often readily come into 
being and must be engineered or rooted through practice in a process of habituation 
(Hadenius, 2002:71). This is known also as institutionalization, as it involves the 
strengthening of democratic institutions within that country (O’Donnell, 1996:42-43). 
Hillard et al. (2001:151) emphasize the need for neo-democracies to develop a 
democratic political culture by reinforcing the fact that democracy is a way of life, not 
                                                 
12 This is support in terms of attitudes, once again emphasizing the link between attitudes and political 
support.   
13 It has already been suggested in this thesis that democratic political norms were not completely absent 
from the political cultures of Brazil and South Africa, but it must be acknowledged that their regimes 
before the democratic transition were authoritarian. 
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merely a set of political institutions14. South Africa, however, is a case in point that 
political culture “is not destiny” (Diamond et al., 1995:21). Despite having emerged from 
an inflexible, intolerant political culture from the apartheid years as well as a legacy of 
violent protest, South Africa is developing a culture of concession and compromise, with 
the political elite having set the precedent in the 1994 pacted transition (Shaw, 2001:18-
19, Higley & Gunther, 1992:24, Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1995:14).    
 
It is contended here that, despite appearances, both South Africa and Brazil do possess a 
political culture to which democratic values are not alien. Throughout the period of 
authoritarian rule both retained some vestiges of democratic institutions, such as limited 
elections and qualified franchise15 (Lamounier, 1999:132-133; Martinez-Lara, 1996:15; 
Friedman, 1995:541).  
 
The necessity of political culture lies in its ability to aid in consolidating a regime. In this 
case the development of a democratic political culture will lead to the further 
consolidation of a democratic regime16. To paraphrase Weffert (1994:44), one cannot 
have democracy without democratically minded people, and without them, one cannot 
have a consolidated democracy. Similarly: “…elections do not create a culture of 
democracy if there is no general will for reconciliation or for an emerging civic 
competence which transcends past enmities”17 (Inoguchi et al., 1998:16). Thus the norms 
and values of the people must be able to support the political institutions in place.  
 
                                                 
14 Ake (1996:65) disputes the widely held Western view that democracy is incompatible with African 
political culture, thought to be authoritarian by nature. He contends that this perception confuses 
democratic institutions with democratic principles, the latter of which are implicit in traditional African 
political culture. Similarly, Diamond (1999:38) disputes the view that the Latin American political culture, 
held to be absolutist, elitist, hierarchical and authoritarian is not comparable with a democratic political 
culture. He suggests that it is often the political system which can create the political culture, thus allowing 
the possibility for a democratic political culture to arise through the new democratic regime.  
15 Friedman 1995:567), for example, has suggested that the long process of negotiation and compromise 
completed by political elites during the transition set a precedent for future political behaviour.    
16 Dahl (1997:34) maintains that political culture provides both cognitive and emotional support for the 
regime; see Dahl (1997).     
17 This quote emphasizes the importance of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
building a democratic political culture, an institution which offered amnesty to those willing to 
acknowledge crimes committed under apartheid. 
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What a consolidated democracy is and when a democracy reaches this stage in its 
political development are both, unsurprisingly, also contentious issues. For clarity’s sake, 
O’Donnell’s definition of a consolidated democracy will be adopted whereby a 
democracy is considered consolidated when the principles of democracy and the actual 
practices of the democratic regime are deemed similar (O’Donnell, 1996:47)18.     
 
Schmitter (1996, 1998; Schmitter & Karl, 1996) has spent some time exploring the 
concept and nature of democratic consolidation, particularly in Latin America. He 
contends that to describe a democracy as consolidated is in fact a paradox as it is 
continuously evolving (Schmitter, 1998:23). He nevertheless describes the process of 
consolidation as the engendering of norms such as political trust and tolerance19, which 
allow the uncertainties inherent in democratic rule (such as election outcomes20) to take 
place without violent conflict 21 (Schmitter, 1998:25). Schmitter (1998:27, 1996a:77) 
maintains that democratic institutions22  are fundamental in normalizing the levels of 
uncertainty inherent in regime change through democratic processes, as they establish 
and maintain the rituals by which these political changes occur and minimize the 
unknowns. Nevertheless, the presence of institutions is not sufficient to ensure 
democracy, as in the case of Brazil, where he contends that minimal commitment to 
procedural democracy has failed to allow democracy to crystallize (Schmitter, 1996a:80).  
Indeed, Brazil’s weak democratic institutionalization, through the abuse of democratic 
procedures by political actors, is considered by Diamond (1997) to be the primary reason 
for its remaining an unconsolidated democracy nearly two decades after democratic 
transition.   
 
                                                 
18 For other definitions of ‘consolidated democracy’ see also Diamond (1997); Schmitter (1998); 
Przeworski (1995). 
19 This once again emphasizes the importance of political culture in supporting the political regime as trust 
and tolerance are both values deemed democratically important (Dahl, 1997:34).  
20 A rule of thumb, initially developed by Huntingdon, is that a democracy has become stabilized after two 
democratic handovers of power (Randall & Theobald, 1998:41). Brazil has achieved this, South Africa, 
however, has not, remaining under an ANC-dominated government and stirring fears that it will become a 
one-party state; see Giliomee & Simkins (eds) (1999).  
21 This is supported by Diamond (1997) who contends that consolidated democracies are not characterized 
by the absence of conflict, but by the absence conflict through illegal means.  
22 There is a lively debate as to which specific institutional configurations actually best foster consolidated 
democracies (Lijphart, 1996; Linz, 1996a, 1996b; Hadenius, 1994; Elklit, 1994). 
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In light of the above, it is necessary to return to the discussion of political support and of 
the two types pertinent to this study in order to better understand how support for 
democracy in South Africa and Brazil will be measured. 
 
Specific support is the more cognitively accessible concept, as it is simply the quid pro 
quo satisfaction of the public with the government following the fulfilment of very 
specific and immediate needs and demands (Easton, 1965:268). This is generally a 
narrow base of support and can, by definition, be conceived of as very short-term. The 
support generated is due to the manifestation of a specific policy and is directed at the 
incumbents of the regime, whose political term is theoretically limited23.  
 
Diffuse support is conceived of as support for the zeitgeist24 of the political system and 
the processes by which the system actually functions, in our case democracy, as opposed 
to merely its output. As opposed to the “narrowness” of the concept of specific support, 
diffuse support is a broader, more abstract level of support. Easton (1965:269), in 
describing the functions of the political system, emphasises how diffuse and specific 
support are complementary in the following way. Government is generally entrusted with 
the distribution of scarce resources and it is logically impossible that the demands of 
every sector of society will be met. Capacity aside, many of these demands are in conflict 
with one another. Diffuse support, representing the public’s inherent acceptance of the 
political system’s procedures of government, fosters tolerance for the government despite 
the inability of the government to satisfy all needs 25 . Diffuse support thus fosters 
sociotropic tendencies within society. Diffuse support can thus be seen as a “reservoir” of 
                                                 
23An example of this is perhaps what  Tóka (1995:356) refers to as the “honeymoon period” experienced in 
most neo-democracies. The new democratic regime receives support for establishing democratic rule. This 
is short-lived, however, (2-3 years) and the government cannot rely on it to sustain support. South 
American desencantado (disenchantment) with democracy with the passing of time is an example of this 
effect wearing off.    
24 A German term for ‘spirit of the age’; in this context zeitgeist refers to the philosophy and founding 
principles of a concept, in this case democracy (Diamond, 1997). 
25 There is a perception that in terms of South Africa, apartheid both hindered and fostered the growth of 
diffuse support for democracy. Whereas rejecting the legitimacy of the tricameral parliament elections 
created validated fears that in some instances all representative institutions would be mistrusted, there has 
been an innate willingness to value democratic institutions which extends beyond the political elite 
(Friedman, 1995:541-543). This is a positive contribution to developing a democratic political culture. 
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support to sustain the political system when public demand is not being directly met26 
(Easton, 1965:249). Specific support, on the other hand, sustains both the political system 
and its source of diffuse support through the continuously necessary direct satisfaction of 
at least some demands, providing substantiation for this ultimate support for the regime 
and its principles (Easton, 1965:273). A critical loss of support, in terms of either of these 
two types, will place the political system under stress and could lead to its collapse, as 
mentioned above.  
 
In order to further clarify the concepts of diffuse and specific support, it is necessary to 
identify the various levels of government to which they apply. Easton (1965) provided 
the initial framework of objects of political support by enumerating these as the political 
community, the regime and the authorities27 (Easton, 1965:157).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 Establishing whether mass support for democracy still exits, despite deteriorating socio-economic 
inequalities in both South Africa and Brazil since their transitions, would thus shed some light on mass 
democratic commitment in these two countries. According to Przeworski (1995:57), diffuse support for 
democracy remains in neo-democracies despite a growing mistrust of politics and politicians. Whether this 
applies to South Africa and Brazil specifically remains to be seen.   
27 This model was later expanded by Norris (1999a).  
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Figure 1. The Concept Diagram of the Different Object Levels of Political Support 
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Source: Norris, P. (1999).  
 
2.2.2 The Political Community 
The political community (see Figure 1.) is described by Easton, drawing on definitions 
from Deutsch and Haas (quoted in Easton, 1965:177) as:  
“…a group of persons bound together by a political division of labour. The 
existence of political system must included a plurality of relationships 
through which the individual members are linked to each other and through 
which the political objectives of the system are pursued, no matter how 
limited they might be”. 
 
The political community is thus conceptualised as a willingness to participate in the 
collective solving of political problems and manifesting solidarity in terms of support for 
the political system. Norris (1999a:10) extends this further by incorporating what Easton 
(1965:185) terms the “social community”, thus including a fundamental attachment to the 
 31
nation served by the political system. This is a sense of identification and cohesion, a so-
called “we-feeling”. This level of the political system is sustained by democratic support 
at its most abstract and intangible, thus comprising an aspect of diffuse support. It must 
be noted here that, especially regarding our two case studies, this dimension of the 
political system is particularly important considering the heterogeneous28 nature of their 
populations, negating the existence of a “nation-state” in the European sense. Easton 
(1965:187) emphasizes this by commenting that it is possible for a political structure to 
bind a society together without this feeling of political community. He stresses, however, 
that should a sense of political community not eventually develop, the system will 
become vulnerable, especially during times of system stress. It may be argued that this 
became the case in apartheid South Africa.     
 
2.2.3 Regime Principles 
The second level of the political system, similarly sustained by diffuse support (see 
Figure 1), was identified by Easton as “the regime”. Easton (1965: 190-192) described 
this object of support as the constitutional order of the political society. It was a 
regularized method of ordering political relationships and stabilized the expectations of 
society as regards authority and the ability of the latter to process the demands of the 
former. The regime encompassed the values and accepted ideology of the political 
society, the procedures accepted as norms for political behaviour and the actual structure 
of authority used to implement policy decisions (Easton, 1965:193-194). Support for the 
regime on the part of the public denoted support for the “rules of the game”. In this case 
it would thus be support for the basic tenets of democracy as a political system and a 
consequent pledge to abide by and be ruled by them29.  
 
It was felt by later theorists that this level of the political system was too broad to be 
categorized as a single political object, especially as it was felt by some (Fuchs et al., 
1995:330) that Easton’s conceptualisation was unclear on several crucial points. The 
                                                 
28 This is, however, perhaps more applicable to South Africa than to Brazil, as linguistic unity and a 
conscious unification policy implemented by political elites has removed the potential threat of ethnic 
conflict in Brazil (Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001:122). 
29 The active civil forces present in both countries prior to transition attest to the support present for 
democratic regime principles (Friedman, 1995; Whitehead, 1996).  
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political object of “the regime” has thus more recently been broken down and the various 
aspects of the regime divided into three separate levels of the political system. These are 
“regime principles”, “regime performance”, and “regime institutions” (Norris, 1999a:10).  
 
“Regime principles” (see Figure 1) is the level of the political system representing 
exclusively the “rules of the game”. Support for this political object, diffuse in nature, 
denotes an acceptance and willingness on the part of the public to adhere to democracy as 
a set of principles. Easton hints at this level, suggesting that it is part of the ideology used 
to mobilize support and inspire legitimacy for the regime, but at the same time holding 
the government accountable to a certain mode of behaviour. It is, nevertheless, 
recognised that this is an ideal concept of regime behaviour, which governments rarely 
live up to (Easton, 1965:291; Parry and Moran; 1994a:3). Regime principles can thus also 
perhaps be seen as essentially a measurement of congruence with a citizen’s own beliefs 
and values.    
 
A potential problem, considering that the regime principles in question are those of 
democracy, in our case is ascertaining what exactly about them is controversial and the 
subject of debate for such a long time (Elgström, 2002:1; Parry & Moran, 1994a:10; 
Inoguchi et al., 1998:1; Edwards, 1998:90; Cammack, 1994:176; Norris, 1999a:11). 
Although usually modelled on the concept of Western liberal democracy, following 
Thomassen’s (1995) investigation of the public perceptions of the meaning of democracy 
in Western publics, it is evident that the generally accepted meaning of democracy can 
change. For this reason, what precisely is meant by “regime principles” in our case will 
become clearer after it has been operationalized in Chapter Three.  
 
2.2.4 Regime Performance 
Regime performance is the last object of democratic support subject to diffuse political 
support (see Figure 1). This is essentially an evaluation of the workings of the regime 
within the specific context of the country in question. It is also the evaluation of the 
perceived performance of democracy. In gauging support for regime performance, one is 
essentially measuring the level of support for democracy as applied to the governing of 
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the nation, which thus contributes to support for democracy as a political construct. 
Regime performance is crucial in terms of fostering support for democracy, especially in 
very young democracies: 
“After all, it is very unlikely that citizens in neo-democracies would possess a 
reservoir of favourable affective dispositions arising from a lifetime of 
exposure to democratic norms…citizens fall back on performance-based 
judgements of what democracy actually does for them” (Bratton & Mattes, 
2000a:1).      
 
The above is especially relevant in this study, because it is indeed the purpose to find out 
whether trends in Brazil and South Africa mirror those of the mature Western 
democracies in levels of diffuse and specific support, or whether they maintain the 
patterns of new democracies, as described above.  
 
2.2.5 Regime Institutions 
“Regime institutions” is the first of two levels of political support to which specific 
support applies (see Figure 1). This is an evaluation of the role of the institutions and 
offices of the regime itself, as opposed to the office-holder, in governing the country. As 
these institutions are directly involved in the satisfaction of the public’s needs, it is easy 
to see why these are recipients of specific support. In terms of a democratic regime, such 
institutions consist of a parliament, independent judiciary and transparent multiparty 
elections, among others. They represent the democratic political culture of the country in 
question in that they have been established to aid in the democratic rule of the country. 
Listhaug and Wiberg (1995:299) emphasize the importance of the public’s ability to 
distinguish between the institutions of government and the incumbents themselves30 , 
although Norris (1999a:12) acknowledges the fact that it is frequently difficult to do so. 
In addition, the institutions considered to be under the jurisdiction of the government may 
vary according to the degree of state control over society and the legacy of the current 
and previous regimes. Both Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) and Fuchs and Klingeman (1995) 
                                                 
30 The literature suggests that this is a problem in Brazil and South Africa (Lagos, 2001 ,2003; Bratton & 
Mattes, 2000a, 2000b). This will be further discussed below.   
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differentiate between “institutions of order”31 and other institutions generally considered 
as belonging to the private sphere, but it cannot necessarily be assumed immediately that 
these are free from state influence32. For this reason, it will later be discussed which 
institutions will comprise our research and the reasons for this. 
 
2.2.6 Political Actors 
The last level of the political system, termed by Easton (1965) as “the authorities” and by 
Norris (1999a) as “political actors” refers to the incumbents and politicians themselves, 
thus those held directly responsible for government actions within the context of 
representative government. As such, this level of the political system requires specific 
support (see Figure 1). Arguably, support for this level is also the most crucial as this 
level is the most high profile and cognitively accessible to the public, thus also the most 
open to criticism. Indeed, political actors are regarded as “where the buck stops” and 
diminishing support at this level can lead to a loss of support at other levels 
(Easton,1965:216). This is known as the “generalization process” (Fuchs et al,1995:327). 
A loss of support at the level of the political actor as an isolated phenomenon is not 
necessarily serious, as it is the purpose of elections to empower the public to be able to 
alternate the incumbent government (Dalton,1988:238).  Nevertheless, continued long-
term dissatisfaction with the authorities may cause this public dissatisfaction to spread to 
other levels of the political system, precipitating the destabilization of the system as a 
whole (Easton,1965:217). While Listhaug and Wiberg (1995:299) imply that a complete 
overhaul of the democratic political system is unlikely, as a viable alternative does not 
exist, the importance of declining specific support should not be underestimated, 
especially within neo-democracies, such as South Africa and Brazil, which have not yet 
reached consolidation.                           
 
 
 
                                                 
31 These are institutions which are generally appointed to carry out the functions of the state, such as 
maintaining law and order: the police, the army, the legal system, etc.  
32 The ability of both apartheid and the Brazilian military regime to permeate every level of society was 
infamous, an example being apartheid’s Immorality Act of 1950, banning inter-racial sexual relations, or 
the Brazilian clientelist relations with big business (Du Toit, 1995:300; Roett, 1999). 
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2.2.8 Democracy as a Concept 
With the establishment of the theoretical framework to be used as our departure point and 
the conceptualisation of the various levels of the variable under study, that is, support for 
democracy, it would seem appropriate to conceptualise “democracy” itself. This is, 
however, more difficult than it would first seem.  
 
The meaning of democracy, as mentioned above, has been seen to vary through time and 
across geographical distance. Thus, while both the Brazilians and the South Africans 
seem to recognise and hold a meaning for the term “democracy” (Lagos,2003; Mattes,et 
al,2003), it is debatable as to whether the meaning they attribute to this concept is the 
same. Indeed, their conceptualization of democracy will more than likely vary according 
to their different experiences of democracy (Doh & McDonough,1999).   
 
In any event, this concept is arguably very subjective. As discussed above, no consensus 
has been reached in terms of an objective definition (Inoguchi et al.,1998:1; 
Edwards,1998:90; Cammack,1994:176; Norris,1999a:1;Thomassen,1995;Parry & Moran, 
1994a:10). Indeed, in terms of methodology, the fact that the concept “democracy” was 
not defined for respondents in the WVS, limits our knowledge of their understanding of 
the term. In a sense, we do not know what we are measuring. All things considered, 
however, due to the nature of this study, this should not prove too much of a problem. 
This is because this study is interested in levels of support for democracy, as opposed to 
democracy per se. Thus whether the regime embodies the views of democracy of the 
respective mass publics is of primary interest, instead of a universally accepted definition 
of the term33.   
                                                 
33 This implies that in this case, the masses’ understanding of the concept of democracy as applied to the 
political regime is more important than a universal definition that analysts conceptualise democracy with. 
Admittedly, should the masses collectively harbour a perception of democracy considered academically 
‘wrong’, we are not measuring democracy per se, but rather what they believe to be democracy.  
Mattes et al (2003:8) make the point that mass opinions are perhaps more valid than academic ‘ideal 
models’. They comment that the opinions of the ordinary South Africans about the state of the South 
African democracy (thus Afrobarometer data) may be more relevant than the opinions of foreign experts 
(referring to Freedom House ratings) as it is the South Africans themselves that must endure and/or provide 
support for the South African democratic regime.   
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2.3 Historical Perspective       
In a study of a historical-comparative nature such as this, it is vitally important to place 
the data to be analysed within context. McAllister (1999:201) actually identifies 
“historical circumstance” as one of the most important factors affecting democratic 
(institutional) support. In addition, such a historical perspective has two further benefits. 
Firstly, the histories of the two case studies can be compared. Secondly, the basis for the 
primary proposition of this study, outlined above, will become clearer34. In considering 
the historical events in both countries, it is plausible to suggest that despite the youth of 
the democratic regimes, trends in the support for democracy will follow those of the 
Western publics, namely that diffuse support will remain fairly constant, despite the 
decline of specific support (Klingeman & Fuchs, 1995; Kaase & Newton, 1995).  
 
It will be suggested that despite the authoritarian nature of both the South African 
apartheid regime and Brazilian military rule, a semblance of democratic procedures 
remained, however distorted. This thus allowed democratic norms and values to permeate 
the consciousness of the national political communities, affording democracy the so-
called “reservoir” of support needed during periods of potential instability (Easton, 
1965:249; Norris, 1999a:11). The contention is thus that South Africa and Brazil have 
more in common with the older democracies of Western Europe in this regard than 
younger democracies such as those of Eastern Europe, whose democratic support is 
attributed to the so-called “honeymoon effect”35.           
 
Thus, a brief political history of both case studies will be outlined. Many argue that 
history stretching back to the colonial era has a bearing on each countries contemporary 
situation (Marx, 1998; Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001; Friedman, 1995). The political 
histories recounted here will thus give a brief description of national history since 
                                                 
34 It was proposed in Chapter One that South Africa and Brazil do actually have a history of limited 
democratic norms inculcated into their respective political cultures. Thus, despite being new democracies, 
they follow the trends in democratic support manifested by Western publics.  
35 Tóka (1995), in his discussion of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe, discusses this effect in 
detail, estimating it to last about 1 to 2 years (Tóka, 1995:357). New democracies seem to accord 
democratic principles the esteem usually only found in mature democracies. This is generally attributed to 
the fact that democracy initially compares favourably with the ancien regime, the novelty of democracy 
thus providing it with legitimacy as an alternative to the previous, unpopular regime.    
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independence, the authoritarian regimes of the respective case studies, events leading up 
to the respective transitions and the nature of the transitions themselves.    
 
2.3.1 Brazil   
Brazil achieved independence in 1822, when Emperor Dom Pedro I unilaterally declared 
independence from the mother country, Portugal, which was ruled by his father, Emperor 
Dom Joao VI (Marx, 1998;159). Ironically, despite the decades of brutal military rule 
which characterized its 20th-century history, Brazil prides herself on the peaceful and 
bloodless transition to independence and the image of a continuity36 embedded in state 
authority figures which prevented the rise of political antagonists. Indeed, even with a 
military coup in 1889, deposing Dom Pedro I’s son, Dom Pedro II, there was no change 
in the state bureaucracy. Power changed hands only symbolically as it remained in the 
hands of the elite (Roett, 1999:7).    
 
Despite the large slave population and Brazil’s dependence on primary commodity 
exports until the Great Wars of the 20th century, abolition in 1889 created barely a 
political ripple as the emancipated blacks were simply “abandoned to their fate”37 at the 
lower echelons of Brazilian society (Marx,1998:161). This reflects the confidence and 
complacency of the Brazilian political elite, especially when state power was 
decentralized up until 1930 (Marx, 1998:161). Indeed, it was only with the rise of Getulio 
Vargas that Brazil fell into the Latin American pattern of rule by military dictator.    
 
Coming to power in 1930 as the “temporary president” of the Liberal Alliance party, 
Vargas consolidated power in the Estado Novo (New State) and promulgated a new 
constitution, which in 1934 which replaced that of 189138. Vargas ruled Brazil by dictate 
                                                 
36 Przeworski (1995:50) refers to this as the characteristic ‘continuismo’ of Brazilian politics.    
37 Potential black mobilization was also emasculated by a national policy of ‘racial democracy’ which was 
perpetuated despite the frequent changes in regime throughout the 20th century. By emphasizing racial 
colour-blindness and a ‘colour continuum’ within society, the structural discrimination experienced by 
blacks was masked (Marx, 1998:280; Sansone, 2003:97; Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001: 122).  
38 Following Vargas’s apparent relinquishing of political power in 1945, yet another constitution was 
promulgated in 1946 to replace that which had held sway for 12 years. Brazil has had 7 constitutions since 
independence in 1822. These were promulgated in 1824, 1891, 1934, 1946, 1967-9, 1988 (Martinez-Lara, 
1996:8).     
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until 1945. Even he realised that his stranglehold on power would not be sustainable in a 
post-war situation. In an attempt to normalise political participation and foster a fledgling 
multiparty system, Vargas created two parties in 1945. These were the Social Democratic 
Party (PSD)39 and the Workers’ Party (PTB)40 (Roett, 1999:39). He used the latter as a 
vehicle for re-election in 1950, serving a term as president until 1954, when he 
committed suicide rather than suffer the humiliation of removal from power by military 
coup (Roett, 1999:108).  
 
It seems that Vargas’s power had been rooted in his populist form of rule, as what 
followed was a string of ineffectual presidents, 41  which did little to ameliorate an 
economic crisis rapidly spiralling out of control. Matters came to a head in 1964, when 
the military managed to achieve what had been prevented in 1961. The military assumed 
control of the national government. 
 
It must be mentioned here that despite the military’s frequent intervention in civilian 
politics, it had never been the intention of the armed forces to assume control of the state. 
The military had been recognised before this as the protectors of democracy and 
arbitrators in the struggle for political power (Roett, 1999:103; Fiechter, 1975:23; 
Martinez-Lara, 1996:13). With the assumption of the authority to rule, the military had 
set a precedent. Previously, power had always been handed back to civilians once the 
political situation had been normalized, as in the case of removing Vargas in 1954 (Roett, 
1999:108). Military professionalism, which had until 1964 guided the military’s dealing 
with politicians, was replaced by what Fiechter (1975:25) terms “structural militarism”42.  
 
                                                 
39 Partido Social Democrático 
40 Partido Trabalhador Brásileiro 
41 Roett (1999:37) uses Huntingdon’s term “praetorian society” to describe the Brazilian political situation 
from 1946-1964. This refers to the low institutionalisation of, yet high participation in, political processes.   
42 This term refers to the emerging belief that the military, because of their training at the institution known 
as the Superior War College (ESG), was eminently more suitable to rule Brazil and guide it on a path to 
economic modernization and democratic consolidation. The Superior War College’s purpose was 
essentially to train the young military elite for entrance into political careers. All the military presidents 
were graduates of this institution (Roett, 1999:110).       
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Thus the intention of the military was originally to hold the state of Brazil in trusteeship 
until such time as it was deemed ready to be handed back to civilian rule once more. This 
mandate, subsequently extended to 1967, was issued in the preamble of the first of five 
“Institutional Acts” unilaterally decreed by the acting military president43:  
 
“…to provide the new government which will be sworn in with the 
indispensable means for the task of the economic, financial, political and 
moral reconstruction of Brazil, to enable it to grapple directly and 
immediately with the serious and urgent problems on which the restoration of 
internal order and the international prestige of the country depend.”   
(quoted from Fiechter, 1975:37). 
 
The PSD joined the National Democratic Union (UDN)44 to form ARENA (National 
Renewal Alliance)45 , the official government party (Roett, 1999:45).  
 
It initially seemed that the military was indeed making good on its promises of national 
restoration. For over a decade Brazil’s economy witnessed spectacular growth of 10% per 
annum, propelled by import-substitution policies and rapidly increased industrialization 
(Gillespie, 1990:64).  This was not to last.  
 
The growth experienced had huge social costs (Lamounier, 1999:153) reinforcing 
Fiechter’s (1975:37) assertion that the military succeeded only in modernizing Brazil’s 
economy, rather than rectifying inequalities and creating jobs from foreign direct 
investment as was originally intended46. In addition to the weakening of the “capitalist 
dictatorship miracle” (McDonough, 1981:3), by 1969 inflation had reached 20% and 
would worsen in the coming years despite every attempt by the government to bring it 
under control (Fiechter, 1975:192).   During the reign of the military, the successive 
                                                 
43 The first of these was Castello Branco, appointed to this position on the approval of several military 
factions (Fichter, 1975:37) 
44 Uniao Democrática Nacional (the unofficial opposition before 1964). 
45 Alliança Renovadora Nacional. 
46 These were two of the goals of PAEG (Economic Plan of Action of the Government) in 1964-1966 under 
President Castello Branco. 
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passing of the “Institutional Acts”, one of which suspended most basic civil liberties, 
rendered the Constitution (of 1946) useless. It is estimated that nine thousand people 
“disappeared” at the hands of the military and three hundred had their political rights, 
such as they were, suspended. Forty of these were Congress members. The police were 
notorious for their brutality. Brazil was slowly becoming internationally ostracized (Roett, 
1999:115). 
 
It was in 1974, under President Ernesto Geisel, the fourth president of the military 
regime47, that the government finally began the process of implementing much needed 
reforms (Martinez-Lara, 1996:27). As is characteristic of authoritarian reform, however, 
it was envisioned that the military would be in constant control of the abertura48 process 
(Roett,1999:127). Indeed, to prevent the regime change from being too dramatic, what 
became known as the “April package”49 was issued. Despite the weak party structure and 
the virtually non-existent civil society, however, it was not possible to retain control of 
the process which had been set in motion (Martinez-Lara, 1996:29). 
 
By 1978 new reforms had been imposed, revoking Institutional Act No. 5 and thus re-
instating all civil liberties, including habeus corpus (Martinez-Lara, 1996:30). In 1979 an 
amnesty law allowed the official recognition of political parties other than the 
government party (ARENA) and the official opposition (MDB50). Both of these parties 
renamed themselves as the PDS51 and PMDB52 respectively.  
 
A massive campaign for direct presidential elections was launched in 1984, directed for 
the first time at the public at large. It was known as “Direitas-Ja”53. Despite its failure to 
                                                 
47 The Presidents of the military regime were General Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1966); General 
Arthur Costa e Silva (1966-1969); General Emilio Garrastazu Medici (1969-1973); Ernesto Geisel (1974-
1978). 
48 Portuguese for ‘opening’; this term was coined to describe the process of political liberalisation which 
began in Brazil in 1974.   
49 This was a series of liberalizing reforms, intended to slow down the need for a political handover. It is an 
example of what Schmitter (1996:78) terms “dictablanda”, liberalization without democratisation.   
50 Movimento Democrático Brasileiro 
51 Partido Democrático Social 
52 Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro 
53 Translated literally, this means “Direct elections now”. 
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achieve this goal, its enormous popular support base succeeded in raising mass political 
awareness (Martinez-Lara, 1996:33).  
 
When Tancredo Neves, the opposition’s presidential candidate, was elected in 1985, it 
was widely recognised that his charismatic personality was required to reconcile the 
uneasy elite settlement of government handover and overcome Brazil’s institutional 
weaknesses (Martinez-Lara, 1996:41). Indeed, although a skeletal democratic framework 
essentially remained in place, its institutions had effectively become obsolete, rendering 
the transition extremely vulnerable (Lamounier, 1999:137). His untimely death on the 
eve of his inauguration was almost the death knell for the transition, with José Sarney, the 
vice-president elect, hastily being sworn in in his stead, despite the unacceptability of this 
to both sides54.  
 
Democracy, however, did not atrophy completely. To symbolize a clean break with the 
past, despite the lack of unity 55  and weak party system, Brazil’s fourth and current 
Constitution was drafted and eventually promulgated in 1988.  
 
Severe economic problems, however, further hampered the democratic process. While it 
seems that the PMDB had found the solution in the Cruzado Plan of 198656, the situation 
only worsened with successive attempts. By 1990, under the Collor administration, the 
fifth austerity plan in as many years was being put into place, complete with yet another 
unit of currency, also the fifth such change (Roett, 1999163). Admittedly, many of the 
aspirations represented by the economic plans were foiled by political power plays57. 
Nevertheless, it was only in 1994, during the presidency of Itamar Franco, that the 
situation improved. Appointed as Finance Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s “Plano 
                                                 
54 As previously discussed, Sarney was a PDS candidate, thus his crossing the floor rendered him 
untrustworthy to both the PMDB and PDS. It is interesting that Ulysses Guimarães, president of the PMDB 
was not sworn in, perhaps illustrating the uniqueness of Neves in his ability to win PDS acceptance.    
55 Aside from the inherent conflict between PDS and PMDB, the PMDB, the largest political party since 
1982, had sacrificed ideological coherence for strength in numbers. Lack of internal unity prevented both 
decisive action and hindered their ability to mobilize civil society’s support (Martinez-Lara, 1996:48).      
56 The short-term success of this plan is reflected in the results of the 1986 gubernatorial and national 
elections (Roett, 1999:159).  
57 An example here is the Bresser Plan, implemented in the late eighties. For a comprehensive outline, see 
Roett, 1999.   
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Real” destroyed hyper-inflation and began to reduce inequalities marginally. So 
successful was he that he was promptly elected president in 1995 and the Constitution 
was changed so that he could serve another term from 1999 to 2003.  
 
It must be mentioned here that Brazil’s democracy is still nowhere near what some 
consider to be consolidated democracies 58  (Cammack, 1994; Higley & Gunther, 
1992:277). Despite severe economic pressure, huge socio-economic inequalities and the 
impeachment of a president less than a decade after transition, however, Brazil has 
weathered all these trials remarkably well and remains a democracy today (Hunter, 
2003:158). Arguably, this is due to the nature of the transition, an elite pact59. Despite 
Brazil’s weak party system, the elite settlement was concluded whereby the government 
party was beaten at its own game and accepted defeat (Landman, 2000:155). Lack of 
unity notwithstanding, the political elites were brought together to draw up the “rules of 
the game”.  Interestingly, Higley & Gunther (1992:279), contend that there never was an 
elite settlement at all. They claim that the loss of Neves60 and the fragmented nature of 
Brazilian party politics prevented any real conclusive or even inclusive agreement 
between elites, suggesting that this is the reason that Brazil’s democracy is not 
consolidated61  (Higley & Gunther, 1992:279). They contend that an elite pact is a social 
contract which guarantees security for certain elite groups, allowing the eventual 
consolidation of democracy (Higley and Gunther, 1992:33-34). Although it is perhaps 
true that Brazil’s democracy is not consolidated because of the reasons mentioned above, 
the fact that an agreement was reached in which not only was power transferred from the 
military (ARENA) to civilians (PMDB), but democratisation, however limited, occurred, 
which suggests an agreement of some sort.    
 
                                                 
58 See Chapter Three for the definition and conceptualization of a consolidated democracy. 
59 As shall be seen, this pact was not concluded under as favourable conditions as those of South Africa. 
The partners were not equal, there was much procrastination by bureaucratic hard-liners and it is argued 
that the wrong set of institutions was picked for Brazil’s political context (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & 
De Villiers, 1996:12-14).     
60 This in itself illustrates the importance of the personal characteristics of the elites (Higley & Gunther, 
1992:279). This can be seen in the South African case in terms of Mandela’s and De Klerk’s key roles in 
negotiations.   
61 Broderick (2000:15) also emphasizes the importance of elite agreement in pacts and settlements leading 
to democratic transition.   
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The election of Lula in 2003 sets a new precedent for Brazilian politics. As mentioned 
above, he is the only working-class president ever elected in Brazil, albeit on his fifth 
attempt62. Many believe Lula’s ascendance to be a reflection of popular disillusionment 
with Cardoso’s neo-liberal market reforms and the jobless growth it has produced 
(Hunter, 2003:154, Lagos, 2003:170). It remains to be seen whether President Lula will 
indeed succeed in addressing the dire socio-economic problems of Brazil.            
 
2.3.2. South Africa      
In terms of independence from a colonial power, South Africa is a much younger country 
than Brazil. Having formed the South African Union in 191063, South Africa was made a 
de facto sovereign state by the mid-1930s with the passing of the Statute of Westminster 
(1931) and the Status of the Union Act (1934) (Du Toit, 1995:296). Segregationist 
legislation was already firmly established by this stage64. Indeed, several key pieces of 
legislation had been passed within the first few years of the formation of the Union. The 
most infamous of these are the Native Land Act65 (1913) and the Native Urban Areas Act 
(1923)66 (Marx, 1998:98).      
 
It must be mentioned here that, despite the propensity of the South African government to 
distinguish primarily between whites and non-whites67, within the white minority there 
                                                 
62 Lula has long been involved in politics, as a member of the Worker’ Party (PT). His first presidential 
election campaign was against Fernando Collor de Mello in 1990.  
63 This was the consolidation of the four British colonial possessions into one political unit which was de 
facto self-governing (Du Toit, 1995:292). As a foretaste of things to come, no black representatives were 
invited to the National Convention in 1900 which led to the formation of the Union (Du Toit, 1995:295). 
64 The South African Native Affairs Commission, established in 1903 by Lord Milner, aided in this. 
65 This law restricted black ownership of land to ‘reserves’ especially laid aside for this purpose. These 
constituted 7% of South Africa’s land area.  
66This legislation introduced the notorious pass laws and regulated separate housing for blacks. These laws 
would be followed by the Pegging Act (1943); Asiatic Land and Indian Representative Act (1946); and the 
Group Areas Act (1950) (James & Lever, 2001:37).  
67 Coloureds were officially recognized as a racial category in 1904 (Marx, 1998:71). Nevertheless, all 
races which were not Caucasian (or could not pass as such) were eventually lumped together in 1955 and 
labelled ‘non-whites’. Coloureds, despite having had qualified franchise in the Cape Colony for over 100 
years, were struck off the common voter’s role in 1956 (Giliomee, 1994:4). Along with other ‘non-whites’, 
they could elect three white representatives, in terms of the Representation of the Native Act (1936) (Du 
Toit, 1995:309, 298). In the early 1980s, to reinforce segregation and perhaps in an attempt to win over 
political support in the event of a democratic transition, coloureds and Indians were afforded special 
privileges (Steyn, 2001:93). Although this placed them marginally above blacks in socio-economic status, 
the racial balance of power remained the same (Friedman, 1995:531).   
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was by no means complete unity. Marx (1998:37-38) suggests that the British reneged on 
promised protection for the “native African” in favour of forming an alliance with the 
Afrikaner68, considered the biggest threat to the colonial dominance of the former. Indeed, 
the segregationist Glen Grey Act of 1884 was apartheid’s forerunner. Furthermore, this 
created white solidarity in the face of a black majority.  
 
By 1912 the organisation which later became known as the African National Congress 
(ANC)69 had been formed and this movement petitioned the Crown directly in an attempt 
to alleviate the racial discrimination suffered by blacks, coloureds and Indians in South 
Africa. The ANC’s pleas, however, fell on deaf ears and their perceived failure led to a 
withdrawal of support in the wake of the Great Depression70. In the 1940s however, a 
more militant group re-emerged with the formation of the ANC Youth League. The 
miner’s strike of 1946, however, seemed to highlight the swart gevaar71 in the minds of 
the white minority (Marais, 2001:12) and the National Party (NP), flagship of Afrikaaner 
nationalism, experienced a windfall election result in 1948. This party would rule 
unchallenged electorally, albeit by whites-only parties, for over four decades.  
 
The NP immediately began consolidating the racial domination which had taken root 
within South African political culture. With reference to the passing of the Population 
Registration Act (1950), Freidman (1995:534) does not exaggerate when he states that 
race, in South Africa, was the primary social and economic divide, determining 
everything from one’s property rights and residential area, to education and access to 
state facilities72. Furthermore, the Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act 
                                                 
68 ‘Afrikaner’ is that name of South Africans of primarily Dutch origin whose ancestors settled in what is 
now South Africa prior to its becoming a British colony in the early nineteenth century. Historically there 
was animosity between the Afrikaners and British settlers following the First and Second Boer Wars. (For a 
more detailed discussions on the repercussions of these events, see Marx, 1998).     
69 This organization, formerly the South African National Native Congress, was made up of the members of 
the tiny black elite that had arisen despite South African society’s heavy racial prejudice. Most had been 
educated at mission stations (Friedman, 1995:537). It was renamed the African National Congress in 1923. 
70 This organisation’s support base had been elitist; members had in fact been at pains to distinguish 
themselves from the uncivilized masses in the eyes of the South African government (Sisk, 1995:61).   
71 Afrikaans for literally “black danger”, this was a propagandist term used in apartheid days to emphasize 
the danger of black minority rule for whites from which apartheid supposedly protected society.    
72 This is the primary reason that race is included as a social background variable in the South African 
section of this study. 
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ensured that there would be no further racial miscegenation (Sisk, 1995:8). The ANC, 
aided by the newly formed ANC Women’s League, launched the Defiance Campaign in 
1952. Nevertheless, failure to achieve results led to support petering out by 1953. The 
tragedy of the Sharpeville massacre73 in 1960 gave the NP government the excuse they 
needed to declare a state of emergency and ban both the ANC and other “non-white” 
political organisations (Du Toit, 1995:25).   
 
The apartheid state extended its definition of separate development by establishing 
several “homelands” or “bantustans”, each one roughly corresponding to supposedly 
traditional lands of an ethnic group such as the Zulus, the Tswanas, the Xhosas, etc. 
Together these “homelands”, the boundaries of which were originally laid out in the Land 
Act of 193674, comprised approximately 14% of South Africa’s total surface area and 
they were technically supposed to be the home of 80% of the population (Hanf, 1981:145, 
286). The homelands were offered independence from South Africa, as an alternative to 
white rule, but should they accept it, as the Transkei did in 1976, citizens of the homeland 
lost their South African citizenship. Thus, as was intended, migrant workers would 
become foreign labourers in South Africa, devoid of any political rights at all75 (Schrire, 
1994:127).    
 
Apartheid thus was effectively a project of social engineering which enabled a white 
Afrikaans minority to sculpt a sense of nationality and nationhood. The centralist state 
apparatus was also used as an “ethnic patronage network” (Friedman, 1995:541) in order 
to resolve the “poor white” question by privileging whites to the detriment of other ethnic 
groups. Unofficially, the Afrikaans community was given free reign in the political arena, 
while the English consolidated their control over the private sector up until the 1970s 
(Marx, 1998:97; Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:8). While ostensibly not the most ardent 
supporters of apartheid per se, big business had a readily exploitable unskilled labour 
                                                 
73 Police opened fire on unarmed rioting township residents in Sharpeville, killing 12 by shooting them in 
the back as they fled.  
74 The bantustans officially came into being with the Promotion of the Bantu Self-government Act (1959).  
75 The legislation involved was the known as the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970). 
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force as a result of the socio-political division of labour76 (Friedman, 1995:541; Marx, 
1998:38).  
 
After the most prominent leaders of the ANC were exiled, their ties with the South 
African Communist Party (SACP77) strengthened (Friedman, 1995:537, Marais, 2001). 
This was perhaps not only due to the geo-strategic pledge of the Soviet Union to support 
“freedom fighters,” but also because of the appeal at the time of the ideological 
tendencies of socialism. It was felt by some within the ANC that its emphasis on non-
racialism and acceptance as members of all those willing to oppose apartheid, regardless 
of ethnicity, damaged black solidarity. The Pan-African Congress (PAC) under the 
leadership of Robert Sobukwe broke away in 1959 to become the hard-liners of the left. 
By the 1970s “Black Consciousness” had emerged in South Africa, although its appeal 
was essentially only to the black elite. From it arose the Azanian People’s Organisation 
(AZAPO)78.  
 
While the Soweto Uprising of 1976 ultimately led to the granting of union rights to black 
workers79 in 1978 (Sisk, 1995:61; Friedman, 1995:538), the apartheid government was 
disinclined to negotiate with the ANC, despite the anti-apartheid struggle having 
escalated into a “virtual civil war” (Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:146). There were some 
who maintained that the regime had softened even before this apparent concession to 
black labour, which in turn had led Albert Hertzog80 to form the Herstigtigte Nasionale 
Party81 in 1968.    
 
                                                 
76 As in the case of Brazil, it would only be when this was form of political economy was no longer 
economically viable that big business would come to advocate democracy (Gillespie,1990:50; 
Shaw,2001:4).  
77 Formed in 1923, the SACP’s  (then the CPSA) power increased with the banning of the ANC. They are 
credited with helping to finance ANC guerrilla fighters’ training in Moscow and Cuba (Lodge, 1999:131). 
78 Steve Biko, a prominent activist in the ‘Black Consciousness’ movement became this organisation’s 
martyr when he died in police custody in 1977.  
79 This relates to the apartheid government consenting to blacks legally being able to form unions. Cosatu, 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions, formed  in 1985, became the third member of what became 
known as the tripartite alliance between the latter, the ANC and the SACP (Shaw, 2001:3).  
80 Son of the former prime minister James Barry Hertzog (1924-1939).  
81Renewed National Party 
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It was obvious that when attempted reforms were implemented, such as Prime Minister 
PW Botha’s “tricameral” parliament, allowing controlled representation of the Indian and 
Coloured minorities, that it was too little too late (Slabbert, 1990,82; Friedman, 
1995:538). The United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella organisation for civil 
society movements, although affirming political independence (Lodge, 1999:83), was 
very much behind the ANC. The Anglican Church had also condemned racial segregation 
(Friedman, 1995:540). The ANC, in planning to make South Africa “ungovernable” by 
1985, had in essence succeeded, as states of emergency were declared in 1985 and 1986 
to be maintained indefinitely (Cloete, 1990:43).    
 
Thus, by the mid-1980s it was realised that some sort of political compromise to break 
the deadlock between the ANC and the NP was inevitable82. Indeed, the NP had been 
conducting secret negotiations with Nelson Mandela83 since as early as 1982 (Shaw, 
2002:7). His release, along with many other political prisoners, and the unbanning of the 
ANC in February 1990 marked the beginning of public rapprochement between the two 
political opponents, the NP and the ANC (Rhoodie, 1991:510; Schlemmer, 1991:2; 
Cloete, 1990:29). 
 
The period between 1990 and 1993 can best be described as a protracted series of 
negotiations between the aspiring political elites and the crumbling incumbent regime, 
which ultimately culminated in an elite pact. Conventions such as the Congress for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA) of 1991 and 199384 and the Multi-party Negotiation 
Process (MPNP) of 1993 were held. Through these, an Interim Constitution, promulgated 
                                                 
82 While external influences are not the focus of this study, Shaw (2002:7) mentions several such factors, 
such as the end of the Cold War, sanctions, the precedent set by the Namibian negotiated pact, among 
others, which precipitated the NP’s decision to negotiate. It can be argued that neglecting to discuss these 
factors leaves several holes in the study’s line of argument. Nevertheless, it is argued here that these factors, 
on a broader, more global scale, influenced both the Brazilian and the South African transitions in a similar 
way. For example, Reagan’s foreign policy encouraging democratisation was present during both 
transitions (Broderick, 2000:14) and thus logically had a similar influence on regime change from 
authoritarianism to democracy in both cases.      
83 Nelson Mandela had been incarcerated on Robben Island as a political prisoner since 1963 following his 
being found guilty of terrorist acts. He was acting president of the ANC because Oliver Tambo, the de jure 
president, was in exile.     
84 The first set of these talks collapsed in 1991, although a ‘Declaration of Principles’ was issued, and a 
second set, CODESA II, was established in 1993 to continue the process.  
 48
in 1993, was hammered out, describing the processes through which the proposed 
Government of National Unity was to be elected (Shaw, 2002:12-15). 
 
So it was that the first South African multi-party elections with universal franchise took 
place in 1994. Cynics contend that rather than putting faith in the uncertainty of a truly 
democratic outcome, it was an elite pact to the very end. All the key players achieved a 
political goal to mollify them and curb any animosity, leaving nothing of Schmitter’s 
(1998) “uncertainties of democracy”. The ANC won a two-thirds majority barring one 
vote, thus stopping just short of the power to unilaterally change the Constitution, the NP 
won enough seats to warrant a deputy-president being chosen from their party and the 
IFP (Inkatha Freedom Party85) won regional control of the Kwa-Zulu Natal province, 
their political stronghold. Nevertheless, the important role of political elites in smoothing 
the transition process and thus preventing the possibility of grassroots clashes is 
recognised by political analysts (Hadenius, 2000:73). It must be conceded that whatever 
“back-room bargaining” (Friedman & de Villiers, 1996:50) may have taken place, the 
South African transition in 1994 was truly remarkable considering the pessimistic 
prognoses of some. It was the effective mediation of a political transition86 which, acted 
out at grassroots level, would more than likely have culminated in a blood bath (Landman, 
2000:73).       
 
In 1996 the Government of National Unity87 promulgated the final National Constitution 
which would replace the interim document. It was understood that such concessions to 
appease minority and essentially white concerns, such as the guarantee of a cabinet seat 
                                                 
85 Initially a cultural movement, “Inkatha” became a political party in the early nineties under Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi. A controversial personage in South African political history, Buthelezi is said to have 
collaborated with the apartheid government as a bantustan tribal ruler in the 1980s in opposing the ANC 
and fomenting so-called “black on black” violent (Marx, 1998:206). Relations between the ANC and the 
IFP have thus sometimes been strained, especially as the IFP is predominantly Zulu by definition, whereas 
the ANC, despite their policy of non-racialism, garners most of its support from South African Xhosa 
speakers. Matters came to a head in 1994, when the IFP walked out of talks leading up to the 1994 
elections, only to announce their re-entry into the elections just days before the polling stations were to 
open (Friedman, 1995:545).    
86 The precedent which this pact, essentially between the NP and the ANC, set in terms of compromise and 
reconciliation has already been commented on. It served to foster unity within the nation starting from the 
top (Landman, 2000:74).  
87 This was the government which was elected in the 1994 elections, whose primary tasks were the 
formulation of the official Constitution and overseeing the political transition.  
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to any party winning a 5% threshold in Parliament, would be waived in the 1999 
elections (Hadenius, 2000:77).   
 
It was recognised that a major goal for the newly elected government would be the social 
and economic upliftment of those previously disadvantaged under the apartheid system, 
in essence the majority of the population. To this effect, the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme88 (RDP) was launched, with the twin goals of simultaneously 
alleviating poverty and reconstructing the economy, under strain from the ancien 
regime’s89 considerable debt (Lodge, 1999:27). This programme was interpreted to mean 
“different things to different people” (Marais, 2001:238). Whereas the political left saw 
this as beginning to redress the past, the private sector saw the RDP as a promise by the 
state not to oppose privatisation. The cost of this programme was not reflected in 
increased state expenditure as many state subsidies were withdrawn to cover its costs 
(Lodge, 1999:30-31). Despite marked improvement in the provision of basic services, the 
ambiguity of the programme’s mandate limited its impact and it was withdrawn in 1996 
amid much controversy, later replaced by GEAR (the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution programme).  
 
It is here that the tripartite alliance90 began to weaken, as the perception was that the 
ANC had succumbed to the temptations of international capital and big business. This is 
especially true because GEAR, a document much more neo-liberally orientated in its 
framework, was presented as a fait accompli to the ANC National Executive and its allies. 
Consultation with the SACP or Cosatu was thus pointedly neglected, as was becoming 
more and more the case91  (Lodge, 1999:5-7). While the influence of the SACP had 
waned with the crumbling of the USSR in 1989, Cosatu had perhaps arguably been 
                                                 
88 Under the directorship of Aziz Pahad. 
89 Originally used in the context of the French Revolution in 1789 to refer to the absolutist monarchy of 
King Louis XVI, ancien regime is French for ‘previous regime’.  
90 This was a political alliance between ANC, SACP and Cosatu (The Congress of South African Trade 
Unions). 
91 Indeed, Marais (2001:95) suggests that the Reconstruction and Development Programme was propagated 
before the 1994 elections to win Cosatu’s backing of the ANC, then subtly changed following the elections. 
To be sure, the final document was radically different from the initial drafts.   
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mollified by the formation of NEDLAC92 in 1994. The ANC remained firmly in the 
driving seat, however. In addition, civil society, while having flourished during the 
apartheid era, suffered a severe blow when the UDF’s successor, the South African 
National Civic Organisation (SANCO) lost 70% of its leadership to regional and national 
governments following the 1994 elections93 (Lodge, 1999:83). Despite SANCO allowing 
those who had become parliamentarians and local councillors to retain their positions at 
SANCO, in 1997 it was felt that this organisation experienced severe marginalisation and 
had lost much of the influence it had previously exercised over the ANC (Lodge, 
1999:84). 
 
South Africa has nevertheless emerged from two more consecutive national elections, 
held in 1999 and 2004, without mishap and is considered by some to be well on its way 
to furthering democratic consolidation, having successfully completed democratic 
transition (Friedman, 1995; Lodge, 1999; Shaw, 2002; Hyden, 2000b:14). Mandela 
stepped down following the completion of his presidential term in 1999 in favour of his 
successor, Thabo Mbeki. Despite the ANC’s having won well over a two-thirds majority 
in the most recent national election, Mbeki has promised not to seek a third term through 
a unilateral constitutional amendment 94 . Marring this picture of possible democratic 
consolidation, however, is the fact that despite President Mbeki’s promises, South Africa 
is seen by both analysts and political opponents alike as a de facto one-party dominant 
state and it seems that it will remain so for the foreseeable future (Giliomee & Simkins, 
1999:1; Mail & Guardian 21/6/04). Exacerbating the situation is the view held by some 
that, because of their historical affiliations, the majority of black South Africans will 
support the ANC whether their situations improve or not, threatening to alienate the other 
racial minorities (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999:25;41). There are thus many political 
obstacles, both real and perceived, yet to be overcome before South African democracy 
can be regarded as convincingly consolidated.   
                                                 
92 The National Economic Development and Labour Council was instituted to foster dialogue between the 
state, the private sector and labour organizations, specifically about labour policies; see www.nedlac.org.za.     
93 Due to the policy of maintaining political neutrality, SANCO members who wished to participate in the 
public sector had to resign from their positions held at SANCO. This held until 1997.  
94A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds majority, followed by a further 75% vote in favour of 
the motion in the National Assembly. Furthermore, six out of the nine provinces in the National Council of 
Provinces must also be in favour of the motion (Shaw, 2001:20).    
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 On the economic front South Africa was recognised by Morgan & Stanley as one of the 
top five most promising emerging markets (Shaw, 2002:7). Although apartheid’s 
ostracism was a contributing factor, the new regime’s refusal to borrow money to service 
debt has led to low levels of international debt and South Africa is recognised as 
harbouring few of the characteristically African impediments to progress and stability 
that are present elsewhere on the continent (Shaw, 2002:68; Chege, 1996:351; Ake, 
1996:70).  
 
Politically, the Mbeki administration has done much for South Africa. Although not a 
charismatic leader like his predecessor, President Mbeki is an astute political manager 
and negotiator, supported by the business sector (Lodge, 1999:117). He has also 
endeavoured to put South Africa on the map through his 1997 “I am an African” speech 
and his propagation of the “African Renaissance” (Lodge, 1999:98). Nevertheless, he has 
often been surrounded by controversy, following his “quiet diplomacy” approach towards 
Zimbabwe and his stance on HIV/AIDS (Cape Times, 27/04/04). The backlash at media 
criticism of the government is also worrying. The fact that South Africa could be 
described as a “de facto one-party dominant state” is also a point of concern, as Shaw 
(2002:30) points to the fact that multiparty politics are “the heart-beat of democracy”.  
Thus prospects for South Africa’s further consolidation of democracy, while promising, 
are by no means completely assured.  
 
2.4 Comparing Historical Legacies         
 From the cursory political insights provided above, it is evident that while there are 
many aspects of South Africa and Brazil’s historical legacies which bear little 
resemblance, there are several rather important parallels. The most striking of these, as 
well as the most radical differences, will be elaborated on below. 
 
Firstly, it is evident that both the ancien regimes and the nature of the democratic 
transitions themselves share many characteristics. In both cases the pre-democratic 
government was authoritarian, yet it began introducing gradual reforms and negotiating 
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with the political opposition. This was approximately ten years before history recognised 
these respective countries’ democratizations after their first democratic elections (Shaw, 
2002:7; Martinez-Lara, 1996:27).  The self-imposed nature of these reforms is 
emphasized in this study as the international influences of both of these transitions, while 
not ignored, have not been focused on95. It has been argued that internal pressures for 
democratic transition are by far the most important prerequisite for such change (Hurrell, 
1996). Consequently, it must be recognized that the timing of South Africa’s transition 
was affected by several external factors, despite or perhaps because of its political 
isolation (Shaw, 2002:7). These are the ANC’s international support network and the end 
of the Cold War. Brazil, while unusually insulated from world affairs (Hurrell, 1996:146) 
also experienced external pressure. The argument maintaining that a comparison over a 
disparate time-frame is thus valid as many of these pressures on the two countries were 
the same96.  
 
Regarding the nature of the transitions specifically, they were both elite pacts 97 . 
Consequently, it could be argued that this provided for too much continuity from the old 
forms of government. It is true that the military kept a strong finger in the political pie 
after abertura through the Sarney presidency; and the NP arguably retained far more 
influence that it would have retained through strict proportional representation98 (Hurrell, 
1996:161; Friedman, 1995:559; Hadenius, 2002:77). Nevertheless, it could be countered 
that it is this very continuity which has saved both democracies from political 
retrogression, so often seen in developing countries, as it cushioned the inevitable 
                                                 
95 The rationale for this is presented by the arguments in Chapter One. 
96 These include the USA’s continued foreign policy advocating democracy, the upholding of human rights 
(both regimes were violators in this respect) and the continued sanctions and ostracism experienced by both 
regimes due to their non-conformity to global norms (Broderick, 2000:14; Whitehead,1996:154; 
Shaw,2001:6) For a detailed examination of Brazil’s external influences to democratic transition, see 
Hurrell (1996). Shaw (2001) albeit less thoroughly, describes the international factors contributing to the 
South African transition. See also Geldenhuys,1984.  
97 While Higley & Gunther’s (1992:279) argument that there was never an elite pact in Brazil is 
acknowledged, it is argued here that the fact that political power remained with the political elite (Roett, 
1999:95), although it changed hands in terms of political parties, constitutes a kind of elite pact.  
98 The provisos guaranteeing minority representation in the first democratic term of administration have 
been mentioned, among those effectively allowing the NP a deputy president. These subsequently fell away 
in the term beginning in 1999.  
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institutional shock inherent in regime change 99  (Schmitter, 1996b:25; Przeworski, 
1995:50; Hadenius, 2002:67). Weffert (1994:31) emphasizes the importance of good 
leaders in the early transitional phases. In both cases studies, it was the political elites 
who took the initiative.    
 
Something must also be said about the remarkably similar socio-economic profile shared 
by South Africa and Brazil100. In both cases the decades of authoritarian rule exacerbated 
what had already been very unequal societies (O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001; Nascimento 
& Nascimento, 2001:128). The reason for this is two-fold.  
 
In the first instance, racism was used as a weapon against the masses. A legacy of slavery 
and colonialism dictated that, as a general rule, blacks were more impoverished than 
whites. In South Africa this situation was reinforced by a deliberate accumulation of 
legislation ensuring that the welfare of the white population was subsidized by the 
neglect of the black majority101 (Ramphele, 2001:65). In Brazil, following the higher rate 
of miscegenation historically, the phenomenon of racism was much more subtle 102 , 
despite achieving the same effect as apartheid (Sansone, 2003:152). It was related more 
to the darkness of one’s skin103 (on a colour continuum) than the ethnic categorization it 
implied. Nevertheless, in Brazil the prerequisite of literacy to vote excluded most blacks 
from political franchise, as had been the intention, especially as little effort was made on 
the part of the government to improve the socio-economic circumstances of the mostly 
black poor (O’Donnell & Birdsall, 2001:291). In addition, the false ideology of a “racial 
                                                 
99 While perhaps not so evident in the Brazilian case, in South Africa the ANC’s primary mandate was to 
bring democracy to South Africa, leaving them ill-prepared to actually assume government authority. Aside 
from allowing “sharing of blame”, retaining parliamentarians from the ancien regime initially provided 
much needed administrative experience (Friedman, 1995).    
100 See chapter one. 
101 A direct example of this is a comparison of government subsidies per schoolchild according to race and 
age group; see O’Donnell & Birdsall, 2001.  
102 It is noteworthy that the principles of eugenics were incorporated into the 1934 Constitution under 
Vargas, despite his populist image as a “champion of the working-class”, who would have been 
predominantly darker skinned (Nascimento & Guimarães, 2001:514). 
103 Sansone (2003) found that his interviewees collectively used more than 36 terms to describe the 
different colours of their complexion, as many have negative or positive connotations. In an attempt to 
promote racial democracy however, the military state census omitted racial categorization (Marx, 
1998:177).  
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democracy”, simultaneously ignored structural inequalities and prevented political 
mobilization or solidarity on the basis of race104 (Guimarães,2001).  
 
Secondly, in both cases, the disenfranchisement of the poor, generally the black masses, 
consequently released the government of any obligations of social accountability, as they 
did not form part of the electorate. This left the governments in South Africa and Brazil 
free to pursue clientelistic relations with the richer, whiter sectors of society, thus further 
widening the gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots” (Friedman, 1995:541; 
McDonough, 1981). The subsequent state of the population, in terms of socio-economic 
inequalities, has had important consequences for levels of support for democracy in both 
South Africa and Brazil. 
 
Firstly, with the institution of a universal franchise, the government had, literally 
overnight, become accountable to an electorate, approximately 80%105 of whom has been 
effectively ignored by the government for several decades and the majority lacked the 
provision of basic needs as a result of past discrimination. This presents a serious 
challenge to the current administrations. Not only was the state apparatus previously not 
equipped to deal with this demand, political actors face the potential loss of substantial 
specific support should these demands not be met. The respective administrations have  
also lost the complete autonomy to enact the necessary economic restructuring for long-
term benefits as the inevitable job losses will evoke public protest.   
 
In addition, the waning legitimacy of both South Africa’s and Brazil’s authoritarian 
regimes also affected citizens’ relations toward the state. In the former case years of 
protest through boycotting had instilled a culture of non-payment (Friedman, 1995:543) 
in certain sectors of the population, further depriving the state of much needed revenue 
and further weakening political legitimacy. In the latter case the recent phenomenon of 
political apathy, most evident among black youths, can be directly attributable to the 
                                                 
104 To this day political campaigning on the basis of race, even in the most black areas of Brazil, have come 
to nothing as it is considered a taboo subject (Guimarães, 2001:170).  
105 In 1994 the percentage of non-whites in South Africa was approximately 76% (Friedman, 1995:531) and 
in Brazil in 1988 the percentage of non-literates was 78% (Lamounier, quoted in Freidman & De Villiers, 
1996:31) 
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feeling of powerlessness and frustration engendered through decades of authoritarian rule 
(Sansone, 2003:104; Guimarães, 2001:170). 
 
Despite all these factors, the contention here is that both South Africa and Brazil will 
demonstrate similar trends to those that characterize mature democracies with deeply 
embedded democratic cultural norms. This is due to the very important fact that in both 
cases some semblance of democratic practice, however limited, was maintained 
throughout authoritarian rule. It is proposed that this sustained practice fostered a 
democratic political culture even through the years of the previous oppressive regime. 
Consequently, it is proposed that diffuse support for democracy, may have developed, 
providing the reservoir of support for democratic principles needed to sustain a 
democratic regime in times of crisis. 
 
In Brazil this is ostensibly due to the fact that it was always the intention of the military 
government to return to civilian democratic rule “once the country was ready” 106  
(Fiechter, 1975:37; Roett, 1999:50). Presidential and gubernatorial elections were held 
regularly and official opposition existed throughout the twenty years of military rule, 
despite the frequent manipulations of the system on the part of the government and 
temporary suspensions of certain rights and institutions (Lamounier, 1999:132-133; 
Martinez-Lara, 1996:15). 
 
In the case of South Africa during the apartheid years, the situation was much the same as 
that described above. Despite police brutality107, regular elections were held, with all the 
institutions of democracy maintained in place, including parliamentary opposition, 
provided the political participants were white. By the same token, the black elite were 
fighting for the institutionalization of democracy, so naturally democratic theory was 
well-known and propagated by them (Friedman, 1995:541). 
 
                                                 
106 It is thus ironic that Castello Branco, the first military president, projected that having a mandate of only 
two years (later extended) would be sufficient to bring Brazil back to political order (Fiechter, 1975:44). 
107 This was present in both authoritarian regimes and it is contended that this situation prevails in Brazil to 
this day (Landman, 2003:31). 
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Consequently, it is possible that the necessary permeation of democratic norms into the 
democratic political culture to ensure diffuse democratic support was already in place108. 
While specific support gained through satisfactory regime performance is of course 
necessary, many argue that is it diffuse support that is the most fundamental to 
democracy’s survival as this cushions the regime in the event of performance failure 
(Bratton & Mattes, 2000b). Diffuse support is thus especially necessary in developing 
countries, where the authorities are faced with the twin challenges of both political and 
economic liberalization as they are re-integrated into the global economy.    
 
2.6 Conclusion                                       
 Democracy, despite the universal acknowledgement of its importance, remains a difficult 
concept to define, much less quantify, owing to the numerous ways in which it is 
conceptualised and the many variations of democratic regimes found throughout the 
world. Support for democracy, as has been discovered, is even more perplexing to 
conceptualise, as it arguably revolves around a common understanding of what 
democracy is. 
 
It has been argued here that, while there is no certainty that Brazilians and South Africans 
define democracy in exactly the same way, they have a similar general understanding of 
it. Thus, in measuring political support for their democratic regimes, we are measuring 
support for democracy in their countries and allowing a certain measure of comparison.  
 
The theoretical model chosen on which to base this study acknowledges the layered 
meaning of political support. It attempts to measure both diffuse support, support for 
democracy itself, and specific support, i.e. support for the more immediate actions of the 
democratic regime. This is done by attempting to measure support for the five layers of 
political objects identified above as the political community, regime principles, regime 
performance, regime institutions and political actors.  
                                                 
108 Furthermore, at least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, there is no correlation between poverty and a 
reduced appreciation of democratic norms (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 4, 2003). This seems to 
contradict the belief that a certain level of economic development is necessary for sustainable democracy 
(Linz & Stepan, 1996). While this cannot be said to reflect Brazilian or indeed uniquely South African 
trends, it is a useful finding to bear in mind.     
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 In addition, the unique politico-historical context of the two case studies has been 
explored in order to provide both an elaboration of their comparability and a setting for 
the data analysis to follow. For both new democratic regimes, knowledge of support 
levels for democracy will be essential in gauging its legitimacy among the masses, which 
is required by these regimes for sustainability, and progress in democratic consolidation. 
 
With the theoretical point of departure clarified, and the specific historical contexts of 
each case study explored, the focus of the study has been solidly conceptualized. It 
remains to accord each element of the framework an instrument of measurement. The 
following chapter will thus operationalize the key conceptual elements in this study. 
 58
Chapter Three: Methodology 
_______________________________________________________________________  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the conceptualization of the key constructs: political support, political objects 
of support and democracy, as well as their contextualisation, it is necessary to consider 
the methodological aspect of the research. Firstly, the World Values Survey1, the chosen 
measurement instrument and source of data, will be briefly described. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the methodological techniques to be used, focusing 
specifically on their appropriateness in this case as well as on disadvantages to take note 
of. Lastly, the operationalization of this study’s primary variables will be explained. 
 
3.2 The World Values Survey as a source of Secondary Aggregate Data2
The chosen measurement instrument, as mentioned above, is the World Values Survey, a 
source of secondary data. The term secondary data refers to data which have already been 
analysed and are being used in a study other than the one for which they were originally 
collected (Jackson, 1995:3). They thus provide an opportunity to rework and re-interpret 
the data from a different angle (Moser & Kalton, 1977:43). It is therefore possible to 
discover relationships between variables across countries that were not originally 
anticipated (Dale et al., 1988:54). The secondary data used in this study, the World 
Values Survey (WVS), are thus aggregate data because the data collected have been 
categorized by country, according to the countries that participated in the survey 
(Landman, 2000:72).   
 
Although the survey was not specifically designed to explore the level of support for 
democracy in South Africa and Brazil per se, it is well suited to this purpose. Especially 
in terms of cross-national comparative research, as is the case here, secondary data is 
often the only source of relevant quantitative information, as few independent researchers 
                                                 
1WVS is a source of secondary data. The implications of this for the study as well as the appropriateness of 
this type of data for a study such as this will be addressed below. In places data have been supplemented by 
the Brazilian Centre of Public Opinion Studies (CESOP) survey data. This is also elaborated on below.  
2 Information on the World Values Survey was obtained at www.worldvaluessurvey.com ; 
wvs.isr.umich.edu/index.shtml  
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can afford to undertake a project of such magnitude as WVS single-handedly (Dale et al., 
1988:26). This is especially true of a longitudinal study such as this thesis, which requires 
several waves of the survey3, implying further expense. In addition, this study is also able 
to benefit from the expertise of those who created the survey, as well as save on the time 
and money needed to complete it (Dale et al., 1988:44; Babbie & Mouton, 1998:265). 
 
There are, however, several disadvantages to the use of secondary data. Although the data 
are quantitative, this does not prevent them from being influenced by the values and 
preferences of the primary researchers (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:82). Often the focus of 
the survey is not appropriate for what the secondary researcher wishes to investigate, 
leading to problems of validity4. Similarly, even should the survey purport to measure 
what the secondary researcher requires, the latter has to rely on the primary researchers’ 
operationalization, which may not always be an accurate measurement (Landman, 
2000:21). Especially in view of the cross-national nature of this study, the problem is 
compounded by the fact that the concept which needs to be measured may be interpreted 
or translated differently from, in the case of this study, English into Portuguese, in the 
case of Brazil, and into the ten other official languages of South Africa, let alone taking 
into account the cultural differences which may inhibit direct translation (Mokrycki, 
1979:94-95; Dogan & Kazancigil, 1994:24). A particular disadvantage of the use of 
secondary data encountered in this study was that, whereas it was suitable as a 
measurement instrument for some aspects, in others it could not be used at all. In this 
case, another survey was used to substitute missing data or poor indicators, as explained 
below. Nevertheless, the World Values Survey, for all that it may not be perfectly suited 
to this study, is the most appropriate source of data for this study as it facilitates the direct 
cross-national comparison of South Africa and Brazil, using the same instrument. As 
such, it origins should be explored.    
     
The World Values Survey (WVS) developed out of surveys initially carried out by the 
European Value Systems Study Group (EVSSG). The first wave, in 1981, was conducted 
                                                 
3 WVS is generally conducted approximately every five years.     
4 This has been the case in several instances in this study; see Chapter Four.  
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in primarily Western developed countries, but the project drew such interest that it was 
expanded to eventually include the mass publics of 45 different countries over a broad 
socio-economic spectrum. Subsequent waves were carried out in 1990 and 1995, when 
the number of participating countries increased to sixty-five. The most recent survey 
wave was completed in 2001. It is to date the largest cross-national exploration of social 
change and value shifts and, according to Babbie & Mouton (2001:265), the most widely 
analysed5.   
 
The survey was designed and carried out by an international network of social scientists, 
under the guidance of a steering committee based at the University of Michigan and 
headed by political scientist and sociologist Ronald Inglehart. The surveys in each 
country were predominantly locally funded6 and organised, essentially allowing relative 
freedom from a central controlling body or sponsor 7 . Organisers, in return for their 
assistance in carrying out the World Values Survey project, receive free access to the data 
collected in all the other countries, as well as their own8.  
 
Covering a wide range of topics, among them family life, work, politics and religion, the 
survey was initially constructed in order to investigate the suspected change in mass 
value systems of belief9. The most recent two waves, however, have shifted their focus 
somewhat to investigating the development of democratic political culture in developing 
countries10. 
 
                                                 
5 Publications based on the WVS used in this study include Klingeman & Fuchs (1995); Kaas & Newton 
(1995) and Abramson & Inglehart (1998). 
6 Exceptions include India, China and Nigeria, for which American-based funding was sourced in order to 
carry out the surveys.  
7 It must be pointed out that, while some consider this an advantage, independent researchers lack a system 
of standardization and this detracts from the ultimate comparability of results, especially in a project of this 
size.    
8 A moratorium is placed on the data for three years for other researchers. This could be seen as a 
disadvantage for researchers using the data in secondary analysis, therefore, as it renders the data slightly 
out of date.    
9 See Inglehart (1990, 1998).  
10 Aside from the fact that both South Africa and Brazil are participants in the survey, this is another reason 
why this particular survey is so appropriate for use in this study, especially as WVS allows longitudinal 
research. Nevertheless, as will be noticed and acknowledged, changes in the survey’s design, while 
increasing the validity of the data’s use, also creates some methodological problems.    
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Both stratified random sampling and quota sampling were used to select the sample 
groups from the cross-national universe11. The population included all adults over the age 
of 18 years12. Respondents were surveyed by means of face-to-face interviews. The data 
have been weighted to correct any bias that non-responses13 or the over-sampling of a 
certain group may create. 
  
The Brazilian version of the survey was conducted by the Gallup Institute based in Sao 
Paulo. The 1990 (n=1782) and 1995 (n=1149) survey waves14 were conducted in October 
1991 to January 1992 and Fall15 1997 respectively. The South African survey sets16 were 
conducted by Markinor Research Company, based in Randburg. The 1995 (n=2935) and 
2001 (n=3000) were conducted in October to November, 1995 and March to May 2001 
respectively.    
 
3.3 Filling in the Gaps: CESOP17 data 
As mentioned above, secondary data can be restrictive because they are not specifically 
formulated around the operationalization of one’s own research problem. This is the case 
with the 1990 Brazil questionnaire. Whereas the 1995 and 2001 survey waves show a 
good deal of continuity, the topic areas covered by the 1990 and 1995 survey waves 
differ markedly.  
 
In addition, questions which may have been utilised in this study’s operationalization 
were excluded from the Brazilian version for unknown reasons. This is beyond the 
control of the current study. As such, in an attempt to supplement the WVS data where 
                                                 
11 Unfortunately the specific sampling techniques for each individual country are not known, although it is 
noted that they do differ. Häder & Gabler (2003:123) note that, whereas random sampling may not be 
universally accepted as appropriate for cross-national surveys, quota sampling lacks sufficient theoretical 
backing. They contend that the latter is in fact inappropriate as, especially cross-nationally, the variable 
used to stratify the population may bias the data. It is in fact acknowledged that the populations of India, 
China and Nigeria, as well as the illiterate and rural populations globally, were under-sampled.   
12 This is officially the age range of the respondents, although it has been discovered that in the case of both 
Brazil and South Africa, respondents were aged 16 years and older. 
13 Non-bias response is a random error whereby a large number of respondents answering ‘don’t know’ to a 
question may distort results (Häder & Gabler, 2003:124). 
14 The primary investigator was Carlos Eduardo Meirelles Matheus in both instances. 
15 It is uncertain as to whether this refers to the Northern or Southern hemisphere.   
16 Investigators included Johann Mouton, Anneke Greyling, Robert Mattes & Mari Harris.    
17 Centro de Estudos de Opinião Publica 
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they do not fill this study’s requirements surveys from the Centro de Estudos de Opinião 
Publica (CESOP) have been used18.      
 
CESOP is an academic organisation affiliated with and based at the University of 
Campinas19 (UNICAMP), Brazil.  It is an interdisciplinary institution, which professes to 
specialize in the structure, collection and organisation of survey data, particularly on 
public opinion. CESOP provides consultation services in the development of research 
projects as well as training programmes for public opinion methodology and quantitative 
analysis20. 
 
Two of the CESOP surveys have of necessity been employed to supplement the WVS 
data: one taken in January 1990 21  (just prior to Collor’s inauguration) and one in 
December 1990 22 . Both are Public Opinion Surveys, with a universe comprising 
Brazilian voters and Brazilian citizens of 16 and 17 years of age. For both surveys, 
N=3650.       
 
3.4 Design and Methodology 
This study, according to the nature of its research problem, is to engage in comparative 
research. In choosing to use the World Values Survey as an instrument of measurement, 
this study assumes a decidedly quantitative nature and it consequently uses a positivist 
approach. This notwithstanding, the importance of the data’s context and historical 
precedent in a study such as this ensures that the study is also influenced by qualitative 
research 23 . Indeed, it is recognised that cross-national comparative research is very 
                                                 
18 This is specifically for the 1990 Brazil ‘regime performance’ and ‘political actor’ operationalization; see 
below.   
19 Information on CESOP is available at: www.unicamp.br/cesop.html  
20 As all the CESOP surveys that were used were conducted in Portuguese, the researcher’s ability to 
understand and speak Portuguese was very useful in translating both the survey item questions and their 
response sets.   
21 Used to provide data to analyse for 1990 Brazil ‘regime performance’.  
22 Used to provide data to analyse for 1990 Brazil ‘political actors’. 
23 It is generally recognised that comparative research is best served by borrowing from both the 
quantitative and qualitative approaches (Ragin, 1994:130).  
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successful in combining the two approaches24 as qualitative data provides more depth to 
the study’s essentially quantitative findings (Dale et al,1988:2,41). As such, all of these 
approaches, the comparative, qualitative and quantitative, will be discussed and 
contrasted.  
 
3.4.1 The Comparative Approach 
The comparative approach, such as it is to be used here, focuses on the differences across 
cases in that it explores the diversity in similar cases with the same outcome (Ragin, 
1994:106). It attempts to establish and understand whether certain generalizations hold 
across particular countries (Dogan & Kazancgil, 1994:15). Here the possible differences 
between South Africa’s and Brazil’s levels of democratic support following democratic 
transition, under broadly similar circumstances, is to be investigated25.  
 
This implies the use of the most similar systems design (MSSD). MSSD is most 
appropriate when analysing relatively few case studies, as in this study, as it allows the 
controlling of several variables in an attempt narrow down possible explanations for the 
phenomenon to be explained 26  (Landman, 2000:53). While this study does not use 
control variables statistically, the marked similarities between Brazil and South Africa, in 
some respects, allows the similar context of these countries to either explain parallels in 
the research results or be ruled out as mitigating factors.  MSSD avoids focusing 
exclusively on statistical and quantitative data, ensuring that context and historical 
influence are accorded the proper amount of emphasis and significance, essentially 
combining aspects of qualitative and quantitative data (Landman, 2003:200, Tashakkori 
& Teddlie, 1998:13). The level of conceptual abstraction is also lower as the case studies 
                                                 
24 This is known as the pragmatic approach. Although many contend that qualitative and quantitative 
approaches are in fact incompatible, many researchers successfully combine the two. For further in depth 
discussion, see Tashakkori,A. & C.Teddlie (1998).  
    
25 It is also the aim of comparative research to advance theory within a specific analytical framework 
(Ragin, 1994:108). Here, the description of levels of democratic support in the case studies, within the 
theoretical framework of political support theory, will perhaps provide avenues for further research in this 
regard.     
26 While this study is primarily descriptive in nature, the controlling of as many variables as possible still 
aids in narrowing down the focus of the research.   
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are more specific (Landman, 2003:27). Nevertheless, this approach has been criticized for 
several reasons.  
 
Especially when comparing developing countries, as is the case here, the quality of data 
is at times limited, which means the researcher may have to compromise the quality of 
statistics (Dogan & Kazancigil, 1994:41). In addition, due to the necessary limitations on 
the number of case studies which can be examined, in this case two, general inferences 
the researcher is able to make are necessarily limited. Similarly, due to the conscious 
choice involved in selecting case studies, researchers may be tempted to select only those 
which will prove their hypothesis27 (Landman, 2000:201). As this study is not concerned 
with hypotheses, nor necessarily with making generalized inferences, however, these 
limitations are not as applicable in this case. 
 
There are several advantages and disadvantages implicit in the use of both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches to cross-national studies. These will both be discussed, 
leading to a substantiation of the use of the methods chosen for this study.  
 
3.4.2 Quantitative and Qualitative Research: Positivism versus Idealism 
Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998:11) emphasize that qualitative and quantitative approaches 
can happily co-exist within a single study and indeed many researchers combine these 
two to enrich their research28. It is necessary to examine them in order to distinguish the 
differences and how their use will benefit this study.   
 
Quantitative research is nomothetic in that it favours the creation of generalizing laws 
following the analysis of data (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:272). Research takes place within 
a carefully controlled environment and relies upon the formulation of hypotheses to be 
disproved within the context of the research (Hammersly,1993:15). Quantitative 
researchers are often accused of “obsessions to control” (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:49) and 
                                                 
27 This is known as selection bias (Landman, 2003:42). It is not, however applicable, as the nature of this 
study is exploratory and part of the research problem involved the specific selection of case studies South 
Africa and Brazil.   
28 This is often called the ‘mixed methods’ or pragmatic approach (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998:11).   
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the reduction of the study to pure mechanics (Dasgupta & Maskin, 1999:81). This is 
largely because quantitative researchers derive their methods from positivism, an 
approach to social science whereby the research is handled like that of the natural 
sciences: the formulation of general laws, the identification of variables, etc. (Bunge, 
1999:19). According to positivists, research can only be based on the reality of 
observable, objective facts and so value judgements are disregarded (Hammersley, 
1993:5-6). This study incorporates aspects of the positivist approach, because it uses 
qualitative data in the form of WVS survey statistics. It does depart from this paradigm, 
however, in that certain value judgements are inherent in the interpretation of the data.29    
 
While the “hypothetico-deductive strategy” (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:273) has no appeal 
for some researchers, who maintain that descriptions and concepts remain thin and lack 
context (Ragin, 1994:81), this approach has some definite advantages. Quantitative 
research, by virtue of the fact that it uses statistics to make inferences, can supposedly 
remain value neutral30 (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998:7). It is also appropriate for this 
specific study because the research employs aggregate data (Landman, 2000:18). Of 
course, this aspect of the quantitative approach leads to a host of limitations in the study. 
Those specific to this study will be discussed below31. 
 
Qualitative research, especially in terms of cross-national comparison, can make an 
important contribution towards enriching the study. Indeed, comparative research, in 
terms of epistemology, is often considered to be half-way between qualitative and 
quantitative research, benefiting from both approaches (Ragin, 1994:130). As this study 
is concerned with only two cases, the qualitative nature of the study can be extended32 
(Landman, 2000:18). Investigations into both South Africa’s and Brazil’s political 
                                                 
29 See Chapter Five. 
30 Admittedly, this claim is problematic because no statistics can be regarded as completely objective. In 
addition, many might perhaps argue that objectivity in the context of social research is not desirable.   
31 They have to do with the problems of validity and reliability, as well as restriction of the research in 
terms of analytical framework (Ragin, 1994:140-142). They will be discussed with specific reference to 
survey and secondary aggregate data studies, as is the case here.   
32 Due to the intensity and ‘rich’ description inherent in qualitative data, as well as the intensity of the 
methodology, usually fieldwork, usually very few cases are incorporated into a single study (Babbie & 
Mouton, 1998:271).  
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histories and development have been made, both to inform the data results and provide a 
context for the data analysis. The complexities of comparative research mean that the 
researcher and the theoretical background employed will influence the study, confirming 
that it is value-bound, as qualitative research maintains33.   
 
Qualitative research places the emphasis on contextualization and rich description, thus 
drawing nuances and subtleties from the collected data (Ragin, 1994:137). Although this 
study will not go so far as to attempt an “emic”34 interpretation of the study, recognition 
of the role that culture has to play in terms of interpreting the data stems from the 
appreciation of the qualitative approach (Landman, 2000:204). Dasgupta and Maskin 
(1999:81-82) summarise the contrast between the principle concerns of qualitative and 
quantitative research most succinctly in terms of this kind of study:    
 
 “The case-by case approach to such questions has enjoyed a long tradition, 
but it is often so case specific that it is difficult to draw a general picture from 
the studies. An alternative is to conduct statistical analyses of cross-country 
data, but the limitations of statistical analysis are often noted by social 
scientists, many of whom find them mechanical, bloodless, and lacking in the 
kind of insights that only macro-historical studies can offer. There is 
something in this, but it is also good to recognise their strength. Statistical 
analyses should be seen as complements to the cases studies of nations and 
regions. Their strength lies in that we avoid getting enmeshed in historical 
details, which can mesmerize us into thinking that whatever has happened to 
the case has a certain inevitability about it”. 
 
                                                 
33 Just as quantitative research stems from the positivist paradigm, the qualitative approach is informed by 
an idealist perspective. Briefly, the latter maintains that reality has multiple truths and the observer cannot 
be separate and independent from the observed. All interpretations are thus value-laden. Similarly, because 
of the unique context of each study, qualitative researchers deny that the formulation of generalized laws, 
such as those found in the natural sciences, is possible (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998:10).    
34 An anthropological term, “emic” relates to attempting to understand and interpret the world from the 
“insider’s” point of view, thus one who is actually being studied. This is in contrast with “etic” studies, 
generally quantitative, which attempt to interpret facts objectively, from the “outsider’s” point of view 
(Babbie & Mouton, 1998:53). 
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3.4.3 Measuring Attitudes 
Considering the nature of this study, which is essentially a measurement of attitudes, the 
operationalization of which is an attitudinal survey, something must be said concerning 
the measurement of attitudes35. 
 
Weisberg and Bowen (1977:6-7) contend that the measurement of attitudes is important 
in terms of understanding social phenomena and processes. Similarly, attitudes are 
instrumental in informing policy decisions. They are thus an integral part of the study of 
support for democracy, as this implies the measurement of a kind of attitude toward a 
(political) object. It is recognised that attitude measurement cannot be said to be directly 
related to behaviour as intent does not necessarily lead to action (Weisberg & Bowen, 
1977:83). This is a very important consideration when interpreting data from the World 
Values Survey. What is equally important, however, is what Oppenheim (1992:175) 
considers the ‘action tendency component’ of the attitude 36 . Manheim (1975:23) 
describes this as the conative part of an attitude. It is what links the attitude to behaviour, 
although it is not part of the behaviour or reaction itself, but it is the thought process 
which precedes the behaviour37.   
Although there is no proof that attitudes are either a product of logical reasoning, or 
measurable on a linear continuum, they are treated as such to facilitate their measurement 
(Oppenheim, 1992:175). This is achieved through attitude scaling. Attitudes are generally 
measured on two dimensions: content and direction (what is thought about the topic 
                                                 
35 Oppenheim (1992:177) describes attitude as more ‘superficial’ than value – the value implying a 
sustained attitude towards a stimulus. In this survey, ‘attitude’ is used interchangeably with ‘value’ as in the 
context of the World Values Survey attitude measurement is considered a manifestation of the value 
orientation (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995:2).  
36 Oppenheim (1992:175) conceptualizes attitude as comprising three parts: beliefs (cognitive component); 
feelings (emotional component); intent (action tendency component). He furthermore maintains that an 
affirmative answer to an attitude statement, such as is found in a survey questionnaire, implies a ‘state of 
readiness’ (Oppenheim, 1992:174). This has been similarly conceptualized by Manheim (1975) as the 
cognitive component, the affective component and the conative component respectively.      
37 Manheim (1975:23) acknowledges that there is a debate surrounding this conceptualization as to whether 
conation is a basic component of an attitude, or whether it is a part of an ‘attitude cluster’ which describes 
various feelings of an individual towards a certain object. See Manheim (1975).   
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under discussion) and intensity (how strongly this is felt) (Oppenheim, 1992:176; 
Manheim, 1975:15).  
 
The most prominent technique used in the World Values Survey in terms of attitude 
scaling is known as the Likert scale. This involves constructing a question whereby there 
is an attitude statement38 and a continuum of responses from which the respondent must 
make a selection39. All the World Values Surveys also include an implicit ‘don’t know’ 
category, although this is not advertised, so as to minimise non-response bias.40  The 
Likert scale is favoured because it allows a greater range of opinion to be gauged and has 
a proven high reliability (Oppenheim, 1992:200). 
 
Despite this, there are several problems unique to attitude measurement which must be 
considered here. Weisberg and Bowen (1977:81) categorize them as issues arising either 
due to the often superficial nature of public opinion, or poor attitude survey construction.  
The former comes into play when researchers try to question respondents on issues 
considered important by the researchers, but not so by the respondents (Weisberg & 
Bowen, 1977:82). Answers can then be invalid, as they are not really meaningful, or 
simply ‘non-answers’, leading to non-response bias, mentioned above. In addition, the 
more abstract the topic under consideration, the more problematic extracting opinions and 
attitudes from the respondent becomes (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:85).  
 
An additional problem, discussed at length by Johnson and Van de Vijver (2003) is social 
desirability bias. They investigate whether this form of survey bias is a social response 
style or an actual personality characteristic of some respondents. Interestingly, social 
desirability bias, the tendency to modify one’s surveyed views in order to appear more 
socially acceptable, is a universally recognised concept (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 
                                                 
38 According to Oppenheim (1992:174), this is a statement expressing a “point of view, belief, preference 
or judgement” with which the respondent must be able to disagree.       
39 An example of this taken from WVS 1995 (q21@4): “one of my main goals in life has been to make my 
parents proud” (attitude statement) ; “strongly agree/agree/disagree/agree strongly”  (Likert scale) This is 
a variation of the more common 5-point scale, which includes a neutral category. Here the choice 
encourages the respondent to take a side.  
40 Non-response bias occurs when the percentage of ‘don’t knows’ distorts the overall picture presented by 
the other attitude category percentages.    
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2003:199), which is good news in terms of cross-national studies. Of relevance to our 
study, however, is the fact that it corresponds to the Latin American cultural norm of 
“simpatia”, as well as the fact that social desirability bias is a greater factor in 
heterogeneous societies41. 
 
These factors of course come into play during the physical measurement of attitudes. As 
mentioned, the chosen instrument of attitude measurement is the World Values Survey. 
Consequently, the aspects of survey research will be discussed.  
 
3.4.4 Survey Research 
Survey research, such as the WVS, uses sampling methods in an attempt to collect 
reliable and valid data from a representative portion (sample) of what is usually a large 
universe. As such, survey research, in the form of the WVS, is ideal for the purposes of 
this study as the universe is the populations of two countries, whose opinions it seeks to 
compare (Moser & Galton, 1977:43). Both of the countries in question have been 
surveyed by the WVS with every attempt to represent the entire population in the sample 
surveyed. The study has further benefited from the survey by virtue of its being 
secondary data and a respected instrument formulated by the collective expertise of many 
senior researchers, increasing its reliability (Babbie & Mouton,1998:265).      
 
Survey research is not however, without its limitations. Although deemed the most 
suitable technique in the case of this study, especially as the focus is attitude 
measurement, survey research has been criticized for its difficulty in dealing with social 
life, particularly with its inability to measure social action, due to its overly positivist 
approach (Dale et al,1988:2,37). In terms of technical problems, sampling error, 
especially from a large universe, is common42 (Braun, 2003:137). In addition, secondary 
                                                 
41South Africa and Brazil are both heterogeneous societies. Social desirability bias is also prevalent among 
lower income and historically disadvantaged groups (Johnson & van de Vijver, 2003:198). Apart from the 
sociological implications of this, it must be remembered that the vast majority of both South Africa’s and 
Brazil’s populations are socio-economically disadvantaged. Thus the potential for social desirability bias to 
distort data in this study is considerable.     
42 In terms of the WVS, not only is it acknowledged that several countries were under-sampled in terms of 
rural areas, but two different kinds of sampling techniques were used during measurement, causing the 
comparability of the national data sets to be questioned.   
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survey research sometimes lacks validity as it was not specifically constructed for that 
study (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:265). Braun & Mohler (2003:110) also refer to the lowest 
common denominator effect, whereby lost data, with no chance of later researchers 
recovering it, forces the entire study to be simplified.    
 
It is also important to consider the technique used to conduct the interview. The World 
Values Survey utilized ‘face-to-face’ interviews43, involving an interviewer asking the 
respondent the survey questions in person and noting the answers.  
 
This technique is very advantageous should the respondent sample group have a low 
literacy rate as is more likely to be the case in developing counties, surveyed here. The 
interviewer can also probe if it is deemed that a particular survey question has not been 
sufficiently answered, leading to more complete data collection (Moser & 
Galton,1977:271; Brenner, 1982:133). In addition, in contrast with self-administered 
surveys, the interviewer can omit the “don’t know” category as a response option, 
encouraging respondents to think about an answer instead of merely opting for “don’t 
know”, thus lowering the ‘non-response’ percentage (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:250, 
Moser & Galton, 1977:272). There are various disadvantages to this technique, however. 
Although it usually achieves a high response rate, face-to-face interviews are the most 
expensive form of survey data collection (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:262). It is also time-
consuming as the interviewer generally has to build up a rapport with the respondents in 
order to gain their trust44 and thus enable the interviewer to probe for answers if the 
respondent seems reticent in answering (De Lamater, 1982:33).  
 
The danger of social desirability bias is also greater in the context of face-to-face 
interviews, as respondents sometimes defer to their perceived opinions of the interviewer 
in terms of their gender, ethnic group or apparent social background. This is known as 
interviewer bias (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 2003:207). For this reason it is necessary to 
                                                 
43 Other commonly used techniques are self-administered surveys (usually sent by post) and telephonic 
interviews. 
44 This is especially important as many respondents are fearful that information provided will later be used 
against them. This was indeed the case during the apartheid era, despite the fact that this violates the 
principle of confidentiality inherent in social research ethics (Babbie & Mouton, 1998:250).    
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pay careful attention to ensuring that respondents are interviewed by interviewers sharing 
the same characteristics, as this will limit the potential distortion of responses by this kind 
of bias (De Lamater, 1982:20).  
 
As mentioned previously, the data collected by means of the responses given by those 
interviewed will be cross-tabulated with several demographic variables, called “social 
background variables” by Norris (1999b:226). Braun and Mohler (2003:101) explain that 
such variables are useful in that they are inherently independent and can be used to 
explore dependent trends in the data used for the study. Thus information can be 
explained or described according to the subsets of these independent variables (Braun & 
Mohler, 2003:102). This is especially relevant because the type of survey used in this 
study targets attitudinal information, and the social background variables such as age, 
education, income and martial status are known to influence certain opinions45. 
 
Thus, having considered the instrument, namely the World Values Survey, and the 
theoretical substantiation for its use in this study, it remains to be seen how the data 
contained in the survey will be applied to the specific problem at hand through 
operationalization.    
          
3.5 Operationalization of Key Concepts 
While the World Values Survey has been selected for its eminent suitability for this study, 
as discussed above, it must be noted that the operationalization of the concepts used has 
been limited in two ways. Firstly, as the survey was composed without this specific study 
in mind, the questions used to measure the identified variables are not always ideal. The 
reader should bear the limitations of secondary data, discussed above, in mind when 
considering the nature of operationalization. Secondly, within the different survey waves, 
while the basic spheres of inquiry have remained the same, the wording of questions has 
often changed. This may be due to an adjusted focus in terms of the survey due to 
research interests or sponsors’ requirements. Whatever the case may be, where this 
                                                 
45 For example, age affects opinions of the individual according to their life cycle and cohort experience. 
For a more in-depth discussion on these phenomena as well as generational displacement theories, see 
Inglehart, R. (1990). See also Chapter Four. 
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occurs with questions pertinent to this study, the best attempts have been made to use 
questions deemed to measure the same concept, although the questions themselves may 
differ slightly.  
 
3.5.1 Political Community  
The conceptualization of political community used in this study encompasses both the 
acceptance of political co-operation within the designated community and a social 
communal feeling of belonging to this community (Norris, 1999a:10; Easton, 1965:177).  
 
Easton (1965:321) predicts the collapse of the political community in the event of 
internal separatist movements. Should this occur, it would mean that sub-regional or 
ethnic and linguistic ties are deemed by the members of the community to be more 
important than identification with the political community as a whole. Separatist 
movements have plagued African attempts in particular at democratization, following the 
imposition of incongruous of colonial borders as they did not correspond to the habitats 
of traditional ethnic and linguistic communities (Ake, 1996:65). This has consequently 
proved a huge problem for the creation of a national identity46. It is thus to be expected 
that African countries would have a very low support of political community, claiming 
loyalty instead to ethnic or cultural groups. This would seem even more likely in South 
Africa, due to the legacy of separate development and the exclusivity of South African 
citizenship47. In Brazil, in contrast, support for the political community could be expected 
to be rather high as ethnic differences are, officially at least, not acknowledged (Marx, 
1998:176). In addition, Portuguese is the universal mother-tongue. 
 
Thus to measure the respondent’s identification with the political community on a 
national level, the following question was asked: “To which of these geographical groups 
would you say you belonged to first of all?”48. Evidently the most desirable response in 
                                                 
46  The notion of national identity has, ironically, been used by many African leaders as a legitimate reason 
to create a centralist, one-party state “in order to consolidate national unity’ (Ake, 1996:65).  
47 Blacks especially were encouraged to claim independence for their artificially created ‘homelands’ so 
that their South African citizenship could be revoked (Schrire, 1994:127).  
48 This is question 320 in the 1990 survey, q80 in the 1995 survey and q215 in the 2001 survey. The 
response set included: a) locality of town where you live; b) province or region of the town where you live; 
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terms of a feeling of national political community would be identification with the 
country of the respondent. Identification below this level indicates regionalism and above 
this level indicates a poor acknowledgement of political community. 
 
Easton (1965:290-291) also speaks of a regime’s “operating values” and the regime’s use 
of an ideology to help legitimate it. Another word for this is nationalism or patriotism. 
Although it could be considered the darker side of the political community – consider, for 
instance, that apartheid was the consequence of Afrikaner nationalism49 and National 
Socialism was the consequence of German nationalism in the 1930’s (Marx, 1998:23) – it 
has had a very unifying effect50 in the case of Brazil (Marx, 1998:252). National pride is 
thus a recognized measure of political community (Norris, 1999a:16). As such the 
following question was also incorporated into the operationalization of the latter concept: 
“How proud are you to be South African/Brazilian?” 51. Evidently, the more national 
pride felt, the stronger the sense of political community.  
 
In relation to the above question, with the similar intention of measuring patriotism, the 
following question is also asked: “Of course we hope that there will not be another war, 
but should it come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?”52 . 
A ‘yes’ response is expected to show a strong sense of patriotism, emphasizing a sense of 
belonging to the political community.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
c) [South Africa/Brazil] as a whole; d) Africa/Latin America as a whole; e) The world as a whole; f) don’t 
know.   
49 It must be acknowledged that nationalism (especially Afrikaners’) was very exclusive, whereas the 
concept of political community is inclusive in character. It is for this very reason that the former is 
considered to be negative whereas the latter is positive. What these concepts have in common, however, is 
the sense of belonging and ‘oneness’ they bestow on a nation. It must be recognised that this of pride and 
community awareness can thus have bad consequences (Afrikaner nationalism circa 1940’s) or good (South 
African patriotism circa 1994).     
50 It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the ideology of ‘racial democracy’ imposed by the Brazilian 
state was instrumental in creating the structural inequalities between blacks and whites in Brazil 
(Guimarães,2001:68). 
51 This was q322 in the 1990 survey, q82 in the 1995 survey and q216 in the 2001 survey. The response set 
included: a) very proud; b) quite proud; c) not very proud; d) not at all proud; e) I am not a South 
African/Brazilian; e) don’t know.  
52 This was q263 in the 1990 survey; q43 in the 1995 survey; q126 in the 2001 survey. The response set 
included a) yes; b) no; c) don’t know.   
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 3.5.2 Regime Principles   
Regime principles, generally held to be the principles of democracy in the case of a 
democratic regime 53 , pose a methodological problem in terms of measurement. 
Democracy’s principles and those which should receive priority are contested 
(Thomassen, 1995; Schmitter & Karl, 1996). It is logical, however, that public attitudes 
which support a democratic system above all other forms of government will support the 
principles of a democratic regime 54 . Furthermore, according to Bratton (2002:9), 
confirmed democrats will reject other forms of non-democratic government. Bearing the 
above in mind, the following question was thus used to operationalize this aspect of 
regime principle support: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each as a way of governing the country. For each one, would 
you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the country?  
• Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections 
• Having experts, not the government, make decisions according to what they think 
is best for the country 
• Having the army rule 
• Having a democratic system”55. 
 
While acceptance of a democratic system is imperative, only the rejection of the other 
two non-democratic political systems would indicate complete support of democratic 
regime principles. 
 
                                                 
53 It is assumed that the principles adopted by a democratic regime would be those ascribed to democracy. 
This is supported by Dahl’s (1997:34) emphasis on the need for a democratic political culture (born of 
democratic principles) to support and sustain a democratic regime.     
54 It could be argued that support may stem from a substantive support, i.e. that those who support 
democracy do not do so for principle’s sake, but for the material needs satisfied by the democratic regime 
(Bratton & Mattes, 2000a; 2003). Nevertheless, according to Schmitter & Karl (1996), there is no evidence 
that democracies will necessarily increase service delivery. Thus support for democratic principles is 
necessary for sustained support of a democratic regime (Plattner, 1996:44; Whitehead, 1996:395; 
Przeworski, 1995:42)    
55 This set of questions was only available in the 1995 (q55@1-4) and 2001 (q164-q167) survey waves. The 
response set, as indicated, was a choice between ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘very bad’ and ‘don’t know’.   
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 3.5.2.1 Index Construction for Consolidated Support for Democracy  
An index was constructed to measure the percentage of respondents who not only 
supported democracy as a form of government, but who also rejected all other forms of 
non-democratic rule. In order to do this all the items were recoded to account for “don’t 
know” and refused answers, or missing responses were recognized as ‘system missing’. 
Furthermore, the item relating to ‘having a democratic system’ was recoded in reverse so 
that the response direction of all the items was the same.  
 
A reliability analysis rendered an Alpha score of between 0.4270 and 0.619656. It is 
recognized that this range is not suitable for a reliable index, but the low reliability may 
be explained. On reverse recoding ‘having a democratic system’, it was assumed that this 
item was diametrically opposed to the other items and would thus be reflected as such in 
the response items. The low Alpha score may suggest that respondents do not necessarily 
see support of another form of regime as completely opposed to support for democracy. It 
is interesting to note that the Alpha score strengthens from 1995 to 2001 in South Africa. 
This may suggest that the idea that these forms of government are indeed in opposition to 
support for democracy is being crystallized in the minds of the respondents.       
 
This notwithstanding, it was concluded that unfortunately, while solidly based 
theoretically, this index could not be rationalized statistically because its Alpha scores for 
the three different survey waves indicated a weak statistical relationship between the 
items, ranging from 0.4270 to 0.6196, as seen above. Furthermore, although explanations 
are offered, they cannot adequately account for the low Alpha scores. This being the case, 
it was considered more appropriate to use only the last item, measuring the opinions on 
‘having a democratic system’ to be used as a simple frequency. 
 
It also stands to reason that democratic regime principles will be supported if they are 
congruent with those held by society as norms and values (Broderick, 2002:19). Support 
                                                 
56 Brazil 1995, Alpha=0.4270; South Africa 1995, Alpha= 0.5716; South Africa 2001, Alpha=0.6196. This 
index is not available for Brazil 1990. 
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for the regime principles will rest on the public’s evaluation of these in society in terms 
of compatibility with reality. This is especially so in new democracies (Doh & 
McDonough, 1999:5). The following questions were thus used to measure levels of 
support for regime principles: “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes 
say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you strongly agree, 
agree, disagree, or strongly disagree57.   
• In a democracy, the economic system runs badly 
• Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling 
• Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order 
• Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of 
government”58.   
 
Disagreement with the first three statements and agreement with the last will be taken as 
confirmation of support for democratic regime principles.  
 
3.5.2.2 Index Construction for Support for Regime Principles 
In order to measure support for regime principles, in this case the purported principles of 
the democratic regimes of South Africa and Brazil, an index was constructed with the 
above-mentioned items. In order to do this, as above, all the items were recoded to 
account for “don’t know” and refused answers, or missing responses were recognized as 
‘system missing’. Furthermore, the item ‘democracy may have problems but it’s better 
than any other form of government’ was recoded in reverse so that the response direction 
for all the items was the same. The Alpha scores ranged from 0.5821 to 0.7394 depending 
on the data set59. Here again however, these scores were judged to be too low to warrant 
the use of the index. Instead, the last item was used on its own “democracy may have 
                                                 
57 This set of questions was only available in the 1995 (q58@1-4) and 2001 (q169-q172) survey waves. The 
response set, as indicated was a choice between ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘disagree’, ‘strongly disagree’ 
and ‘don’t know’. While it admittedly not absolutely clear whether the response is due to personal 
experience or merely an opinion of democracy as an abstract term, methodologically it does not make a 
difference to the operationlization of regime principles.   
58 This statement measures the so-called “Winstonian hypothesis”. It encompasses the argument that 
support for the democratic system will only be seriously threatened when there is a viable alternative 
system in existence which is accepted by the people (Dasgupta & Maskin,1999:71).  
59 Brazil 1995, Alpha=0.5821; South Africa 1995, Alpha=0.7394; South Africa 2001, Alpha=0.7130. This 
index was not available for Brazil 1990. 
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problems but it’s better than any other form of government” as a frequency to provide 
another measure of support for regime principles. 
 
Whereas neither of these batteries was available in the 1990 survey, the methodologically 
most compatible questions were those which measured support for such democratic 
norms as individual freedoms and government transparency. Thus for the 1990 wave, the 
following questions were used to measure support for regime principles: “I am going to 
read out some statements about the government and the economy. For each one, could 
you tell me how much you agree or disagree?  
• Our government should be made much more open to the public 
• We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government allows more 
freedom for individuals to do as they wish”60. 
 
3.5.2.3 Index Construction for Support for Regime Principles for Brazil 1990 
These two items were recoded to eliminate ‘don’t knows’, refused and missing answers 
and combined in an index. This remains the most problematic section of the 
operationalization, in that these questions are a poor substitute for those used in the other 
surveys to operationalize regime principles. This will also be seen to be the case 
empirically, as the Alpha score of these items is only 0.3412. Nevertheless, they remain 
the only possible items to be used.    
 
In addition, the position of the respondents remains ambiguous regardless of their answer. 
Affirmative responses could demonstrate support for democratic values, yet show a lack 
of support for government principles. Similarly, negative responses might not necessarily 
mean lack of support for the democratic norms of transparency and individual freedoms, 
but denote satisfaction with the way the regime protects these values.  Although it is 
acknowledged that this measure must be interpreted with care, affirmative answers will 
be taken to denote a support of democratic values, but possibly a lack of satisfaction with 
the embodiment of these norms by the regime.    
                                                 
60 These are q336 and q337 respectively in the 1990 wave. The response set is as follows: ‘agree 
completely’, ‘agree some what’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree somewhat’, ‘disagree completely’, 
‘don’t know’.  
 78
 3.5.3 Regime Performance 
As mentioned above, regime performance and regime principles are closely related in the 
minds of the public. As Broderick (2002:23) points out : 
[new democracies have] no track record of long-term effectiveness to carry 
the regimes through periods of crisis. Thus it is reasonable to assume 
that …the regime itself will be held responsible for economic performance. In 
other words the performance of the economy will influence citizens’ 
evaluations of the political system in its entirety as well as the incumbent 
government.    
 
Thus democracy itself may be judged by citizens on the performance of a democratic 
regime in terms of how well it seems to work for their country in question (Doh & 
McDonough, 1999).Confidence in the regime would indicate approval of its performance. 
This would in turn indicate support for this political object.  
 
Comparison in terms of what kinds of results were achieved by the previous regime is 
also important for ascertaining public support of democracy. Tóka (1995:357) refers to a 
“honeymoon period” of approximately one or two years whereby the novelty of the 
regime, following its replacement of the old ‘bad’ regime, lends it legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, to sustain such support, the regime must display a satisfactory performance. 
Mattes et al. (2003:24-26) found a nostalgia for apartheid stemming from the fading 
memories of the quality of life then and a perceived failure on the present regime’s part to 
deliver. While Easton (1965:271) points out that it is often the case that governments are 
judged on results predetermined by predecessors and make decisions which will affect 
their successors, it is public perception of regime performance regardless that will inform 
public opinion and evaluation of the regime’s performance. The following questions were 
thus selected to enable the measuring of opinions regarding the current regime:  “People 
have different views about the system for governing the country. Where on this scale61 
would you put the political system: 
                                                 
61 1=very bad; 10= very good. 
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• as it was [in apartheid times/before abertura]?  
•  as it is today? 
• as you expect it will be ten years from now?”62   
 
The first question allows comparison with the performance of the non-democratic regime 
and the third implies the potential of the current regime to affect the political future, tying 
in with Easton’s observation, mentioned above.   
 
Once again, the 1990 Brazil data set did not include these items. In order to supplement 
the World Values Survey, therefore, the following item, taken from a CESOP63 data file 
was used to measure support for regime performance in Brazil in 1990: 
In a general way, how would you say you feel about the future of Brazil?64  
 
This question was chosen because it most closely resembles one of the items used in the 
operationalization. It is also more appropriate, because President Collor, the first 
president elected through universal franchise, had only recently been elected president at 
this stage, thus preventing any evaluation of regime performance based on sustained 
actions.  
 
3.5.4 Regime Institutions  
Regime institutions form part of what is known as “procedural democracy”, i.e. the 
procedures for electing representatives and for delegating power. This is opposed to 
“substantial democracy”, which is concerned with policy issues such as economic 
redistribution65 (Randall & Theobald, 1998:41).   
                                                 
62 This set of questions was only available in the 1995 (54@1-3) and 2001 (q163, X3, X4).  
63 Centro des Estudos de Opinião Publica.  
64 This was question P1 in a survey conducted by CESOP in January 1990. The response categories were as 
follows: a) very optimistic, b) optimistic, c) neutral, d) pessimistic, e) very pessimistic 
65 Some doubt has been expressed as to whether citizens of developing countries can distinguish between 
the institutions and the political leaders themselves, thus the office (procedural) and the office-holder 
(substantive). It is indeed feared, as mentioned above,  that poor policy decisions on the part of political 
actors will not only cause the incumbents to lose support and thus legitimacy, but jeopardise the actual 
democratic political system itself; this due to the inability of citizens in neo-democracies to distinguish 
between these two levels of government (Broderick, 2002:23). Nevertheless, it has been proved in several 
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 This is significant in that the institutions which form part of any democratic system, and 
the institutional choices made by the creators of the system, profoundly affect the nature 
of that democratic system (Linz, 1996; Horowitz, 1996; Lipset, 199666). Thus is it once 
again emphasized that there are different types of democracy, whose frameworks 
necessarily differ cross-nationally according to cultural and historical precedent (Norris, 
1999b:220). What is even more interesting is that according to several analysts, (Norris, 
1999b:234; Hadenius, 1994; Linz, 1996; Lijphart, 1996), these institutional arrangements 
themselves have an impact on the levels of political support.      
 
South Africa and Brazil both have hybridized versions of the presidential/parliamentary 
systems, and a proportional representation electoral system. While it is evident that their 
political systems cannot be identical, they would fall roughly within the same category in 
terms of institutional configuration, rendering comparison slightly more valid in terms of 
comparing levels of political support (Lijphart, 1996). 
 
3.5.4.1 Index Construction for Support for Regime Institutions 
In order to operationalize support for regime institutions, the following question was 
utilized: “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me 
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence67 at all?”   
 
The items listed in the survey questionnaire were run through a factor analysis to 
determine which clustered together (see Appendix 2). From this a battery was constructed 
of the following items:  
                                                                                                                                                 
cases that this fear, at least in the case of Africans, is unfounded (Broderick, 2002; Bratton, 2002; Bratton 
& Mattes, 2000a). 
66 The debate, entered into by these three authors, revolves around whether parliamentarianism or 
presidential democracies are preferable. While Linz (1996) argues that presidential systems encourage the 
abuse of power by a strong executive, Horowitz counters that this is a generalization and applies mostly 
only to Latin America (1996). Lipset (1996) emphasizes the influence of culture and historical precedent, 
suggesting that political culture’s fluidity causes analysts to focus on institutions as a source of democratic 
instability.          
67 Again, the use of secondary data limits this study’s operationalization. It is assumed here that a 
respondent who has a high level of confidence in a certain institution will support it (Kotze, 2001:33).  
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• The armed forces68 
• The Police 
• The National Government 
• Parliament 
• The Civil Service 
• The Legal System 
• The President69 
 
Some qualification is in order here. Although some of the above elements are more 
obviously institutions of democracy, there are several others that, while statistically 
clustering with the above, are not necessarily so. Their inclusion is due to their historical 
roles in government, the importance of these backed up by their strong factor loadings. 
 
In view of the heavy involvement of the armed forces in Brazil, not only as the poder 
moderador 70  (Linz, 1996b:127) before 1964, but because they effectively ruled the 
country by military dictate for twenty years, there is a strong argument to include it in the 
battery. Similarly, the police force in both South Africa and Brazil played an active role 
in subduing political dissidence during the rule of the ancien regimes and promoted the 
emergence of a culture of violence (Landman, 2003:17).  It is highly likely that the 
respective populations will thus still associate them with the government, therefore 
meriting inclusion in the institutional battery.  
 
The items were recoded to eliminate ‘don’t knows’, refused and missing responses and 
combined into an index, with the Alpha score ranging from 0.8593-0.7665 71 . The 
                                                 
68 In the 2001 wave in South Africa, the index does not include ‘the armed forces’ because its factor 
loading was considered too weak (0.496).  
69 In the 1990 wave the items ‘national government’ and ‘president’ are not available, so the 1990 version 
of the battery will omit these two items. Similarly, the 1995 WVS does not include ‘the president’. The 
items forming this battery are taken from a set of questions in each set: q272-q285 (1990); q53@1-16 
(1995); q17-q162,X1-2 (2001).   
70 Literally translated ‘moderating power’. 
71 Brazil 1990, Alpha=0.7665; Brazil 1995, Alpha=0.8048; South Africa 1995, Alpha=0.8090, South Africa, 
Alpha=0.8593.  
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responses were recoded into three categories comprising ‘strong support’, ‘medium 
support’ and ‘weak support’72. 
 
3.5.5 Political Actors    
As the narrowest concept in terms of the political object levels, political actors are no less 
important in terms of sustaining political legitimacy. Indeed, especially in neo-
democracies which have little experience with democratic norms, the political actors are 
often held directly accountable for regime performance 73 . Consequently, consistently 
poor ratings of the political actors will eventually lead to a decline in legitimacy of the 
regime itself (Dalton, 1988:171). Contributing to this, therefore, is the fact that, despite 
being the elected representatives of the ‘people’, political elites sometimes hold very 
different views to their constituencies74 (Dalton, 1998:207). Indeed, even if one was to 
consider the Schumpterian definition of democracy, that democracy is “not 
fundamentally about representation, it is about selling a product – government output – in 
exchange for votes” (Shapiro & Hacker-Cordón, 2000:4), legitimacy depends on the 
delivery of said government output.  
 
Bearing the above in mind, in order to operationalize support for the government 
incumbents, the following questions were used:        
“How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national government are handling 
the country’s affairs?”75  
 
“How much do you trust the government in Brasilia/Pretoria to do what is right?”76
                                                 
72 For the 1995 and 2001 waves, ‘strong support’ = values 6-11; medium support =values 12-18; ‘weak 
support’= values 19-24. For the 1990 wave, ‘strong support’=values 5-9; ‘medium support’=values 10-15; 
‘weak support= values 16-20. See Appendix 2. 
73 As discussed above, in the case of democratic transition through elite pact, political elites are seen to 
have an even bigger influence over political events. 
74 The irony is that this is in spite of the fact that “commitment to popular rule” is what sets democracies 
apart from other political systems (Dalton, 1988:206). 
75 This is q60 in the 1995 wave and q174 in the 2001 wave. It has been substituted for the previous question 
as it did not occur in either of the 1995 or 2001 surveys. The response set read as follows: a)very satisfied; 
b) fairly satisfied; c) fairly dissatisfied; d) very dissatisfied; e) don’t know. 
76 Although ‘what is right’ is conceptually very vague, the operationalization rests on the rational 
assumption that should the government do what is considered right by the respondent, regardless of what 
this is, the respondent supports the government.  This is q289 in the 1990 data set, the only set in which this 
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 Unfortunately the latter question, while very suitable to measure support for political 
actors, was not included in the Brazilian survey wave, although it is part of the 1990 
WVS survey questionnaire. To supplement the data, a question from a CESOP 
questionnaire, polled in December 1990, was used. It read: 
 
In your opinion, do you think Collor is making a(n): i) excellent ii) good iii) average iv) 
bad v) terrible government?77    
  
Especially because the president is a powerful and influential figure within the context of 
both Brazilian and South African politics, both symbolically and as an institution, it 
would have been instructive to be able to compare levels of support for the president as a 
political actor. Unfortunately, this item was only included in the 2001 WVS wave78, 
rendering it useless in terms of enabling a time-scale comparison between South Africa 
and Brazil.   
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The theory behind the methodology of this study is particularly important, because it 
informs both the researcher and the reader how and why the data are interpreted as they 
are. It also provides key insights into the formulation of the operationalization of this 
study. 
 
Due to the nature of this study, the comparative approach is being followed, allowing 
various elements of both quantitative and qualitative research paradigms to be utilized, 
despite statistical analysis being the central focus of the study. Indeed, although survey 
data have been operationalized for this study, the need to understand the context of the 
data in both countries has necessitated aspects of interpretation which are, strictly 
speaking, part of the qualitative discipline.  
                                                                                                                                                 
question was available. The response set reads: a) almost always; b) most of the time; 3) only some of the 
time; d) almost never.   
77 This was question P10 of the questionnaire. The response set was: i) excellent ii) good iii) average iv) 
bad v) terrible. 
78 Confidence in the president is available in the CESOP questionnaires of January and December, allowing 
comparison during 1990 in Brazil, but this does not enable comparison of confidence in the president 
between the two case studies.  
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 In terms of the operationalization itself, it must be remembered that, even should the 
measurement instrument be specifically designed for a study, it is impossible to create an 
instrument which is 100% valid. This is especially so with attitudinal measurements, 
which are open to at least a modicum of interpretation on the respondents’ part. As it is, 
the survey used in this study provides secondary data, and has proved problematic in 
several areas in terms of the operationalization of the various levels of objects of political 
support, as seen above. These challenges have been addressed by making the best use of 
the collected data. A supplementary data set from a reputable source has also been 
introduced in order to ‘fill in the gaps’, where necessary, which would otherwise be 
present in the data analysis. It is important to interpret the results with care, however, as 
the errors inherent in the measurement must be borne in mind.        
 
Now that the key concepts to be used in this study have been operationalized, the data 
may be analysed using these instruments. This will be undertaken in the following 
chapter.  
 85
Chapter Four: Statistical Data Analysis and Description of Results 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the results of data analysis, according to the operationalization described 
in the previous chapter, will be graphically presented and described. Several problems 
with the original data arose during the actual analysis process, as mentioned in Chapter 
Three. A discussion of these problems and their potential solutions, where appropriate1, 
will follow. Following on from this discussion, conclusions will be drawn on the validity 
and reliability of these findings.  
 
4.2 Independent and Dependent Variables 
The previous chapter discussed at length both the conceptualisation and the 
operationalization of the five political objects, the support levels of each of which are to 
be used as the dependent variables. These political objects are the political community, 
regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. The 
theoretical background rationalizing their use was also provided. 
 
The reasons for using the four independent variables selected for this study – age, 
ethnicity, income and education – will also be discussed. Norris (1999a:11) identifies 
these four variables as ‘social background variables’ and maintains that these four 
particular variables have been found to have a marked influence on social science 
phenomena. Whether this is true of developing countries per se is debatable, but in the 
context of this study, each variable’s use has an individual rationale.  
 
Age, especially in the context of a longitudinal study, is arguably very important as a 
determining factor. Abramson and Inglehart (1995:4) maintain that an individual’s values 
reflect experiences in the pre-adult years. The gradual increase in financial security over 
the decades since World War II, for example, has led generations to become less 
preoccupied with the need to accumulate material wealth and consequently less spend-
                                                 
1 In terms of random errors accumulated during data capturing, there is often little one can do as the data 
source is secondary and the means to recover and correct errors are often beyond the scope of the current 
researcher.  
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thrift. This is called the generational replacement theory (Inglehart, 1990:135). Following 
from this, it is perhaps not so far-fetched to believe that successive generations after 
democratic transition will perhaps more easily adopt democratic values as part of a long-
term socialization effect (Inglehart, 1990:79-82). In addition, this cultural socialization is 
said to be crucial in the stabilization of democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1990:33).  Age 
is thus potentially a very influential factor in a longitudinal survey measuring support for 
democracy2.  
 
Income and education are similarly important, but for different reasons. Inglehart (1990; 
1998; Abramson & Inglehart, 1995) related increasing income and education in the 
Western democracies in successive generations to a shift in values which seemed to 
promote an increase in diffuse support, but a decrease in specific support in Western 
publics. This would not be applicable to our two case studies, considering the marked 
inequalities in standards of living found in both.  In Brazil, however, these two variables 
may have an indirect effect on support for democracy. In that country the biggest social 
cleavage is class as there is no formal racial segregation (Marx, 1998:174, Guimarães, 
2001:166). Considering both the patriarchal power structure inherent within the Brazilian 
democracy, protecting the ruling class, and the fact that a lack of formal education is used 
as a class barrier, both education and income, or lack thereof, are projected to have 
profound impact on the way a respondent would evaluate the various levels of political 
support (McDonough, 1981:18; Roett, 1999). 
 
Interestingly, education and income are likely to have a similar such effect in South 
Africa, although in the opposite direction. This is because wealth in both income and 
higher education has been concentrated in a specific racial minority through apartheid 
(O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001:285; James & Lever, 2001:41; powell, 2001:386). Thus, 
indirectly, South Africa’s democratization and the removal of former privileges for 
whites may well bias those who hold the majority of the wealth in income and education, 
essentially whites, against democracy in South Africa.  
                                                 
2While it is recognised that such a shift in values as propounded by Inglehart will not be observable in a 
study spanning such a short time period as this one, it is important to be aware of the broader context of this 
age variable.  
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It can also be seen from the above that ethnicity has a large part to play in any such 
analysis in South Africa at least3, and may well do so until apartheid’s legacy has been 
uprooted (Friedman, 1995; powell, 1995:374; Ramphele, 1995:65).Consequently, all four 
selected independent variables have an important bearing on this study. 
 
4.3 Challenges in the Data Analysis Process 
In terms of the Brazilian data set, it quickly came to light that using race/ethnicity as a 
social background variable would be problematic. This is the case for several reasons. 
Firstly, due to the state socialization policy involving propagating a ‘racial democracy’, 
race was not acknowledged as a social characteristic, and was omitted from the state 
census during the military regime4. ‘Colour’ is conceptualized as a continuum, rather 
than in terms of separate categories. (Marx, 1998:67; 177). The legacy of slavery has led 
a darker skin to be supposedly indicative of a lower social class/standing (Nascimento & 
Nascimento, 2001). Thus, should any form of colour description be required, respondents 
are likely to describe themselves as lighter skinned than they might be perceived by an 
observer in order to avoid discrimination based on class (Sansone, 2003:44). This 
explains why, although Brazil is acknowledged as having a ‘black majority’ (Nascimento 
& Nadcimento, 2001:120; Marx, 1998:8), 72.8% of Brazilians classified themselves as 
white in the 1995 WVS 5 , thus choosing the more socially desirable response. The 
vagueness of Brazilian ethnic coding is emphasized even more strongly when compared 
to circumstances in South Africa, where the legacy of apartheid has enforced rigid ethnic 
self-awareness (Friedman & De Villiers, 1995:220). As such, analysis in terms of 
ethnicity has not been used in the Brazilian case, because the coding categories used in 
the survey are inaccurate, being inapplicable to the Brazilian context and thus deemed 
invalid for this study. For the record, although the danger of generalization is noted, state 
                                                 
3 For reasons discussed below, the ethnicity variable was deemed inappropriate for use in the Brazilian 
context. 
4 This has diminished the use of race as a demographic characteristic in Brazilian social research, as was 
intended. It is assumed here that the reason the Brazilian survey wave if 1990 did not survey the ethnic 
group of the respondents was that legislation of the previous regime discouraged use of this category. 
5 The ethnicity variable is not even available on the 1990 WVS, probably due to state restrictions as 
mentioned above.               
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social policy and prejudice seem to dictate that the lower the education and the lower the 
income, the darker the Brazilian respondent’s skin will be6.  
 
The ethnic group variable in South Africa, however, in contrast with Brazil, has great 
importance in terms of historical precedent7 and explanatory value in this study. This 
notwithstanding, the use of the terms white, black, coloured and Indian as ethnic 
categories does not imply agreement on the researcher’s part with the use of these terms.         
 
In terms of the social background variables themselves, recoding was required in most 
cases. Additional challenges arose following the discovery of several inconsistencies in 
the coding of the social background variables. 
 
It must be noted that, whereas the convention is to survey respondents 18 years and older, 
in both the South African and Brazilian cases, respondents 16 years and older were 
included. In the Brazilian sets, where this variable was used, age groups had been coded 
differently in that, whereas the oldest group in 1990 is 51+ years, in 1995 it is 65+ years. 
This does not pose a serious challenge to data interpretation, especially as this sector of 
the population is relatively small, but has been duly noted. In terms of education, it must 
be pointed out that the schooling systems are not identical in the two countries, although 
the levels of primary, secondary and tertiary education exist. As such, educational levels 
have been grouped into the following categories in an attempt to better facilitate 
comparison: no schooling8, at least some primary education9, at least some high school10, 
at least some tertiary education11.   
                                                 
6 This has been argued eloquently by many scholars, despite Brazil’s seeming ‘racial democracy’. See 
Sanson, 2003; Hamilton et al., 2001; Friedman & De Villiers, 1995.  
7 This is perhaps especially so because this is roughly the classification system used by the apartheid 
government in enforcing the Population Registration Act. 
8 This refers to no formal education on the part of the respondent, but does not necessarily mean that the 
respondent is illiterate.  
9 In the South African case, primary education refers to Grades 0-7, ideally with the student beginning at 7 
years of age and finishing at 13. In Brazil the case is similar, in that there are 8 série (Grades).  
10 In the South African case this refers to Grades 8-12, with the student ideally finishing at age 18. In the 
final year a senior certificate is written called matriculation. In Brazil high school consists of three years 
(primeiro, segundo and terceiro ano), after which the student writes vestibular, similar in function to the 
matriculation certificate in that it is necessary for university entrance.   
11 This refers to any further study beyond the completion of matriculation or vestibular. 
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4.4 Data Analysis 
Following an explanation of the shortcomings and problems encountered in the data, it is 
now necessary to turn to the analysis of the data itself. As the time periods are not the 
same, but comparable in terms of the political history of each country as motivated earlier, 
the data have been analysed by giving an overview of general levels of support 
comparing the two countries, then comparing the progress of each country individually.  
 
 It must be remembered that in the case of this study, there are 5 dependent variables, 
namely the five levels of political support discussed in Chapter Two, and the four 
independent variables, namely the four social background variables selected for use in 
this study: age, education, income and ethnicity 12 .  As such, a large number of 
permutations were investigated in this study. Space does not permit the intensive 
examination of each one. Nevertheless, the most important relationships will be discussed. 
All cross-tabulations are found in Appendix 1.   
 
As the principal focus of this study is the level of support for democracy, the data will be 
analysed and presented in terms of each level of the Norris model: political community, 
regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. 
 
4.4.1 Political Community  
It is unfortunate that the three measures used to indicate the level of support for political 
community were incompatible with respect to index construction. Nevertheless, an 
examination of these variables individually will still enable the formation of a general 
idea of the perception of the political community as a political object. The trends over the 
entire sample will firstly be examined, followed by their inspection in terms of the 
various social background variables. 
 
 
                                                 
12 See recoding problems discussed above.  
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4.4.1.1 National Pride13  
As can be seen from the total sample, levels of ‘pride to be Brazilian’ (Figure 2), are 
much lower than the corresponding levels of pride to be South African (Figure 3). It 
could be argued that South African respondents in 1995 were still euphoric over the 
successful, relatively bloodless democratic transition in 1994, demonstrating Tóka’s 
(1995:356) previously mentioned ‘honeymoon period’. In addition, South Africa winning 
the World Cup Rugby in May of that year may also have inflated national pride in that 
period as the 1995 wave was taken only 5 months later. Nevertheless, relatively high 
levels of national pride are sustained in 2001, despite a slight shift from ‘very proud’ to 
‘quite proud’. Indeed, although the ‘very proud’ drops by nearly 7%, this is still 10% 
higher than 1995 levels in Brazil, and while those ‘not at all proud’ in South Africa 
triples, this is also still less than 1995 Brazilian levels. It must be pointed out, however, 
that in Brazil those who are ‘very proud’ are not as numerous as in South Africa, between 
1990 and 1995, those who were ‘not at all proud’ reduced to less than a third of the 
original percentage, from 6.4% to 1.9%.     
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Figure 2: Proud to be Brazilian (1990-1995)
1990 64.0 22.2 7.1 6.7
1995 64.5 19.2 14.3 1.9
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Figure 3: Proud to be South African (1995-2001)
1995 81.8 13.6 3.2 0.7
2001 74.5 19.9 3.2 1.8
very proud quite proud not very 
proud
not at all 
proud
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The question item used to measure national pride was worded: “How proud are you to be South 
African/Brazilian?”. Response set: very proud/quite proud/not very proud/not at all proud. This item was 
q322 (1990); q82 (1995); q216 (2001).    
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4.4.1.1.1 National Pride: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix 1, pp. i and v) 
In terms of the social background variables, several interesting relationships emerge. In 
Brazil, in terms of age, it seems that the more aged respondents consistently displayed 
higher levels of national pride. The most notable increase occurs when the respondents 
reach the 65+ year age category, increasing from the previous age category by nearly 
14% to 81.3% in 1990 and rising by 7.4% to 74.4% in 1995. With regards to education, it 
seems that in 1990 those with the less schooling are prouder to be Brazilian.  Indeed, 
concerning the ‘very proud’ category, there is a huge dip between those with primary 
school and some high school (68.3% and 48.2% respectively). It is thus perhaps 
significant that, in Brazil, the military state policies to ensure the universal and subsidized 
enrolment of all children at a primary school level since 1965 have been largely 
successful (O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001:290). Those who study further, however, must 
have the money to be able to afford it14. It seems thus that the great divide between the 
very poor and the richer Brazilian respondents in terms of pride to be Brazilian is evident 
in the difference between ‘at least some primary school’ and ‘at least some high school’ 
In 1995 this trend is not so obvious15, although those who are ‘very proud’ with ‘at least 
some primary school’ increase by almost 12% to 69.6% from those with ‘no schooling’ 
and remains at least 7% higher than any other education category. It is interesting to note, 
however, that with increases in level of education, the percentage which is ‘not at all 
proud’ decreases.  
 
Thus the drop in national pride in those with more than primary education seems to 
suggest that the wealthier16 are less ‘proud to be Brazilian’. This is partially corroborated 
by the fact in 1990 67.5% of the working class are ‘very proud’ as opposed to only 55% 
of those with ‘higher incomes’ in 1990. The same trend is manifested in 1995, where 
                                                 
14 Very few poorer families keep their children in school after the primary level. Not only is the quality of 
education at state high schools very poor, but it is thus logically believed by parents that it would be more 
productive to bring them home to work (O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001:297). 
15 This may b due to the limited improvement in providing good secondary education for poorer Brazilians 
(O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001:290), thus softening the distinction slightly between the very rich and the very 
poor in terms of education.  
16 The wealthier in Brazil are mostly those with better education as formal education is used as a social 
barrier in Brazil (McDonough, 1981:18). 
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66.9% of those with ‘working-class incomes’ are ‘very proud’, whereas only 53.3% of 
the higher income group are ‘very proud’.  
 
4.4.1.1.2 National Pride: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xii and xxi) 
In South Africa in 1995, age-wise, there do not seem to be any marked trends, although it 
is noted that in 2001 the 55-64 age group drops more than 8% lower than the other 
categories’ range of approximately 72%-78% to 64.9% in the ‘very proud’ category17. 
Along ethnic divisions, the ethnic groups previously discriminated against under 
apartheid are much prouder to be South African. Blacks are the most proud (85.8%), with 
whites trailing at 62.6% in 199518. This is to be expected. The ANC, the first non-racial 
South African party to come to power, had done so through peaceful means, signalling 
the end of racial discrimination and, by implication, a better life for those previously 
discriminated against under apartheid (Ramphele, 2001:76). Although whites are still 
relatively proud, their apprehension about their future as a previously privileged minority 
had perhaps dampened their enthusiasm, as well as a lingering sense of guilt over 
apartheid (Steyn, 2001:97-100). While the percentages of those who are ‘very proud’ 
drop in 2001, blacks and coloureds are still in the seventies (78.1% and 72.1% 
respectively), whereas the whites and the Indians, historically more privileged races19, 
have dropped to 48.6% and 52.2% respectively.    
 
In terms of income and education, the legacy of apartheid is clearly illustrated in the 
almost perfect parallel between the low levels of these two variables and ethnic 
divisions20. In 1995 pride to be South African drops nearly 20% (66.4% as opposed to 
ranging from 84.9-82.6%) as the respondents acquire some tertiary education, which 
                                                 
17 This age group also had the lowest percentage of ‘very proud’ in 1995, perhaps as they are the older part 
of the work force, on the brink of retirement and fear the political upheaval and consequent job insecurity 
the democratic transition may cause.  
18This is still higher than the national Brazilian percentage of those ‘very proud’ in 1990 and 1995.      
19 While it is true that Indians were classified as ‘non-white’ under the apartheid regime and thus obligated 
to carry passes, they were still higher up on the racial hierarchy than either coloureds or blacks, being 
conceded more privileges. This was intended to foment resentment and discourage any possible alliance 
between blacks, coloureds and Indians, thus using the latter as a racial buffer (Steyn, 2001:93).  
20 Whites correspond roughly to higher income, Indians to ‘middle income’, coloureds to ‘lower income’ 
and blacks to ‘working-class income’ - in the perceived racial hierarchy of the apartheid era. James & 
Lever (2001:29) dispute the fact that race and wealth really coincide so neatly, but it must e remembered 
that their article was published 6 years after the data for 1995 were collected.    
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corroborates the fact that whites were concentrated in the higher education facilities 
(O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001:285). Income mirrors this as in 1995 30% more of those 
respondents with working-class income are ‘very proud’ than those with a higher income 
(86% as opposed to 56.2%). While not so marked in 200121, a similar trend is visible and 
significant in terms of both education and income. This is probably due to the fact that in 
South Africa race is almost an antecedent variable as it continues in some measure to 
define income and educational level due to the legacy of apartheid (Friedman, 1995:534; 
Alexander, 2001:475; Zoninsein, 2001:363). Only further longitudinal survey research 
will be able to determine whether and when income and education will become fully 
independent from race.  
 
Thus it seems here that in both South Africa and Brazil, it is the poorer, less educated 
respondents who have the highest levels of national pride, ironically suggesting that it is 
those who have, according to the respective circumstances, benefited the least from the 
previous regime have the most national pride.22  This may be because they are the most 
susceptible to populist propaganda in Brazil, following a history of populism, whereas in 
South Africa, following the new democratic dispensation, they now have the most to gain 
as the South African Bill of Rights commits the government to addressing the provision 
of basic needs as far as services such as water, sanitation and electricity are concerned 
(Marais, 2001:125).  
 
4.4.1.2 Geographic Identification23
With regards to identifying with the country as a geo-political unit, neither country has a 
population majority which does so, although South African national identification is 
again stronger (see Figures 4 and 5). In both countries regional and continental 
identification is fairly poor, although it does increase slightly in later years. The latter is 
                                                 
21 This is possibly due to concerted attempts by the government to address such racial inequalities. 
22 In the case of South Africa, blacks are historically poorer as a result of apartheid’s discriminatory 
policies (Sisk, 1995), whereas the poorer classes in Brazil were less subsidized than the richer classes 
(Roett, 1999; McDonough, 1981). 
23 The question item used for geographic identification was worded: “To which of these geographical 
groups would you say you belong first of all?” Response set: locality or town where you live/province or 
region of country where you live/South Africa (Brazil) as a whole/Africa(South America)/The world as a 
whole. These were q320 (1990); q80 (1995); q214 (2001). 
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probably due to the fact that Brazil has a different colonial history to the rest of South 
America 24 , whereas South Africa’s Eurocentrism during apartheid as well as the 
country’s global ostracism prevented her from identifying strongly with either Africa or 
the world (Steyn, 2001:85). Interestingly, an increasing number of Brazilian respondents 
seem to identify themselves as ‘world citizens’ as opposed to nationals.       
 
4.4.1.2.1 Geographic Identification: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix 1, pp. i and vi) 
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Figure 4: Brazilian Geographic Identification  (1990-
1995)
1990 36.7 11.2 30.6 1.7 20.0
1995 30.9 11.6 28.5 2.2 26.8
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In terms of the social background variables it is the poorer income groups which identify 
more strongly with their town, possibly due to a rural mentality or a lack of political 
education (Bresser-Pereira, 1990:206). Predictably, it is also the higher income groups 
which are more likely to classify themselves as ‘world citizens’, most likely because of 
the growing phenomenon of the ‘global village’ and their more likely participation in 
international trade and affairs. Interestingly, in 1990 in Brazil the poorer income groups 
seem to identify more with the nation geographically only marginally, with the working-
class and lower income groups at 31.2% and 31.9% respectively against the middle and 
high income groups at 27.6% and 30% respectively. By 1995 this has changed. National 
identification increases gradually with income until it drops from 37.5% (middle income) 
to 16.7% (higher income). Whereas no trend was discernable in terms of education in 
Brazil 1990, by 1995 those with some tertiary education displayed the highest levels of 
                                                 
24 She was colonized by Portugal, as discussed, whereas the other South American countries were 
colonized by Spain. Brazil is consequently the only South American country to speak Portuguese, whereas 
the others have Spanish as their national language.    
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national identification (30.1%), which drops steadily as education levels decrease. In 
terms of age, the older the respondent, the more likely national identification was chosen, 
up until before the oldest age group, after which national identification drops from 35.9% 
to 30.6% in 1990 and 38% to 25.6% in 1995.   
 
4.4.1.2.2 Geographic Identification: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1,pp. xiii  
and xxii) 
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Figure 5: South African Geographic 
Identification (1995-2001)
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In the South African case, as in that of Brazil, ‘world citizens’ are also more likely to 
come from the higher income group and stronger identification with one’s town from the 
lower or working-class income. In 1995 the lower income class identified most strongly 
on a geographically national level (50.1%). In terms of education, an increase in this 
variable seemed to increase national identification, rising from 31.1% (no schooling) to 
47.8% (at least some high school), although dropping slightly to 42% (some tertiary 
education). These trends are fairly consistent in 2001. In terms of ethnicity, Indians 
identified most with South Africa as a country in 1995 (56.1%), although the inter-ethnic 
differences are relatively small on this issue. In terms of age, little remarkable emerges 
except that in 1995, the 45-54 year age group had the strongest national identification 
(47.3%), but it is almost the weakest in 2001 (36.1%).  
 
To compare, it seems that in South Africa and Brazil, the seemingly contradictory trends 
of higher education yet lower income in terms of those respondents with the stronger 
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national identification seem to point to a stronger national geographic identification. 
While it is true that these trends are only slight, it is curious as in both countries, by 
implication, income and education have a fairly direct relationship. It is possible that the 
higher income group’s pre-occupation with their global context may skew the 
relationship in this case.    
 
4.4.1.3 Willingness to fight for their country25  
The last indicator used to measure levels of support for the political community, 
willingness to fight in a war for one’s country, yields some interesting results. Brazil 
produced curious results indeed. In contradistinction to South Africa, whose percentages 
of respondents willing to fight remained fairly constant at just under 60%, in Brazil an 
almost two-thirds majority admitted that they would not be willing to fight (64%, see 
Figure 6). Nevertheless, by 1995 this trend has radically reversed with 71.8% stating they 
would be willing to fight for their country. It is unlikely that this is due to a single factor, 
but it is worth noting that this survey was conducted shortly after Cardoso’s election as 
president in 1995, following the successful economic turn-around he achieved for the 
Brazilian economy in terms of hyper-inflation (Hunter, 2003:154). This is something that 
would have been experienced positively by all Brazilians, particularly the poor, whom 
inflation often hits the hardest. It is possible that such a tangible improvement in the 
economy, following the solution of a chronic problem, prompted the flood of patriotic 
devotion which is suggested by the percentages in Figure 6.    
                                                 
25 The question item used for ‘willingness to fight for their country’ was worded: “Of course, we all hope 
that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your 
country?” Responses set: yes/no. These were q263 (1990); q43 (1995); q126 (2001). 
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Figure 6: Brazilian willingness to fight for their 
country in a war (1990-1995)
1990 36.0 64.0
1995 71.8 28.2
yes no
 
In South Africa in 1995 a majority does express a willingness to fight for their country. 
(59.4%, see Figure 7), but it is arguably not very high. This is possibly due to South 
Africa’s expensive involvement in the Angolan war, terminated only several years before 
1995, or perhaps mistrust of the armed forces and enforced conscription under the 
apartheid state. This drops slightly to 58.3% five years later in 2001. An interesting 
observation is that a fairly large proportion (13.7 % in 1995 and 14.4% in 2001) stated 
that they did not know. This suggests that there is a fair amount of uncertainty in terms of 
the hypothetical situation of being called to war.  
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Figure 7:South African willingness to fight for their 
country in a war (1995-2001)  
1995 59.4 26.9
2001 58.3 27.3
yes no
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4.4.1.3.1 Willingness to Fight for their Country: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix 1, pp. 
ii and vii) 
 
On examination of the trends inherent in the social background variables, it is interesting 
that in Brazil, willingness to fight a war for one’s country increases with education, with 
54.8% of those with ‘some tertiary education’ willing to fight as opposed to 40% of those 
with ‘no schooling’ and 32.8% of those with ‘some primary education’ in 1990. This is 
completely reversed in 1995, with 94.7% of those with ‘no schooling’ willing to fight, 
against 65.3% of those with ‘some tertiary education’, perhaps reinforcing the idea of the 
unskilled labourers’ gratitude that hyper-inflation is now under control and no longer 
eating away at their meagre disposable incomes. In terms of the relationship between 
willingness to fight for one’s country and income in 1990, the trends here remain 
mysterious as willingness increases with income until the higher income group where it 
drops sharply by over 10% (39.8% to 28.6%). In 1995 ‘willingness to fight’ decreases 
steadily with income, from 74.9% (working-class income) to 63.3% (higher income).  
 
4.4.1.3.2 Willingness to Fight for their Country: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 
1, pp. xiv and xxii) 
 
In South Africa in 1995 initial trends mirror those of Brazil in 1990, i.e. that willingness 
to fight in a war increases with education. By 2001 increased education still uniformly 
increases willingness to fight. With regards to ethnicity, blacks are least likely to fight, 
although the percentage of willingness to fight is still 58.6% in 1995. This does seem to 
corroborate the previous trend, as it is generally accepted that whites were better educated 
due to apartheid’s legacy of discriminatory education subsidisation26. Interestingly, by 
2001 willingness to fight is much the same among ethnic groups except among Indians, 
whose willingness is only 44.8% compared to a range of 57.5% (whites) to 56.1% 
(coloureds), whereas they had been the most willing to fight in 1995 (74.5%). The 
younger the respondent, the more likely to express willingness to fight in 1995 and this 
trend continues to 200127. 
                                                 
26 In 1994 spending on education was 5 times greater for whites than it was for blacks (O’Connell & 
Birdsall, 2001:285).  
27 This is unlikely to be a nationally specific trend, however. 
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Due to the erratic nature of the Brazilian trends, a comparison may not be as useful as it 
has been in the previous items for the political community, pointing once again to the 
problem with only two points of reference in a longitudinal study.  
 
Thus analysis of support for the political community in South Africa and Brazil has led to 
mixed results. It is clear that South African respondents identify with their nationality 
much more proudly and are slightly more likely to recognize a national affiliation as 
opposed to other levels of geographic groupings.  Nevertheless, Brazilian respondents are, 
in theory 28 , much more likely to go to war for their country, perhaps not having 
experienced the toll of protracted warfare such as South Africa’s forays into Angola or 
enforced conscription29. While it is tempting to gauge South Africa’s support for the 
political community as stronger than Brazil’s, it must be remembered that a clear 
majority is ‘very proud’ to be Brazilian, albeit not as large as in South Africa’s case. In 
addition, it cannot be determined what the significance of each of these evaluations is in 
relation to each other and whether each measure is of equal importance in terms of 
support for the political community. It is perhaps more prudent to examine the other 
political objects and their levels of support before attempting to reach any conclusions. 
 
4.4.2 Regime Principles         
While every attempt has been made to measure the same concepts in terms of regime 
principles, it must be remembered that it was the Brazilian 1990 survey which 
necessitated the construction of a different index to those used in the 1995 and 2001 
waves. This must be borne in mind during the interpretation of the data in this section. It 
will also consequently be more difficult to render a precise comparison between Brazilian 
and South African support for this political object. The two countries will thus be 
discussed separately in this section and only afterwards be compared broadly.  
 
                                                 
28 As mentioned in Chapter Three, surveys can only effectively measure attitudes and are not reliable 
indicators of future behaviour (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:83). In this case, for instance, while 71.8% of 
Brazilians in 1995 stated that they would be willing to go to war in a hypothetical situation, whether this 
would translate to 71.8% of Brazilians indeed enlisting should a state of war be declared is both uncertain 
and debatable.   
29 Enforced conscription for all white males (and extended in principle to coloured and Indian men in 1977) 
was met with increasing resistance from the mid-1980s onwards (CIIR, 1989; Guimarães, 1998). 
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4.4.2.1 Regime Principles: Brazil 1990-199530 (see Appendix 1, pp. iii and vii)  
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Figure 8: Brazilian Support for Regime 
Principles (1990)
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Figure 9: Brazil: Having a Democratic Political 
System (1995) 
1995 27.1 57.9 9.9 5.2
very good fairly good fairly bad very bad
 
 
While the data rendered for Brazil in 1990 (see Figure 8) do seem very promising in 
terms of contributing a solid support base for the broad principles which should be held 
up by a democratic regime, the difficulty of constructing an index to measure support for 
this political object31 and the consequent implications must be borne in mind. It does 
seem, however, that Brazilian respondents are very supportive of an open transparent 
government, as well as more freedom for the individual. It is perhaps important to 
remember that this survey was taken around the time of Collor’s impeachment, 
prompting an overwhelming response to the need for a transparent government following 
the corruption scandal which led to the chief executive officer’s being removed from 
office.     
 
As regards trends within the social background variables, in 1990 it seems that the lower 
the income, the more strongly supportive the respondent was of the regime principles. It 
                                                 
30 The two items used to construct the index for Brazil 1990 ‘regime principles’ were responses to 
statements q336 and q337 respectively: “Our government should be made much more open to the public” 
and “ We are more likely to have  healthy economy if the government allows more freedom for individuals 
to do as they wish”. Response set: agree completely/agree somewhat/neither agree nor disagree/disagree 
somewhat/disagree completely. ‘Regime principles’ for 1995 and 2001 were measured using responses to 
the statements “having a democratic political system”; q55@4 (1995); q167 (2001).Response set: very 
good/fairly good/fairly bad/very bad; and “Democracy may have its problems but it’s better than any other 
form of government”; q58@4 (1995); q172 (2001); response set :  strongly agree/agree/disagree/strongly 
disagree.    
31 See Chapter Three and Appendix 2. 
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can be seen that 84.4% of working class income respondents are ‘strongly supportive’ as 
opposed to ‘higher incomes’ at 57.9%. A cynic would suggest that this is probably due to 
the fact that Brazil’s patrimonial state functioning often ensured that wealth removed a 
large number of restrictions ordinary citizens are subjected to, providing structural 
protection for the elites (McDonough, 1981:3). A lack of transparency facilitated many of 
the clientelist backroom deals which characterised Brazil’s earlier political system 
(McDonough, 1981:110-121). The above trend is also supported by the fact that the less 
education a respondent had, the more likely they were to be supportive of the regime 
principles, elites being more likely to have a higher education32. To illustrate the dramatic 
differences, 95.0% of those with ‘no schooling’ demonstrated support, as opposed to 
71.9% of those with ‘some tertiary education’ that did so.  
 
The data rendered for 1995 (Figure 9) compared with the 1990 data (Figure 8) could have 
interesting implications. While support for regime principles in 1990 was measured by 
actual characteristics of a liberal democracy, support for regime principles is measured by 
assessment of the actual system of democracy in 1995. This could be interpreted as 
indicating that, while Brazilians hold the basic tenets of democracy in high regard, what 
they recognise as a democratic system of government does not command such support, 
which may reflect on the performance of democracy in Brazil. This notwithstanding, if 
those who believe ‘having a democratic system’ is ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ are 
combined, it can be seen that a large majority (85%) still regard democratic systems 
fairly highly.   
 
An examination of the data’s relationship to social background variables seems to 
contradict the 1990 findings. It seems that as income increases, so does the likelihood of 
the respondent having a favourable opinion of the democratic system; the percentage of 
those who believe the democratic system to be ‘very good’ rises steadily with income 
from 23.7% (working-class income) to 38.9% (higher income). 
 
                                                 
32 By implication, the more educated respondents were also wealthier.  Formal education was one of ways 
in which class barriers were imposed in Brazil, preventing social mobility (McDonough, 1981:18).  
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While it is indeed possible that the lack of continuity is due to problems with 
measurement as mentioned above, it is possible that the poorer sectors of society are 
disillusioned with democracy as it has failed to improve living standards significantly33 
(Mail & Guardian, 9-15/01/04; Hunter, 2003). The wealthier sectors still enjoy 
considerable influence in the government and thus find democracy agreeable (Roett, 
1999). In terms of education, it seems that there is a slight tendency for those who are 
more educated to have a more positive opinion of the democratic system; the combined 
percentages of those who rate the democratic system as ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’ rise 
from 76.2% (‘no schooling’) to 88.1% (‘at least some tertiary education’). This may be 
because the latter consider the procedural theory behind democratic rule, whereas those 
with less education may rate democracy in terms of performance34.    
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Figure10 : Brazilian support of the Winstonian 
hypothesis (1995)
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A further attempt to measure support for the democratic system or at least acceptance of 
it is to measure agreement with the Winstonian35 hypothesis.   This will be especially 
relevant in Brazil’s case because, whereas the apartheid state in South Africa was never 
truly legitimate, the Brazilian military regime, while never accorded legitimacy through 
official popular mandate, was considered by many respondents in Brazil to have been an 
                                                 
33 The election of Luiz Inacio “Lula” to the presidency in 2002 is seen by many as an attempt by the 
Brazilian population to place redistribution onto the government’s agenda. Lula is the Worker’s Party (PT) 
candidate and the first working-class president to be elected in Brazil’s history (Hunter, 2003).  
34 This may point to a fault in the measuring instrument, as the researcher does not know how the 
respondent conceptualised ‘democratic system’.   
35 This hypothesis takes its name from Winston Churchill who is said to have declared: “democracy is the 
worst form of rule except for all the other ones before it” (Huntington, 1996:10). 
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effective regime36. It is nevertheless encouraging that a majority have ‘strong agreement’ 
that democracy is better than any other form of government (50.1%, see Figure 10). 
Combined with those who ‘agree’, this totals 83.4%, which is almost 10% higher than 
South Africa.     
 
In terms of social background variables, it seems that as income increases, so does the 
strength of opinion that democracy is the best political system despite its faults. This is 
only slightly so, however, as the combined categories of ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ 
differ between the working-class income group and the higher income group by less than 
2%. It is perhaps significant, however, that whereas those of the working-class income 
group who ‘strongly agree’ are 46.4%, those of the higher income group with this opinion 
are 65.0%. Similarly, in terms of education, it seems that the more educated the 
respondent, the more likely to ‘strongly agree’ that democracy is a better political system, 
as only 22.2% of those with ‘no schooling’ strongly agree compared to 56.3% of those 
with ‘some tertiary education’, and those strongly disagreeing 16.7% and 6.0% 
respectively of those with ‘no schooling’ and ‘some tertiary education’. This is consistent 
with results from the previous graph.    
 
4.4.2.2 Regime Principles : South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix, pp. xiv and xxiii ) 
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Figure 12: South Africa: Having a Democratic 
Political System (1995-2001)
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36 Considering the severity of the authoritarian military regime, it is surprising that as much as 35.6% 
thought army rule to be a fairly good form of government according to 1995 WVS data. Public opinion was 
in essence divided on this matter, 45.4% considering it to be a good form of government and 54.6% 
considering it to be a bad form.     
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The South African democratic regime, in both measures of support for regime principles, 
does not seem to have as broad a support base as Brazil, although support is still fairly 
strong. It can be seen that 46.4% of South African respondents showed a high level of 
support for the democratic system, dropping minimally in 2001 (see Figure 12). In terms 
of supporting democracy as opposed to any other form of rule, this support base is also 
relatively well grounded as the ‘strongly agree’ and ‘agree’ categories combined made up 
72.4% in 1995 this was maintained at 73.6% in 2001 (see Figure 11).  
 
In terms of social background variables and ‘having a democratic system’, the younger 
respondents seem to be slightly more in favour, 52.1% of 16-24-year-olds calling it ‘very 
good’ as opposed to 44.2% of 65+ respondents. Interestingly, this trend is reversed in 
2001, where only 34.4% of 16-24-year-olds as opposed to 57.2% of 65+ respondents 
considered ‘having a democracy’ as ‘very good’. This must not be over-emphasized, 
however, because if one combined the ‘very good’ and ‘good’ categories, the younger 
group is larger, 87.7% as opposed to 83.8%. Black respondents are by far the most 
supportive of democracy, 51.0% pronouncing democracy ‘very good’, which is at least 
15% higher than any other ethnic group in 1995. By 2001 black respondent support has 
dropped slightly to 46.9%, whereas both white and Indian respondent support 
strengthened, those with ‘very good’ responses rising between 6% and 9% to 37.6% and 
45.0% respectively.  
 
In terms of income in 1995, curiously, strong support (‘very good’) for democracy 
weakens from 47.4% at the working-class income group as income increases until the 
higher income group, where it increases quite substantially by 13% to 51.0%. Those who 
think that democracy is ‘very bad’ corroborate this trend, reaching a high of 8.6% at the 
middle-income group. By 2001 this has changed somewhat, as opinions seem to polarize. 
Those with higher percentages of ‘very good’ also have higher percentages of ‘very bad’ 
opinions (and thus lower percentages of the more moderate response categories) 
especially the higher income group37. In terms of education in 1995, it does seem that the 
                                                 
37 The lower income group now has the lowest percentage of ‘very good’ responses 41.5%, but the lowest 
percentage of ‘very bad’ responses too (1.0%). The working-class income group and the higher income 
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higher the level of the respondents’ education, the more likely they are to rate having a 
democratic system as ‘very good’; 43.7% of those with ‘no schooling’ doing so as 
opposed to 52.4% of those with ‘at least some tertiary education’. By 2001 it seems that 
strong enthusiasm for having a democratic system still increases as education rises, but 
dips 9% at the higher income group to 36.8%.         
 
As regards democracy above all other forms of government (see Figure 11), blacks still 
have the largest percentage of strong support (42.1%, almost double any other group’s) 
and whites, the lowest (19.6%) in 1995. It is possible that the other ethnic groups fear the 
so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’ as ethnic minorities. By 2001, however, these opinions 
have become less polarized, with blacks and Indians the most ‘strongly supportive’ of 
democracy over any other system (34.6% and 34.1% respectively) and whites and 
coloureds not far behind, in comparison to 1995 at 22.3% and 21.5% respectively. This 
bodes well, as universal acceptance of the political ‘rules of the game’ is conducive to 
effective conflict resolution38. 
 
In terms of income and democracy as the better form of political system in 1995, the 
working-class income group displays the highest level of ‘strong agreement’ (39.0%), 
decreasing as income increases to 27.5% (higher income group). This trend becomes less 
marked in 2001, however, as opinions homogenise between income groups. It becomes 
the trend that strong support for consolidated democracy increases as income declines. 
On examining the influence of education in 1995, it is interesting to note that, while the 
percentage of those who ‘strongly agree’ that democracy is the better political system 
remains fairly constant as education increases, so does the percentage of those who 
‘agree’, rising from 25.9% (‘no schooling’) to 45.8% (‘some tertiary education’). By 
2001 this has changed, so that agreement that democracy is the better political system 
increases uniformly until ‘some tertiary education’. At this category ‘strongly agree’ and 
                                                                                                                                                 
group, while having ‘very good’ percentages of 47.4% and 43.7% respectively, also have ‘very bad’ 
percentages of 4.3% and 5.0% respectively. 
38 This refers to democracy being not absence of conflict, but absence of illegal conflict mechanisms. 
Democracy is thus seen as a legitimate process through which consensus can be reached through conflict 
management and mediation (Schmitter & Karl, 1996:50). 
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‘agree’ drop 10% each to 24.9% and 34.3% respectively. Age does not show any 
significant trends.   
 
To ignore for a moment the data results of 1990, it would seem that education increases 
the chance of a favourable opinion of democracy in both South Africa and Brazil. This 
may be due to an increased understanding of democracy’s theoretical basis39, but in the 
case of Brazil, it could be because the way that democracy functions is very beneficial to 
the elite. This indeed seems to be the case, as in 1995 the wealthier and more educated 
the Brazilian respondents, the more likely they were to be in favour of democracy in 
principle. In South Africa, it seems that it is the groups at the extreme ends of the 
education and income continuum which are the most supportive of democracy. This may 
be explained by the expectations that the democratic transition was meant to fulfil with 
respect to the prevailing inequalities. The wealthier, more educated South African 
respondents, still pre-dominantly the historically privileged ethnic groups, seem at once 
to support democracy and yet remain wary of it as they are invariably minorities in a 
“majority rules” situation.      
 
Overall, in terms of regime principles, it seems that Brazilian respondents provide a 
slightly stronger base of diffuse support for this political object. What is significant, 
however, is that in the final wave in South Africa those who believe democracy to be 
‘very good’ outnumber those who only believe it to be ‘fairly good’ (43.2% to 37.9%), 
whereas in Brazil this is not so (27% to 57.9% respectively). This perhaps due to the fact 
that many still regard the army as having been effective rulers40, despite the oppression 
and especially because there was not much confidence in the most recent president, 
Itamar Franco, who had assumed office by default as vice-president following Collor’s 
impeachment (Martinez-Lara, 1996:174). Brazilian respondents are nevertheless much 
more supportive of democracy over other systems, despite its faults (83.4% as opposed to 
73.6%), suggesting that democracy is still preferable to rule by the military. Thus it 
seems that, in this context, although South African respondents may have a slightly 
                                                 
39 To corroborate this, the ‘don’t know’ rates drop as education increases among the items referring to 
democracy.  
40 In 1995 fully 45.4% of the Brazilian respondents thought army rule was fairly good to very good.  
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greater sense of pride and national identification, the Brazilian support base for regime 
principles is wider.  
 
4.4.3 Regime Performance41   
As previously mentioned, in some cases problems in the data capturing of the World 
Values Survey in the country sets used meant that crucial variables required for analysis 
were missing in certain instances in the Brazil 1990 wave. In order to supplement the data 
required for the study therefore, several variables were acquired from CESOP 42 , the 
Centre for Public Opinion Studies, based in Sao Paulo, Brazil. It is recognised that this 
does compromise the comparability of the data and results must thus be interpreted with 
caution. Nevertheless, use of variables43 from another data set is intended to provide a 
rough idea of public opinion where the original instrument is unable to do so.  As a 
consequence of the different variables used, Brazil and South Africa will again be 
compared separately in terms of evaluation of regime performance. General impressions 
in terms of comparison will be noted following the individual analyses. 
 
4.4.3.1 Regime Performance: Brazil 1990-1995 (see Appendix 1, pp. iii and ix) 
Broadly speaking in terms of Brazilian respondents, it is encouraging to note that almost 
twice as many people felt ‘optimistic’ or ‘very optimistic’ as ‘pessimistic’ or ‘very 
pessimistic’ (43.8% as opposed to 22%) about Brazil’s future in 1990 (see Figure 13). It 
seems that opinions are very favourably disposed towards the future of the regime. 
 
In terms of social background variables, it seems that the most optimistic are the 
youngest (16-25 years) and oldest (51+ years) age cohorts, 8% and 8.3% respectively 
                                                 
41 The items used for 1995 and 2001 ‘regime performance’ were: “Where on this scale would you put the 
political system: as it was [in apartheid times/before abertura]?” q 54@1 (1995); q163 (2001) as it is today? 
q54@3 (1995); qX3 (2001) as you expect it will be ten years from now?” q54@2(1995); qX4 (2001). 
Response set scale, 1-10; 1=very bad; 10=very good. 
42 Centro de Estudos de Opinião Publica 
43 The data used in this case to provide a point of departure for support for regime performance in Brazil 
1990 were taken from a survey conducted by CESOP in January 1990. The question reads: “Generally, 
how would you say you feel in relation to the future of Brazil? a) very optimistic, b) optimistic, c) neutral, d) 
pessimistic, e) very pessimistic?”    This question was chosen because it most closely resembles one of the 
items used in the operationalization. It is also appropriate, because President Collor had only recently been 
elected president at this stage, thus preventing any evaluation of regime performance based on sustained 
actions.  
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stating they were ‘very optimistic’, as opposed to the other age cohorts who ranged from 
4.7% to 5% in this category. If one combines the ‘very optimistic’ and ‘optimistic’ 
categories, however, optimism seems to increase with age. This is corroborated by the 
fact that that the youngest age category also displays the highest percentage of those 
feeling ‘pessimistic’ (16.7%) and within 0.2% of the highest percentage of ‘very 
pessimistic’ (7.9%). This prompts the suggestion that younger Brazilians are more 
polarised in their views and less settled in their political opinions perhaps. In terms of 
schooling, there are no spectacular differences discernable between the various levels of 
schooling, although opinions seem slightly more favourable towards the regime’s future 
among those with less education44.            
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Although it is unfortunately not possible to compare perceptions of the previous and 
present regimes between 1990 and 1995, it is possible to compare roughly the perceptions 
of the future regime45 between these two times frames (see Figure 13 and Figure 14). It is 
                                                 
44 While the percentage of those who have ‘no schooling’ and are ‘very optimistic’ about Brazil’s future is 
slightly more than those with ‘some tertiary education’ of the same opinion (6.3% to 4.8%), combined with 
the respective percentages which are ‘optimistic’, this differences is negligible (42.1% versus 44.4% 
respectively). It is only when combining those who are ‘pessimistic’ and ‘very pessimistic’ that one can 
notice a slight difference: 12.5% (‘no schooling’) versus 23.6% (‘some tertiary education’).                                                              
45 Strictly speaking, the question used for this item measures anticipation for the future regime as the survey 
was taken on the eve of Collor’s inauguration, thus the new administration could not yet be judged on 
current performance.   
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clear that, whereas more Brazilian respondents were optimistic than pessimistic in 1990 
(42.8% as opposed to 22%), in 1995 this picture has changed somewhat46.   
 
In terms of the future regime in 1995, however, one can see that 10 years after democratic 
transition Brazilian respondents are still optimistic about the future of the government. 
This optimism is fairly evenly distributed across the board in terms of age47. Interestingly, 
although those with ‘no schooling’ are the happiest with the present and previous regimes, 
in terms of the future regime, they are the most pessimistic. In a reversal of previous 
trends, it seems that as the respondent’s level of education increases, so does their 
optimism for the future48.  
 
It is curious that, whereas there had been a strong link between education and income 
previously, these variables display quite different trends in terms of perspectives on the 
political future of Brazil. This can be seen by examining the trends in income. 
Interestingly, the working-class respondents are very polarized as they are the most 
pessimistic in terms of the future regime (at 21.1%), but they are also the most optimistic 
(25.7%). As regards the other income groups, there is a slow decline in the percentage of 
those who predict the future regime to be ‘very good’, with higher income at 16.7%. 
Interestingly however, as regards those who think the future regime will be ‘very bad’, 
the percentage declines with increase in income until the higher income group, where it 
jumps from 8.5% (middle income) to 20% (higher income).   
 
                                                 
46 The figures of 42.8% and 22% are achieved by collapsing the ‘very optimistic’ and ‘optimistic’ 
categories and the ‘very pessimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ categories respectively (see Figure 13).  Combining 
‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’, and ‘very bad’ and ‘fairly bad’ for anticipation of the future regime in 1995, 
percentages of 54.2% and 35.9% respectively are reached, demonstrating a shift in opinion. While it is 
acknowledged that the discrepancy may be attributed to the fact that the WVS had no neutral response 
category, and those who are optimistic are more numerous than those who are pessimistic, the change is 
significant enough to take note of.    
47 Of those who predict the future regime to be ‘very good’ and ‘fairly good’, all age groups range between 
60% and 49.3%. It is interesting to note that the two most optimistic groups are the oldest, 65-70 years 
(60.0%) and the youngest, 16-24 years (59.7%).  
48 This is illustrated in that of those with ‘no schooling’, 50% rate the future regime ‘very bad’ whereas 
after a steady decline through the education groups, only 14.2% of those with at least some tertiary 
education do so. In addition, only 12.5% of those with ‘no schooling’ predict the future regime to be ‘very 
good’, whereas the other education groups all range between 22% and 27.9% in this category.    
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Although they cannot be compared with 1990 data, evaluations of the present and past 
regimes can be compared with projections for the future regime in 1995 (see Figure 14). 
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Encouragingly, it can be seen that Brazilian respondents contemplate the political future 
with optimism relative to their evaluation of the present regime. What is troubling is that 
in 1995 the former military regime rates better than the current democratic regime49.  
 
On examining evaluations of the previous regime in terms of age, what is interesting is 
that, although the percentage of those who consider the regime to be ‘very bad’ increases 
slightly with age, it dips substantially from group 55-64 years to 65-70+ years (from 
27.8% to 18.9%). This is especially remarkable as it is this group that is most supportive 
of the 1995 present democratic regime (see below), yet they were least opposed to the 
military regime. This can perhaps be explained by noting that this group had lower 
expectations of democracy, seeming to retain a fairly good opinion of the former military 
regime.  
 
In terms of education, a marked divide is noticeable. Those with ‘no schooling’ and ‘at 
least some primary school’ who rated the previous regime ‘very good’, made up 22.2% 
                                                 
49 Although only a slight difference, the fact that those who rate the previous regime ‘very good’ and ‘fairly 
good’ make up 33.4% as opposed to the present regime’s 28.2% is worrying.  
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and 20.1% respectively.  Only 9.6% and 7.0% of those with at least ‘some high school’ 
and at least ‘some tertiary education’ respectively considered the previous regime to be 
‘very good’. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that Brazilian regimes have 
always been populist, appealing to the masses50, whereas it is those with higher education 
who would have noticed the fundamental injustices of authoritarian rule. 
 
On examining trends within the social background variables in terms of evaluation of the 
present regime in 1995, it is interesting to note that, although no respondent with a higher 
income rated the government as ‘very good’, those who considered it ‘fairly good’ were 
more than the ‘fairly good’ and ‘very good’ categories combined among the other income 
groups.  
 
Regarding education, those with ‘no schooling’ are the most supportive, 36.8% rating the 
present regime as ‘very good’, which is more than triple the percentage of any other education 
group.   It is possible that this is due to hyper-inflation having been brought under control 
by the Minister of Finance, Cardoso. Those with no education are probably rural workers, 
whose incomes to buy such basic commodities as paraffin and foodstuffs are eaten away 
by inflation.  
 
On examining support within age groups, what is most noticeable is that the percentage 
of those who think that the government is ‘very good’ increases very slightly with age, 
but between 55-64 years and 65-70 years it jumps from 9.4% to 32.4%. While it must be 
remembered that this is probably because the sample size of this group is smaller, as 
mentioned before, it could be argued that respondents of this age can more reliably 
compare the present regime’s previous attempts at democracy. That the 65-70 year age 
group was the most supportive of the previous regime, however (see above), suggests that 
this group is pleasantly surprised at the democratic regime’s performance, having 
endorsed military rule in the past.            
 
                                                 
50 Bresser-Pereira (1990:206) describes the typical Brazilian voter as having a poor political education and 
a lack of information, mistrusting elites but favouring ‘popular’ candidates. These are vestiges of the 
populist nature of Brazilian government.    
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4.4.3.2 Regime Performance: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xvi and xxv) 
On examining regime evaluation in South Africa in 1995 (see Figure 15), it is evident 
that the new democratic dispensation is much more popular among respondents than the 
apartheid regime (only 10.4% as opposed to 56.3% considering it ‘very bad’), and South 
African respondents were very optimistic about the future, 47.2% predicting it will be 
‘very good’.  
 
In terms of social background variables, there are predictably stark polarities noticeable 
between those who benefited from apartheid and those who did not. For example, in 
terms of ethnicity in 1995 only 16.6% of whites considered apartheid ‘very bad’, whereas 
between 66.1% (blacks) and 47% (coloureds) of the other ethnic groups considered it to 
be so. These percentages perhaps again reflect the racial hierarchy inherent in apartheid 
laws. Similarly, whereas 47.8% of whites considered apartheid ‘fairly good’ or ‘very 
good’, these two categories never made up more than 16.2% (Indians) of any other racial 
category.  
 
In 1995 there is a definite trend whereby, as education increases, so does the likelihood of 
a more positive evaluation of apartheid51. What is interesting in examining trends in 
terms of income is that it would be expected that there would be a clear trend of an 
increase in income denoting an increase in support for apartheid. It seems, however, that 
those with a higher income are less supportive than the middle-income group (35.2% 
consider apartheid ‘very bad’, as opposed to 23% respectively). In terms of age, it seems 
to be the youngest (60.8%) and the oldest (66.3%) age categories that have the highest 
percentage of those rating apartheid as ‘very bad’.  
 
In terms of evaluating the present regime in 1995, whites are by far the most 
pessimistic52, although in terms of considering it ‘very bad’, they are closely followed by 
                                                 
51 Only 37.9% of those with ‘some tertiary education’ considered apartheid ‘very bad’, as opposed to 
68.6% of those with ‘no schooling’.  This could arguably be called circular reasoning, as whites, who 
supported apartheid, were afforded better educational subsidies, thus increasing the likelihood that they 
would be in favour of a system that benefited them.  
52Of whites, 76.9% consider the present regime either ‘very bad’ or ‘fairly bad’. 
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coloureds 53  (26.7% compared to 24.6% respectively). Perhaps an illustration of the 
continued inequalities across racial lines present in 1995, the general trend is that the 
poorer the respondent, the more supportive of the present regime, although the higher 
income group is slightly more supportive than the middle income group54. This may be 
attributed to the small repatriated black elite and newly appointed, high-salaried public 
officials who support the governing party. In terms of education, there is a clear trend that 
the more educated the respondents, the less likely they are to support the present regime55, 
again pointing to apartheid’s legacy of inequality affecting the present regime. In 1995 it 
seems that the younger respondents are more likely to be positive about the present 
regime. The percentage of those rating the regime as ‘very bad’ doubles from 6.1% (16-
24 years) to 13.1% (45-54 years) and the ‘very good’ respondents halving in percentage 
from 17.4% (16-24 years) to 8.8% (55-64 years).      
 
On considering the future, the pessimism of whites is again evident, although they seem 
slightly more optimistic about the future than the present56. Blacks are again the most 
positive, and the coloureds and Indians of a similar opinion, although this time the 
coloureds are slightly more optimistic than the latter group about the future, 38.2% as 
opposed to 32.7% predicting the future regime to be ‘very good’. As regards income 
groups, the same trend of support for the present regime is evident in terms of support for 
the future incumbents. On examining trends within the age categories, it becomes clear 
that the younger respondents are definitely more positive57.  
 
                                                 
53 It is possible that they feel vulnerable politically, as a minority, because although they were victims of 
apartheid, coloureds were traditional supporters of the NP, following the latter’s belated attempt to 
diversify its support base in 1984 (Giliomee, 1994:11). That the same is true of the Indian population is 
reflected in the fact that the percentages of those who collectively consider the regime ‘very bad’ and 
‘fairly bad’ are 63.5% (coloureds) and 62.2% (Indians).   
54 Of the higher income group 17.2% as opposed to the middle-income group’s 22.7% consider the present 
regime ‘very bad’ whereas, collectively, 33.1% of the higher income group consider it to be ‘very good’ or 
‘fairly good’ in comparison to the middle-income group’s 27.6%.     
55 This is most dramatically illustrated in that, whereas 29.8% of those with ‘no schooling’ evaluate the 
present regime as ‘very good’, this percentage decreases with education until support drops to 3.4% among 
those with ‘at least some tertiary education’.  
56 Notably, whereas 0.9% considered the current regime to be ‘very good’, 6.3% project the future regime 
to be ‘very good’.  
57 As this trend extends into 2001 (although there is not enough data yet available to support this), it is 
possible that this suggests the applicability of Inglehart’s (1998) generational displacement thesis in terms 
of democratic values.  
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In comparing 1995 results (Figure 15) to 2001 (Figure 16), it would seem that the 
optimism for the future has tempered somewhat; those who think the future regime will 
be ‘very good’ dropping from 47.2% in 1995 (Figure 14) to 22.9% in 2000 (Figure 15). 
Indeed, while opinions on apartheid have changed minimally in five years, the outlook on 
the present and future regimes has become somewhat more pessimistic.  
 
On examining patterns in terms of social background variables, several patterns are 
evident. Blacks still have the highest percentage in considering the previous regime ‘very 
bad’, although this has dropped slightly from 66.1% in 1995 to 60.4% in 2001. Similarly, 
whereas 47% of coloureds considered it ‘very bad’ in 1995, by 2001 this has dropped to 
33.5%. Indians display the highest level of nostalgia as the percentage of those 
considering apartheid ‘very bad’ drops from 54.3% to 28.8%, suggesting that they are the 
unhappiest with the current regime performance. Interestingly, slightly more whites 
consider apartheid to be ‘very bad’58.  
 
                                                 
58 The percentage considering apartheid ‘very bad’ rises from 16.6% to 18.5%. It is, however, arguable that 
this increase is negligible. What is more interesting is that the white percentage considering the apartheid 
regime ‘very good’ has dropped from 12.1% to 8.1%, whereas coloureds and Indians considering apartheid 
to be ‘very good’ have increased slightly (4.5% to 6.8% and 3.2% to 12.8% respectively). 
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In 2001 support for the previous regime continues to increase with education, the most 
noticeable differences occurring between those with ‘no schooling’ and those with ‘at 
least some primary school’ and again with those who have ‘some tertiary education’59.  
 
In terms of income, generally, it seems that time has softened perceptions of apartheid as, 
although support for this regime was not high, the percentages for those who considered 
it to be ‘very bad’ have diminished. An exception to this is the middle-income group, 
whose perceptions of apartheid have worsened considerably, the percentage considering 
it ‘very bad’ climbing from 23% in 1995 to 45.6% in 2001. A possible explanation is that 
some South African respondents who were relatively poor have since the democratic 
transition been able to increase their income to that of a middle-level income. Thus they 
attribute their previous poverty to apartheid discrimination and continue to hold bad 
memories of their experiences under that regime. 
 
On evaluating the present regime, there is a clear trend demonstrating that as respondent 
income increases, so support for the present regime declines60. This is probably due to 
the redistributive measures introduced by the ANC-led government to address the income 
inequalities in South Africa. Support for the present regime has, however, declined 
absolutely among all income groups, perhaps due to dissatisfaction with service delivery 
(Lodge, 2000:33-34; Schlemmer, 1994a:99). Bearing in mind that there seems to be a 
relationship between democratization and a strong middle class (Rivero et al., 2003:6), 
the fact that only 26.4% of the middle consider the present regime ‘fairly good’ or ‘very 
good’ may be a cause for concern. Within the context of South Africa, however, rampant 
inequalities ensure that the middle class is not in the majority, although it is increasing 
(11.9% in 2003), perhaps reducing the severity of this situation (Rivero et al., 2003:23).     
                                                 
59 The percentage of those who consider the previous regime to be ‘very bad’ drops from 74.1% (‘no 
schooling’) to 53.8% (‘at least some primary education’) and again to 34.6% (‘at least some tertiary 
education’).  
60 While 8.9% of the working-class income group consider the present regime ‘very bad’, 25.8% of the 
higher income group hold the same opinion. Similarly, whereas 56.8% of the working-class income group 
consider the present regime either ‘fairly good’ or ‘very good’, only 16.1% of the higher-income group 
hold the same opinion.     
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On examining trends in 2001 among ethnic groups, white pessimism is again evident as 
the group which has the highest percentage (29.5%) considering the present regime ‘very 
bad’. This is closely followed by the Indian population (24.4%). Racially, trends in terms 
of present regime support have changed little in five years, although Indians are slightly 
more pessimistic than coloureds61, whereas the reverse was true in 1995. In terms of 
education, the same trend apparent in 1995 is present. 
 
On projecting into the future of the South African regime, all respondents are more 
positive and supportive, although those with little or no education continue to be more so 
than others62.   
 
Optimism for the future continues to decrease fairly rapidly as income increases63. There 
are some interesting developments in terms of support amongst the ethnic groups. Among 
whites, there is a slight moderation in views on the future regime64. Among black people, 
                                                 
61 78.6% of Indians consider the present regime to be ‘very bad’ or ‘fairly bad’ as opposed to 61.5% of 
coloureds.  
62 This is reflected in the fact that of those with ‘no education’, 1% project the regime to be ‘very bad’ as 
opposed to 20.8% of those who have ‘some tertiary education’.  
63 Of those who project the future regime to be ‘very good’, the percentage of the working-class income 
group is 39.4% dropping to 5.3% amongst the higher income group. This suggests a link with ethnicity. 
64 From 1995 to 2001, although those who project the future regime to be ‘very good’ have dropped from 
6.3% to 3.8%, those who project the future regime to be ‘very bad’ have also dropped from 35% to 26.7%.    
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however, optimism for the future has dropped significantly, as those projecting the future 
regime to be ‘very good’ have dropped from 58.7% to 40.5%. Whereas coloured support 
for the future regime has dropped only marginally, however, Indian support has dropped 
even more significantly than that of black South African respondents65.    
 
In terms of overall impressions, it seems that both Brazilian and South African 
respondents are increasingly optimistic about the future of their country in terms of 
regime performance66. What is interesting, but perhaps worrying, is that whereas South 
Africans overall remain convinced about the evils of apartheid67, Brazilians in 1995 seem 
to rate the former military regime as better than their current democratic system of 
government. This does not bode well for the continued legitimacy of the democratic 
regime, although it is encouraging to note that Brazilians remain optimistic about the 
future. An examination of specific support, support for regime institutions and political 
actors, will perhaps clarify the picture.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
65 Coloureds are more likely to consider the future regime to be ‘fairly good’ (38.2%) in 2001 than ‘very 
good’ as in 1995 (38.2%), but the percentage of Indians projecting the future regime to be ‘very good’ has 
dropped dramatically from 32.7% to 8.9%.  
66 This is especially so because those with higher levels of education and income are the least supportive, 
suggesting that the elite, very influential in the Brazilian political arena (O’Donnell, 1996:100) are least 
disenchanted with democracy.  
67 It must be acknowledged that this is possibly due in part to the fact that black South Africans form an 
overwhelming majority of the population and, considering that they were the group most discriminated 
against during apartheid, do sway opinion, masking dissatisfaction among other groups. Opinions among 
ethnic groups, as has been seen, are not really that unanimous.    
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4.4.4 Regime Institutions68
At this level of political support, it is possible to compare South Africa and Brazil using 
the same variables; thus an overall general impression can be given initially, followed by 
a country by country analysis. 
 
It is clear that within both countries support for the regime institutions seems relatively 
stable over the period of time examined. Encouragingly, both countries display a high 
level of medium support or neutral support, at least suggesting that the institutions are 
largely tolerated, if not emphatically supported. What puts Brazil at a disadvantage in 
comparison to South Africa is that whereas in Brazil approximately 14% of respondents 
have strong support and approximately 30% weak support, the opposite is true of South 
Africa, suggesting that the latter has a much more secure support base.  
    
4.4.4.1 Regime Institutions: Brazil 1990-1995 (See Appendix 1, pp. iv and x) 
It is evident here (see Figure 17) that levels of support for the Brazilian regime 
institutions have remained fairly stable, with only a very slight shift to higher levels of 
support in 1995 . It is also notable that whereas ‘strong support’ does not constitute a 
large percentage, a clear majority at least has medium support, in essence suggesting 
approval of at least the institutions of the democratic regime.  
                                                 
68 The question item used to construct the index reads: “I am going to name a number of organisations. For 
each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a 
lot of confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?”  The armed forces; The 
legal system; The police; Parliament; Civil Service; The government in Brasilia/Pretoria; The president. 
Response set: a great deal /quite a lot/not very much/none at all. The 1990 (q273;q275; q277-280) data set 
only contained the first 5 items, and the 1995 (q53@2-3; q53@6-11) data set did not include the last item. 
The 2001 data set (q148; q151-q156;X1;X2) included all of them. Responses were recoded such that 
(1990); ‘strong support’ =6-11, ‘medium support’= 12-18, ‘weak support’= 19-24 (1995) and (2001). From 
this it can be deduced that strong support comprises responses of mostly ‘a great deal of confidence’ or 
‘quite a lot of confidence’ responses; medium support comprises mostly ‘quite a lot of confidence’ and ‘not 
very much confidence’ responses and weak support comprises responses of mostly ‘not very much 
confidence’ and ‘no confidence at all’. (See Appendix 2 for more in depth discussion).      
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In 1990, in terms of income, it seems that the lower the Brazilian respondents’ income, 
the more likely they are to demonstrate strong support for regime institutions69. It seems 
that the higher income group is equally divided between medium support and weak 
support (50% in both categories), the middle and lower income groups also displaying 
high levels of weak support, 39.4% and 35.7% respectively, suggesting that weak support 
increases with increased income. By 1995 several changes have occurred. It is still true 
that the lower the income, the more likely the respondent to show ‘strong support’70. 
What is interesting, however, is that this trend ceases to hold for the higher income group. 
From no ‘strong support’ at all in 1990, 12.8% show ‘strong support’ in 1995. 
Nevertheless, 51.3% of this group still display low support for regime institutions. In 
1995 results confirm the regularized trend that the wealthier the respondents, the more 
likely they are to have ‘low support’ for the regime institutions71. 
 
In terms of education in 1990 there are very definite trends demonstrating that the less 
education the respondents have, the more likely they are to demonstrate ‘strong support’, 
and the more education the respondents have, the more likely they are to demonstrate 
                                                 
69 Of working-class income Brazilians, 20.5 % demonstrated high support. This declines steadily until the 
higher income group, 0% of which demonstrate strong support.   
70 Of the working-class income group, 19.9% show ‘strong support’, at least 7% higher than any other 
group.  
71 It can be seen in 1995 that 25.9% of working-class income respondents show ‘weak support’. This figure 
increases steadily to 51.3% in the higher income group.      
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‘weak support’72. Five years later, in 1995, levels of support among the different levels of 
education have begun to homogenise73. In 1995, whereas those with ‘no schooling’ and 
‘at least some primary school’ display similar levels of strong support (25% and 22.7% 
respectively) as do the other two groups (14.6% and 12.0% in ascending order of 
educational level), a visible cleavage exists between them of at least 8.1%.                   
 
In terms of age in 1990, once again it seems that the older respondents (55+ years) show 
more political support, not only showing the highest percentage of ‘strong support’ 
(26.3%) but also the lowest percentage of weak support (21.2%). In 1995 this trend 
continues, with the oldest age group (65-70 years) demonstrating 35.6% strong support, 
almost 15% higher than any other age group. In all groups, however, the majority (55.5% 
to 60.4%74) demonstrate medium support, suggesting a stable and fairly secure support 
base for the regimes institutions.  
 
4.4.4.2 Regime Institutions: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xix and xxvii) 
Levels of support among South African respondents also seem relatively stable in the 
period under study, although a slight shift to weaker levels of support is discernable (see 
Figure 18). As in the case with Brazil, a clear majority has at least medium support for 
the regime institutions, which is encouraging in terms of support for democracy. Also 
important to note, however, is that, whereas in Brazil the percentage of ‘strong support’ is 
less than half that of ‘weak support’, in South Africa this situation is reversed, suggesting 
an overall stronger support base for the South African regime’s institutions. 
 
On examining trends within ethnic groups in 1995, white pessimism is again clear, this 
group showing the highest percentage of weak support (25.1%) and the lowest percentage 
of strong support (8.7%). In 2001 this support drops lower as a mere 2.0% retain strong 
                                                 
72 Of those with ‘no schooling’, 43.2% show ‘strong support’. This declines as education level rises until 
3.1% of those with at least some tertiary education show ‘strong support’. Also, of those with ‘at least some 
tertiary education’, 62.5% show ‘weak support’ as opposed to those with ‘no schooling’, 18.9% of which 
show weak support.     
73 ‘Strong support’ figures have a smaller range, 25.0% (‘no schooling’) to 12.0% (‘at least some tertiary 
education’) and ‘weak support’ figures do not vary by more than 2.2%.   
74 Percentages of medium support increase with age until the 65-70 years age group, where the percentage 
decline slightly by approximately 5% (60.3% to 55.6%).   
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support for regime institutions, whereas weak support increases substantially to 48.1%. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum, understandably, are blacks with 6.2% and 46.0% in 
the respective categories in 1995. These percentages do not change significantly in 2001. 
The majority of Indians show moderate support in 1995, as 69.9% are medium supporters, 
whereas coloureds have slightly more negative views, demonstrating a higher percentage 
of weak support (20.2% as opposed to 8.1%) than Indians. By 2001 Indians’ support has 
dropped noticeably, weak support more than trebling to 29.8% at the expense of strong 
and medium support. Coloured support, on the other hand, shifts less significantly. In 
terms of age, whereas it seems in 1995 that the younger the respondents, the more likely 
they are to be supportive of the regime’s institutions, strong support decreasing almost 
uniformly from 43.5% (16-24 years) to 30.6% (65+ years); by 2001 strong support peaks 
at the 45-54 year age category (41.5%), declining in both directions from this point.                                    
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Figure18: South African Support for Regime 
Institutions Index (1995-2001)
1995 36.4 52.8 10.7
2001 33.5 51.2 15.3
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As regards education in 1995, strong support peaks with those who have ‘primary school’ 
(45.8%), declining to 16.1% with those with ‘some tertiary education’. This is 
explainable in the light of the poor institutional support shown by whites and their higher 
education in 1995 as a legacy of apartheid discrimination. Most of those with ‘some 
tertiary education’ are medium supporters (66.0%). Although they have the highest 
percentage of weak support75 (17.9%), this in itself shows that low support in 1995 for 
regime institution was not high enough to cause concern. These trends have not altered 
                                                 
75 The percentage of weak support increases steadily as the level of education rises.   
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drastically by 2001. Those with ‘primary school’ increased ‘strong support’ to 55.8%, 
although ‘strong support’ has otherwise dropped several percent across the board. Indeed, 
it seems that support has lowered generally, as ‘weak support’ has increased, those with 
tertiary education remaining the least supportive with a ‘weak support’ percentage of 
18.2%. A majority in each category (ranging from 69.5% to 45.5%), except those with 
‘some primary school’ (37.4%) being mostly ‘strong’ supporters, however, does retain 
‘medium support’, demonstrating that the drop in institutional support does not threaten 
to lead to destabilization.  
 
On looking at income in 1995, there is clear evidence that generally the poorer the 
respondents, the more likely they are to support the regime’s institutions. Of the working-
class income group, 44.6% demonstrated strong support. This figure dwindles gradually 
with an increase in income to 9.9% with the higher income group. Similarly, of the 
working-class income group, 7.6% show weak support, which increases with higher 
income until 22.0% in the higher income group. What is interesting to note, however, is 
that medium support also increases with an increase in income, providing reassurance 
that the higher income group does not completely oppose the regime’s institutions. By 
2001 very little has changed. Trends concerning strong and weak support have remained 
the same, except that the actual percentages have dropped. In the case of ‘strong support’, 
the higher income group decreases threefold from 9.9% to 2.9%. Also with regards to 
weak support, the middle and higher income group show 23.6% and 46.3% (the latter 
more than doubling from 1995), suggesting that support has dropped at increasingly 
higher rates as income increases.        
 
It is evident here that South African respondents’ support for regime institutions is 
stronger than that of Brazilian respondents. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis 
to hypothesize as to why this might be, several suggestions, which will be developed in 
the following chapter, can be offered. From Brazil’s side, the clear regard that the 
majority of the Brazilian respondents have for the former military regime, especially in 
comparison to the current democratic dispensation, is reflected in their lack of enthusiasm 
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for the current regime’s institutions76. In addition, as South African opinion is swayed by 
the strength of black South African respondent opinion, so Brazil is swayed by that of the 
working-class citizen, essentially also poor, black and marginalised77. The fact that the 
government has until very recently attempted to address their situation may have much to 
do with the low confidence in institutions, especially as it is reported that the police and 
courts are still especially discriminatory against poorer, darker-skinned Brazilians 
(Sansone, 2003:152; Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001:120; Friedman & De Villiers, 
1995:509).  The slight shift towards more favourable levels of support is encouraging, 
however, suggesting perhaps that these problems are being addressed. In terms of South 
Africa, the very fact that the majority of the (poorer, previously disadvantaged) 
population are now treated equally according to the nature of democratic institutions 
explains their higher support. Perhaps the reason that their support is not in fact stronger 
is that South African respondents are disappointed with government service delivery78. 
This may also relate to opinions held about the political actors, the leaders of the 
democratic regimes, themselves.      
 
4.4.5 Political Actors      
In terms of both South American and African politics, the political actors themselves, 
especially such high-ranking officials as the president, have always played a large role in 
the political arena. This can be related to the populism considered characteristic of South 
American politics, and the central role of the so-called ‘big or strong man’ in African 
politics (Bresser Pereira, 1990:206; Bratton & Mattes, 2003:17).  
 
                                                 
76In contrast, the army, albeit it is considered as an institution of the current regime, has always been fairly 
autonomous from civilian control (Roett, 1999:20). Despite its brutal rule for 20 years, the army has the 
confidence of 45.4% (‘a great deal’ and ‘quite a lot of confidence’ combined) of the population in 1995.    
77 This is evident in the high inequalities in Brazil (Gini co-efficient= 0.63 in 1991); the correlation 
between poverty and darker skin was discussed in Chapters Two and Three.   
78Bratton & Mattes (2000:9) discovered that South Africans, especially in comparison with the rest of 
Africa, have a very materialistic or substantive interpretation of democracy, in that their support for 
democracy was contingent on how much the democratic regime could raise their standard of living or 
redress the inequalities generated by the apartheid government. This may explain why, in some cases, 
specific support levels are not very high. Intrinsic support for democracy, on the other hand, is support for 
democracy as a set of principles, essentially diffuse support.     
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While the operationalization of the ‘political actors’ could not focus specifically on 
support for the President as this item was not present in all the survey waves79, it must be 
emphasized how important a figure he is considered to be in both countries.     
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Figure 19: Brazilian Support for 
Political Actors (1990)
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Figure 20: Brazilian support for Political 
Actors (1995)
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4.4.5.1 Political Actors : Brazil 1990-199580 (see Appendix 1, pp. v and xi) 
Due to constraints within the data, it is again not possible to compare directly data results 
from 1990 with those from 199581.  The data used to supplement this study must again be 
interpreted with caution in terms of linking them to patterns inherent in the 1995 data.  
 
In terms of political actor evaluation at the national level82 in 1990, it can be seen (Figure 
19) that, although those who regard them as excellent are a relatively small percentage 
(7.6%), those who are positive are the larger in number than those who are purely 
negative in their evaluation (29.6% as opposed to 23.4%).  
 
                                                 
79 ‘The president’ occurs as an item on the regime institution index in 2001 wave only. 
80 The question item used in the 1995 (q60) and 2001 (q174) waves was worded: “How satisfied are you 
with the way the people now in national government are handling the countries affairs? Would you say that 
you were very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied?” 
81 The variable necessary for the measurement of the level of support for political actor was not recorded, 
despite its presence on the questionnaire. To supplement this study therefore, the missing data were 
replaced by part of a study conducted by CESOP (Centro de Estudos de Opiniao Publica) in Brazil in 
December 1990. The question read : “In your opinion, is President Fernando Collor making a(n) : a) 
excellent, b) good, c) average, d) bad, e) terrible government?” The response categories were collapsed 
and recoded as seen in Figure 19.     
82 Considering the survey question items used to operationalize this level of political support, the 
assumption is made that both Brazilian and South African respondents will evaluate political actors at a 
national level.     
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In terms of age, it seems that, although there is no general trend, those who are over fifty 
years seem to be much more approving of Collor’s government83. It is possible that this 
is due to the fact that they experienced the ineffective democratic regime between 
Vargas’s and the military’s dictatorships (1946-1964) leading them to see the current 
democratic dispensation in a comparatively favourable light.     
 
In terms of education levels, although again no clear trends are exhibited, it seems that 
those with ‘no schooling’ are more supportive of the government84. Those with ‘at least 
some primary’ and ‘at least some high school’ are increasingly less optimistic, although 
those with ‘at least some tertiary education’ do not follow the pattern, seeming to hold 
more moderate views85. As it is probable that those with ‘at least some primary’ and 
‘high school’ are urban workers86, it is possible that they come into more conflict with 
the government through wage disputes, thus dampening their enthusiasm for the regime87.     
 
In 1995 there are clear tendencies demonstrating that the older the respondents, the more 
likely they are to show satisfaction with the incumbents88. Predictably, those with less 
education also seem to show more support for their contemporary political actors. 
Interestingly, while the tends are consistent, the biggest percentage differentials occur 
between those with ‘no schooling’ and those with ‘at least some primary school’, 
suggesting division in terms of strength of opinion89. In terms of income, several rather 
                                                 
83 Of those of the age of 51+ years, 9.2% rate the regime as excellent, whereas no other age group does so 
above 7.4%. Similarly, those who rate it ‘good’ make up 29%, whereas no other age group does so above 
23%.     
84 Those with ‘no schooling’ who rate the present incumbents as ‘excellent’ or ‘good’ make up 45.5%, 
almost double any other educational group.     
85 Although possessing the lowest percentage that considers the government ‘excellent’ (4.6%), they also 
have the lowest percentage, after those with ‘no schooling’, in rating the present incumbents as ‘terrible’ 
(12.8%). 
86 This is as opposed to rural workers, who is it expected will consist mostly of those with ‘no schooling’.   
87 This follows from what Roett (1999) describes as Brazil’s patriarchal society, thus benefiting the 
wealthier Brazilians at the expense of the poorer, perhaps also explaining the slightly more favourable 
views of those with ‘some tertiary education’. In addition, it is possible that the urban workers supported 
Lula, from the Worker’s Party (PT), who was Collor’s opposition in the presidential elections of 1990.    
88 Incumbent satisfaction rises steadily with each age cohort. The ‘very satisfied’ increase from 8.4% (16-
25 years) to 21.1% (65-70 years). The ‘fairly satisfied’ rise from 42.7% (16-25 years) to 60.5% (65-70 
years).  
89 Whereas percentages of those who are ‘fairly satisfied’ decrease from 66.7% (‘no schooling’) to 43.6% 
(‘at least some primary school’), other education groups differed from the latter by no more than 0.3%. In 
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interesting observations can be made. In comparing the combined percentages of ‘very 
satisfied’ and ‘satisfied’, with ‘very dissatisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’, there is not a large 
difference in opinion between income groups. Nevertheless, whereas those with higher 
income show the highest percentage of those ‘very satisfied’ (16.7%), the middle income 
group has the highest percentage of those ‘fairly satisfied’, i.e. 52.8%, almost 10% higher 
than any other group. This suggests that the higher income group are slightly more 
enthusiastic supporters, while the middle class are the most reluctant supporters. Bearing 
the above in mind, it is curious that the higher income group also show the highest 
percentage of those ‘very dissatisfied’, i.e. 33.3%, also almost 10% higher than any other 
group. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that, as higher income respondents in 
patrimonial Brazilian society, they are more likely to wield political influence and, 
consequently, have more at stake financially in the political game. The polarized nature 
of opinion among those of the higher income group is probably due to the difference in 
political preferences; those who support the incumbents are obviously supporters of 
Collor and those dissatisfied support an opposition party.      
 
4.4.5.2 Political Actors: South Africa 1995-2001 (see Appendix 1, pp. xix and xxviii) 
Here again the levels of support for the South African incumbents over the period of 
study seem to remain relatively stable. Satisfaction with and support for South African 
political actors in fact increases slightly, the only instance of an increase in specific 
support experienced in either country90. A majority remain at least ‘fairly satisfied’ with 
their political leaders, which is encouraging in terms of support for the democratic regime.      
 
                                                                                                                                                 
addition, whereas those who were ‘very dissatisfied’ rise from 11.1% (no schooling’) to 19.4% (‘at last 
some primary school’); other percentages differed by no more than 5%.        
90 This is seen if one combines the ‘very satisfied’ with the ‘fairly satisfied’: 50.2% in 1995 and 52.3% in 
2001.  
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for Political Actors (1995-2001)
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Results in terms of ethnic groups are fairly predictable in 1995 in that black South 
African respondents are the most supportive of their political leaders, whereas the whites 
are least so. This is understandable as blacks, the most oppressed group under apartheid, 
are showing support for the political leaders who brought that regime to an end. The more 
conservative whites, on the other hand, may be mourning the loss of their past privileges 
that the new regime has brought about. Comparing relatively with coloureds, however, 
whites do not compare as unfavourably in terms of support as perhaps might be 
expected91. Less encouraging is the fact that whites are more numerous than any other 
ethnic group in not being satisfied at all with the government, suggesting sustained racial 
cleavages92. By 2001 opinion polarities between black and white respondents in South 
Africa seem to have widened93. Meanwhile, whereas coloured support remained the same 
since 1995, Indian support has weakened94. Those Indians who are ‘very dissatisfied’ 
with the government are 35.9%, which is almost as much as whites (36.2%).  
 
                                                 
91 ‘Very satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ blacks together make up 56.0% of their total, whereas whites with 
the same opinions total only 32.3%. This is not that much less than the coloured total of 35.8%, whereas 
Indians total 40.0%.     
92 Of whites, 27.0% are very dissatisfied, nearly 10% higher than any other ethnic group.  
93 Of blacks, those ‘very satisfied’ and ‘fairly satisfied’ together make up 60.6%, but whites of the same 
opinion are only 26.2%. This differential has thus increased by 10.7% in 5 years.       
94 The percentage of coloureds who are ‘very satisfied’ and fairly satisfied’ has decreased marginally from 
35.8% to 34.9%. Indians with these views, on the other hand, have decreased from 40% to 34%.    
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In terms of education in 1995, it is again evident that, generally speaking, the less 
education the respondents have, the more likely they are to support the government95. 
This pattern continues with little variation into 2001.  
 
On examining income in 1995, a similar trend to that of the above variable emerges96, 
unsurprisingly, given South Africa’s known social demographics. The poorer the 
respondents, the more likely they are to support the incumbent government. What is 
interesting is that the working-class and lower income groups share similar percentage 
breakdowns as do the middle and higher income groups, suggesting an ideological 
separation between the lower and upper economic classes.  Regarding age, there is a 
definite trend in 1995, which suggests that the younger the respondents, the more likely 
they are to support the political actors of the regime. This changes in 2001, with the older 
respondents indicating that they have become both more satisfied and more dissatisfied, 
suggesting that the older the respondents, the more polarized their view97.  
 
In taking an overall view, it seems that, whereas neither South African nor Brazilian 
respondents’ evaluation dynamics have changed drastically, there is a slight shift towards 
less satisfaction with the incumbents discernable98. In the case of both countries, the 
poorer and less educated the respondents, the more likely they are to support the 
incumbents. While admittedly it is perhaps the poorer, less educated respondents who are 
more susceptible to social desirability bias, taken at face value, it is encouraging that the 
poorer, less educated respondents, who represent the majority in both countries, show the 
                                                 
95 Of those with ‘no schooling’, 10.7% are very satisfied, as compared to the 1.8% of those with ‘at least 
some tertiary education’. In addition, while only 9% of those with ‘no schooling’ are ‘very dissatisfied’, 
18.9% of those with ‘at least some tertiary education’ are.      
96 Whereas 11.5% of the working-class income group are ‘very satisfied’ with the political leaders, this 
percentage declines as income increases until the percentage for higher income is 1.2%. Similarly, whereas 
8.1% of the working-class income group are ‘very dissatisfied’, this is true of as much as 21% of the higher 
income group.  
97 In 1995, those ‘very satisfied’ decreases with age from 12.1% (16-24 years) to 4.0% (65+ years) and the 
‘very dissatisfied’ respondent percentage increases from 9.3% to 16.0% respectively. In 2001, this trend 
changes where those ‘very satisfied’ increases with age from 7.1% (16-24 years) to 19.1% (65+ years) and 
but those who are very dissatisfied also increases from 13.0% to 20.6% respectively. 
98 In both the South African and the Brazilian cases, both the areas of ‘fairly satisfied’ and ‘very 
dissatisfied’ have increased, suggesting a shift in those who were ‘very satisfied’ and only ‘fairly 
dissatisfied’ to these two categories.  
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highest level of support for their political actors. The onus is on these actors to maintain 
this support by executing efficient service delivery.        
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 After examining the levels of support pertinent to each political object in both South 
Africa and Brazil, it would seem that overall South African respondents hold a slightly 
higher level of support for their democratic political system.  
 
This does seem to be in keeping with the research of others, who have noticed the 
worrying decline in support for democracy in South America (Lagos, 2001; Lagos 
2003) 99 . In South Africa, however, a decline in support is noticeable at each level, 
barring a slight increase of support for political actors. While it is natural to assume a 
normalization of unusually high levels of support following democratic transition, 
support for democracy should increase with the successful perpetuation of a democratic 
regime (Doh & McDonough, 1999). Indeed, Bratton and Mattes’s studies (2001, 2003) of 
democracy in Africa compare South Africa rather unfavourably to Africa in terms of an 
understanding and support of democracy, particularly in what they call ‘intrinsic’ (diffuse) 
support.  
 
Indeed, in terms of the data analysed in this study, while South African respondents may 
seem to show a slightly better sense of political community and higher support for 
present and future regime performance, Brazilian respondents are much stronger in their 
support for democratic regime principles. This having been said, South African 
respondents show higher support for their regime institutions and arguably higher support 
for their political actors. Thus, comparatively speaking, South African respondents seem 
to indicate much more encouraging results in terms of the future of this country’s 
democracy.     
 
                                                 
99 See also research conducted by the Latinobarometro, available: www.latinobarometro.org 
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In the next chapter these issues will be discussed in more detail in order to present a 
clearer picture of the findings of this data analysis and speculate on their possible 
consequences.    
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Following the analysis of data in Chapter Four, it is the purpose of this chapter to expand 
on the cursory interpretation initiated in the previous chapter, placing the results within a 
broader socio-political context. Both the initial propositions and the broader significance 
of this study, outlined in Chapter One, will be revisited in order to evaluate the results of 
the data analysis. In addition, recommendations for further research, which could stem 
from this essentially descriptive and exploratory study, will be suggested.      
 
The original research proposition put forward by this study was to describe and analyze 
comparatively the level of support for democracy in South Africa and Brazil over the 
decade since democratic transformation. It was proposed that the levels of diffuse and 
specific support would manifest similar trends to those found in the Western consolidated 
democracies because of the long-established undercurrent of democratic 
institutionalization in these two countries, despite decades of authoritarian rule. If Brazil 
and South Africa seem to be following the paths of more mature democracies, this will 
have very interesting implications for their democratic consolidation. Similarly, this study 
may broaden our knowledge about the deepening of third-wave developing democracies 
in general and their prospects for sustainability.    
 
5.2 Following in the footsteps of Western Europe? 
As stated above, an initial proposition put forward in this study was that, despite the 
historically recent establishment of both the South African and the Brazilian democracies, 
their historical precedent of several decades of at least a weak pseudo-democracy1 may 
have instilled both an appreciation of, and a respect for, democratic principles and 
institutions, essentially creating that ‘reservoir’ of democratic political support so 
                                                 
1 During both the apartheid era and the Brazilian military regime, elements of democracies were retained 
(Lamounier, 1999:132-133; Martinez-Lara, 1996:15; Friedman, 1995:541. See also Chapters One and 
Two). In essence, the former was a democracy with limited franchise, and the latter an attempt by the 
military to act as custodians of democracy until such time as Brazil was ‘ready’ to be governed 
democratically.     
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necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Easton, 1965:249; Bratton & Mattes, 
2003:23).  
 
That the future of the democratic political system depends on the establishment of a 
strong level of diffuse support for democracy is demonstrated in the case of the Western 
democracies. These states, which have the oldest and most consolidated democratic 
regimes, have experienced steadily declining levels of specific support, i.e. confidence in 
both their political actors and democratic institutions. The levels of diffuse support, i.e. 
commitment to the principles of democracy itself, however, have either been maintained 
or have experienced a slight increase. This implies that, while the politicians (and perhaps 
the institutions) are themselves not trusted, belief in the system by which they are 
selected and replaced is preventing the collapse of the system in its entirety2 (Easton, 
1965:158). This illustrates the important function of diffuse support in acting as a buffer 
between the political system and the stress placed upon it by rising demands and a limited 
capacity on the part of the regime to process these demands (Easton, 1965:64). The 
legitimacy of the system, sustained by diffuse support, i.e. the fundamental acceptance on 
the part of citizens of the democratic process, prevents its collapse when it fails to 
provide the immediate satisfaction of demands (Easton, 1965:269).     
 
Brazil and South Africa have experienced mixed results in terms of support for the 
various political objects under study. Observations concerning both levels of support, i.e. 
diffuse and specific, will be assessed as well as their possible implications, bearing in 
mind Western publics’ political support trends.      
 
5.3 Trends in Diffuse and Specific Support in South Africa and Brazil  
South Africa and Brazil are possibly emulating the Western democracies in terms of 
trends in democratic political support. It is necessary to take a more in-depth look at what 
is in fact happening at levels of diffuse and specific support in Brazil and South Africa. 
                                                 
2 These phenomena are described by Inglehart (1990, 1998) as a symptom of what he has called the shift 
from materialism to post-materialism, a gradual generational change in core values.   
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Following this, several aspects of their political environments will be discussed in order 
to provide a context for the results of the study.  
 
5.3.1 Diffuse Support: Political Community 
In terms of pride in their countries especially, both South Africa and Brazil demonstrate 
very high levels. This is interesting in the latter case, as opinions about the country’s 
system of government and institutions do not seem to be a source of fierce pride3, but is 
perhaps once again attributable to populism and specific policies of state ideological 
propagation in the early twentieth century. As regards geographic identification, South 
African respondents have a relatively stronger national awareness than their Brazilian 
counterparts, with most of the latter respondents identifying with their town, rather than 
their country4. This is not, however, unusual, as it must be taken into account that Brazil 
is a much larger country than South Africa with a population of about four times the size 
at the time of the surveys5. It is highly probable that many rural communities, relatively 
isolated from the centres of political power in Brazil, would associate more strongly with 
their immediate community than with a national identity, especially as political education 
among the rural poor is notoriously poor (Bresser-Pereira, 1990:106; Sansone, 2003:153, 
Lamounier, 1999:166). This is perhaps a practical example of how, as Dogan & 
Kazancigil (1994:52) claim, the size of a country can indirectly affect its democratic 
workings. Owing to the fact that Brazil is a large country with many pockets of rural 
communities, extensive programmes of voter and political education, and ensuring access 
to them, would be costly, assuming there is the political will to do so.  
 
                                                 
3 The debate as to whether the presidential or parliamentary system is more conducive to democracy is still 
fierce, as has been previously mentioned (see Linz, 1996a, 1996b; Horowitz, 1996; Lipset, 1996). 
Interestingly, despite the protracted debate as to which system the Brazilian constitution should adopt, 
parliamentarian or presidential, in CESOP’s January 1990 survey polled that double the percentage of 
respondents which favoured a parliamentarian system, favoured a presidential system (33.1% as opposed to 
17.1%), but the don’t know response rate was 43.3%. This perhaps illustrates the elitist nature of the 
Brazilian democracy, in that it seems that a large percentage of Brazilians are not concerned with or have 
no opinion on such fundamental procedural questions.   
4 Identification with one’s town was the second highest category in terms of percentage in South Africa, 
and can also be attributed to its high percentage of rural populations.   
5 In 2001 Brazil’s population was 166 million and South Africa’s was 43 million according to Nation-
master (see www. nationmaster.com ) 
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In terms of willingness to fight for one’s country, both countries have a majority willing 
to do so. Whereas South Africa’s percentage is fairly stable from 1995 to 2001, in the 
case of Brazil, the rapid turn-around from 1990 to 1995 of the data results suggests that 
this is due at least in part to a short-term phenomenon and should perhaps be interpreted 
with care when trying to predict long-term phenomena.  
 
The indicators of the level of support for political community are fairly strong all told. It 
must be acknowledged these indicators cannot claim to represent long-term trends. 
Nevertheless, this is a good basis from which to attempt political consolidation and 
should the governments succeed in the challenging task of addressing the skewed 
resource distribution present in both countries, it is highly probable that a sense of 
national identification will become more widespread amongst the more rural 
communities.  
 
5.3.2 Diffuse Support: Regime Principles   
Regime principles are perhaps one of the more important aspects of diffuse support, as 
this level attempts to measure directly mass support for the principles by which the 
current regime ostensibly governs. In the case of Brazil and South Africa, following their 
respective democratic transitions, this would thus seem to measure support for the 
principles of democracy (as opposed to another political system) as these are the regime’s 
purported principles.  
 
Were this undoubtedly the case, South Africa and Brazil would fare very well in the 
process of democratic consolidation as it seems that there is high support for democracy 
as a system among the respondents of both these countries. What is perhaps a cause for 
concern is that this support may not extend to the political elites of these countries, 
particularly Brazil, due to the delegative and elitist nature of her democracy (Huntington, 
1996:12; O’Donnell, 1996:95; McDonough, 1981). This implies that chances of 
consolidating her democracy would be, as some fear, rather slim (Schmitter, 1996a:80, 
Lagos, 2001, 2003).  
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There are, however, two important considerations to bear in mind when considering mass 
evaluations of the regime principles of these two countries. In terms of Brazil, it could be 
argued that unadulterated democracy has never been practised in living memory6. The 
years between Vargas and the military regime (1946-1964) were characterized by a 
democracy so weak and inefficient that the military set a precedent by stepping in and 
assuming political rule rather than merely handing power back to civilian politicians after 
restoring order, as had been the norm (Fiechter, 1975:23). During the military rule, while 
a semblance of democracy was maintained, the government was obviously never truly 
democratic. Even now doubts have been expressed as to whether the current form of 
Brazilian democracy7, characterized by corporatism and patriarchy (Roett, 1999:10; 
Lamounier, 1999:186; Bressser-Pereira, 1990:197; Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:16), 
will ever lead to a consolidated democracy. Nevertheless, although arguably never having 
experienced what some would call a true functioning democracy8, it seems that 
Brazilians are aware of the principles to which these previous pseudo-democracies or 
‘custodians of democracy’ aspired, or claimed to aspire. Furthermore: according to 
Przeworski (199:57): 
Survey data indicate that new democracies often show a syndrome consisting 
of the mistrust of politics and politicians, sentiments of personal inefficacy, 
low confidence in democratic institutions and dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the actual democratic institutions. Yet curiously, the belief in 
democracy as the best form of government does not bear an obvious relation 
to these attitudes.    
 
                                                 
6 It is, however, interesting to note that the older the respondents, the more likely in almost all cases that 
their evaluation will be more favourable towards the regime. This may point to the current regime being 
most positively assessed by those who actually experienced the former military regime. It must be 
remembered that, as Brazil has a young population, those over 65 years are not a large number and 
consequently their positive evaluation is hidden in overall percentages.   
7 It is hoped that the election of Lula, of the Worker’s Party, will perhaps continue to address the pressing 
socio-economic concerns (Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:482). His term, however, falls 
outside of this study’s time frame.     
8 It is for this reason that there was some hesitation  in Chapter One to speak freely about ‘democratic 
political support’, because it was not certain that the de jure democracies examined here were functioning 
de facto democracies as experienced by all citizens.  
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This does seem to be the case in Brazil, especially as support for regime principles 
remains strong, although support for neither the present regime’s performance nor 
institutions (see below) is extremely high. Indeed, the fact that levels of specific support 
remain weak is perhaps suggestive of the fact that Brazilians could subscribe to what are 
generally considered to be the basic principles of democracy and recognize that, at 
present, neither their institutions nor their incumbents embody these. This brings one 
again to the problem of defining democracy. Although the data can gauge what mass 
attitudes in Brazil and South Africa towards democracy are, there is no way of 
ascertaining, through the use of the data at hand, what this conception of democracy is9. 
Interpreted as above, however, it is possible to suggest that, although what Brazilians 
perceive to be a democracy in terms of a definition has not been captured by data, they 
seem to understand what a liberal democracy entails and, while possessing the 
constitutional framework, do not yet have democratic practices institutionalized within 
their system.    
 
In South Africa, although support for both ‘having a democratic system’ and ‘democracy 
as the best political system despite its faults’ is slightly lower than in Brazil, in both cases 
it is still quite high and increased slightly from 1995 to 2001. Even among whites, the 
ethnic group which generally expressed the weakest levels of support for almost all 
political objects, over two thirds support having a democratic system and agree that 
democracy, despite its faults, is the best political system.      
 
Although what South Africans actually mean by ‘democracy’ cannot be gauged through 
the data used for this study, studies by Bratton and Mattes (2000b; see also Bratton, 2002; 
Mattes et al., 2000) undertook to discover what Africans understood by the political 
concept of democracy. Using data from the Afrobarometer10 to survey a selection of 
African countries, it was found that despite South Africa being one of the more wealthy 
                                                 
9 Thus it remains unknown whether these conceptions are similar at all, or how they compare to the 
conventional, so-called Western conception of democracy. Considering that democracy depends on the 
vote of the ordinary citizen, this remains a problem and future studies would benefit from further, more 
intensive research in this regard. 
10 The Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research project which conducts surveys in Africa to 
gauge the socio-economic and political climate of these countries. (See www.afrobarometer.org)    
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countries surveyed, mass perceptions of democracy tended heavily towards an 
instrumental11 approach (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:5). This implies that South Africans 
are more interested in what the democratic system can provide them in terms of an 
improved standard of living rather than in the democratic principles themselves. It must 
be remembered, however, that in South Africa (as in Brazil) the severe inequalities and 
the large number of those living below the poverty line were a consequence of 
discriminatory political policies. It is not difficult to see how some may perceive it to be 
the new regime’s responsibility to directly address the negative consequences of its 
predecessor’s policies12 (Bratton, 2002:6).  It also stands to reason that those without 
economic difficulties and thus not susceptible to ‘the politics of the belly’ – still mostly 
whites in 1995 because of historical precedent – would depend the most on intrinsic 
democratic principles and procedures to protect them as an ethnic minority (Bratton & 
Mattes, 2000b:5). The fact that whites paradoxically seem to be the least enthusiastic 
about democracy, according to this study’s data, is probably because the most basic tenet 
of democratic practice, majority rule, is perceived to work decidedly against them as a 
minority in the new South Africa13.    
  
 5.3.3 Diffuse Support: Regime Performance 
Regime performance evaluation seems to demonstrate the curious trend in the Brazilian 
case that, although contemporary circumstances may not have been very favourably 
perceived, Brazilians remain optimistic about the future under a democratic regime. This, 
if nothing else, perhaps explains why this country’s democratic constitution has survived 
so many political ‘hiccups’ in the past (Hunter, 2003:154).  
 
In 1990, for instance, Brazilians’ general prognosis for the future under Collor, bearing in 
mind that he was the first directly elected national president for over forty years, was 
                                                 
11 Bratton & Mattes (2000) distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental attitudes towards democracy, 
which basically corresponds to support for democracy for the sake of democratic principles and support for 
democracy in practice as it benefits the citizen respectively.   
12 It is not surprising therefore that Bratton & Mattes (2000b:5) found that, whereas blacks stress the 
importance of ‘equality of outcome’, whites stress the importance of equality of opportunity.    
13 In fact it is interesting to note that Bratton (2002:7) found that where non-opposition to authoritarian 
forms of rule occurred in South Africa, it was “significantly concentrated among whites”.  This further 
suggests the trepidation they feel as an ethnic minority in a majority-rule democracy.   
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relatively favourable. He was impeached two years later and his deputy, Itamar Franco, 
was sworn in. This notwithstanding, in 1995, although an evaluation of the present 
regime was not particularly positive, especially in comparison to the evaluation of the 
former military regime, Brazilians were again fairly convinced that the future would 
improve politically. One perspective would be to say that this demonstrates a 
considerable ‘reservoir of support’ (Easton, 1965:249) in terms of support for the current 
political system, especially as they seem to have the mechanisms in place to ‘throw the 
rascals out’, even before the end of their term, if necessary14.   
 
In terms of South Africa, the same optimism for the future is evident, although this does 
decrease rather alarmingly between 1995 and 2001, with the evaluation of the present 
regime performance also worsening slightly. As has been mentioned above, only two 
points of reference cannot determine whether this gradual drop in favourable evaluation 
will be a long-term trend. Should it turn out to be so, this would indeed be worrying in 
terms of South Africa’s ability to sustain a democracy15. On the other hand, this in effect 
may be slightly counteracted by an increased support for regime principles as seen above. 
In addition, if this is merely a stabilization of levels of support for regime performance 
following the democratic transition, then there is little cause for concern.16
 
Thus, in terms of all three indicators of support for the political community17, both South 
African and Brazilian respondents showed fairly healthy support. Similarly, in spite of 
the methodological problems with the Brazilian data18, both Brazil and South Africa also 
showed strong levels of support for the democratic system in principle. It was only on 
appraising regime performance that respondent enthusiasm began to flag slightly and 
                                                 
14 This, of course, refers to Collor’s impeachment. The view has been expressed, however, that Collor was 
impeached because he was considered too volatile and seemed intent on upsetting the political status quo. 
For a more in-depth discussion, see Roett (1999).    
15 Considering that South African perceptions of democracy are so closely linked with service delivery, 
regime performance is especially important. Should it decrease below a critical level, this would have more 
influence than is ideal on South Africa’s ability to sustain democracy.  
16 Here again, the fact that additional longitudinal research in this regard is necessary is acknowledged.  
17 These are pride to be South African/Brazilian; geographic identification on a national level and 
willingness to fight in a war for South Africa/Brazil.  
18 It could almost be argued that, considering that similar results were achieved despite having used 
different questions from different surveys, the high level of support for regime principles found in Brazilian 
respondents shows a high level of external validity.    
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show marked declines within the time period of the assessment, suggesting that support 
for ‘democracy in practice’ is not as strong as that for ‘democracy in principle’19. 
Nevertheless, diffuse support seems to have fairly stable support base, especially as both 
South Africans and Brazilians remained very positive about the future government, 
relative to the contemporary one20. 
 
5.3.4 Specific Support: Regime Institutions  
The debate as to the relative importance of diffuse and specific support has not been 
resolved. Bratton and Mattes (2000b:1; see also Norris, 1999a:1-2) contend that diffuse 
support is much more necessary for the successful consolidation of a democratic regime. 
It must be remembered, however, that failing the establishment of a deeply ingrained 
political culture supporting democratic principles, as is the case in many new 
democracies, democracy will be judged by the regime’s actions perceived to be carried 
out ostensibly according to democratic principles. It can be seen in the case of South 
Africa and Brazil that, whereas diffuse support is strong in terms of support for the 
political community and regime principles, it is possible that a lack of specific support 
may begin to erode diffuse support. Low levels of support for regime performance are 
already suggestive of this. This places the emphasis on specific support and consequently 
support for the regime institutions and political actors.  
 
In terms of institutions, support for democracy seems to be more favourable in South 
Africa, but with only approximately 28% of respondents showing strong support in this 
country, this is not highly encouraging and neither case study seems to have a particularly 
high support base for regime institutions21. Indeed, a large majority of both South 
Africans and Brazilians demonstrate medium (essentially ambivalent) support and strong 
institutional support seems to be dropping slightly in both countries. There are several 
                                                 
19 For a thorough conceptualization of these two terms, see Doh & McDonough, 1999.  
20 See Chapter Four.  
21 Latinobarometro identifies low confidence in democratic institutions as a key problem in Latin 
America’s low support for democracy. Brazil still fares badly compared to her regional neighbours 
however, only 23% showing support for the national congress/parliament in a range of 9% (Ecuador) to 
46% (Uruguay) in 2001. (See www.latinobarometro.org). Similarly, Bratton & Mattes (2000b:11) found 
that: “Apart from in South Africa [emphasis added], trust in governmental institutions is…rather robust [in 
Africa].”   
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reasons that may be suggested as to why South Africans seem more trusting of their 
political institutions, however.  
 
Following the end of apartheid, the institutions essentially comprising the state have 
striven to become both more inclusive and transparent, and, following democratic 
transition, South Africa experienced a complete institutional overhaul. This process was 
smoothed by a coalition government of national unity and an interim constitution 
comprising “The 34 principles of good governance” serving a symbolic as well as 
practical value in terms of generating trust on the part of ordinary South Africans for the 
new political institutions (Shaw, 2001:20; Sisk, 1995:14;41-47; Marx, 1998:213; 
Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:139). Provision was thus made for an interim institutional 
framework not only to begin the process of democratic institutionalization22, but to 
lubricate the democratic transition and the institutional make-over that this entailed.  In 
addition to the ratification of the final Constitution of 1996, other institutions such as the 
Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman and a Bill of Rights were created to protect human 
rights and guarantee equality.  Institutions were thus put in place to protect citizens and to 
eliminate the feelings of uncertainty which not only the transition itself, but the very 
nature of democratic governance, implies (Schmitter & Karl, 1996:56).  
 
 Brazil, in contrast, suffered from a great many teething problems following her 
democratic transition. After an overwhelming victory in the 1985 elections, the PMDB 
experienced a common problem within large, moderate political parties: ideological 
disunity23. Its members held such diverse positions on so many issues of policy that, 
following the death of Tancredo Neves and the political victory over ARENA, there was 
little to unite them. On many occasions that the PMDB should have been able to sway the 
decision-making in the drafting of the new Constitution. It failed to do so, reaching an 
                                                 
22 It should be pointed out here that institutionalization, according to O’Donnell (1996:97), is a “regularized 
pattern of interaction which is known and practiced”, emphasizing the close relationship of institutions with 
political culture.    
23 McDonough (1981: 110) has gone so far as to suggest that Brazilian political elites are completely 
devoid of ideology, save fending off mass rule, thus reducing Brazilian politics to a series of power plays 
among elite sectors. According to Roett (1999:10), this has not changed despite the democratic transition. 
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impasse24. Consequently, there was often a deadlock on certain crucial decisions and the 
end result was a constitutional document that few were satisfied with. This situation was 
worsened by the fact that many aspects were influenced by the personal ambitions of 
politicians (Roett, 1999:165; McDonough, 1981:33). Thus, the drafting of the final 
Constitution was long and tortuous, dominated by power plays within the context of a 
weak party system (Martinez-Lara, 1996:88, 97). The weakness of democratic 
institutionalization in Brazil has also long been identified as one of this country’s major 
stumbling blocks on the road to democratic consolidation25 (Martinez-Lara, 1996: 88; 
Huntington, 1996:9; Hurrell, 1996:165; Schmitter & Karl, 1996:83). It is thus hardly 
improbable that to the many Brazilians for whom the government has done little to 
improve the standard of living, governmental institutions are seen as the playthings of the 
political elite. 
 
Thus, while both countries ostensibly underwent a complete institutional overhaul, it 
seems that South Africans see a cleaner break with the past than their Brazilian 
counterparts. It must be remembered that ten years is scarcely time enough for the 
institutions of democracy to adequately instil democratic norms and practices within the 
government of a country in full, and that procedural democracy does not mean functional 
democracy, not least due to the possibility of corruption. Nevertheless, to further explore 
the attitudes of both Brazilians and South Africans in terms of specific democracy, it is 
necessary to examine their opinions of their political actors.  
 
5.3.5 Specific Support: Political Actors     
In terms of political actors, the other indicator of specific support levels, support was not 
especially high either, although a scant majority in both countries did show support for 
                                                 
24 The new Brazilian Constitution was not drawn up a specially appointed Constitutional Congress, despite 
a strong lobby for it. The process was long and drawn out, taking more than three years to produce the final 
document, which is still criticized for its lack of specificity and blamed for Brazil’s lack of consolidated 
democratic institutionalization (Martinez-Lara, 1996:88). 
25In addition, as has already been mentioned, there is a strong bias on the part of the Brazilian police and 
legal courts to treat darker-skinned Brazilians more harshly in comparison to their lighter-skinned 
counterparts (Nascimento & Nascimento, 2001:120; Przeworski, 1995:35). This manifestation of 
discrimination would do little to instil mass trust in state institutions, especially as police brutality is on the 
rise (Landman, 2003:31). South Africa is also recognized as having a greater commitment to addressing 
equalities (Frederickson, 2001:24). 
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political actors in Brazil in 1995 and in South Africa from 1995 to 200126. Support for 
political actors is thus stronger than that for regime institutions.  
 
It has been established that potential long-term trends cannot be isolated with only two 
points of reference. Interpretation of results in terms of political actors should be 
conducted with even more caution, however, by virtue of the fact that it will rarely be the 
same actor who is evaluated, especially as the incumbent’s terms coincide almost exactly 
with the survey waves, allowing opinions to be polled around the same time of 
consecutive incumbent terms in the case of both South Africa and Brazil27.  
 
In terms of developing democracies, political actors are arguably very influential in mass 
support for democracy as they are the physical manifestations of an intangible system28. 
Simply put, the buck stops with them. In addition, the presidencies of both South Africa 
and Brazil are very influential offices. In Brazil, this is quite understandable, given that 
Brazilian voters must choose specifically from candidates. Aside from the party system in 
Brazil being exceptionally weak and fragmented (Martinez-Lara, 1996:57,62; Diamond, 
1996:xxv; Hurrell, 1996:165), political parties are generally only used as a vehicle for a 
candidate’s election, alliances often having been switched to facilitate this. In addition, 
populism having left its mark on Brazilian political culture, it seems that a president’s 
public relations are just as important as government policy formulation in order to garner 
political support, as has been seen in the case of countless Brazilian leaders’ careers 
(Roett, 1999:39; Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:469; Fiechter, 1975:123). 
 
                                                 
26 The timing of these surveys must, however, not be disregarded when assessing this particular indicator as 
the actors change every 4 (Brazil) to 5 (South Africa) years. The 1990 results bear testimony to the lack of 
confidence in Collor as a leader, especially as confidence in Collor’s government had dropped 32.3%, from 
59.9% to 27.6% between January and December of his first year in office, according to comparative data 
from CESOP. In 1995, on the other hand, under Cardoso, support for the incumbents was up to 57.3% and 
in South Africa, support for the political actors has risen 4.1% from 1995 to 2001.  
27 The 1990 survey, collected in 1991-1992 in Brazil, coincided with the swearing in of Itamar Franco 
following President Collor de Mello’s impeachment in 1992. Fernando Henrique Cardoso was elected in 
1995, coinciding with the 1995 survey wave, although the Brazilian data were collected in 1997. In the 
South African case, the 1995 survey was conducted barely 18 months after President Mandela’s 
inauguration, and the 2001 survey wave nearly two years after President Mbeki’s election in 1999.    
28 This would be especially so in the context of Brazil, with its legacy of populism, and South Africa, 
whose present incumbents, in the African tradition of personality cults and charismatic rulers, carry the 
additional aura of independence leaders (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:5; McDonough, 1981:58-59).   
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In South Africa, while the electoral system is based on a closed party list system, since 
1994 the president, as leader of the majority party in Parliament29, has always, for good 
or ill, been influential over policy30. As in Brazil, it is the President who controls the 
appointments of the cabinet ministers (Martinez-Lara, 1996;141; Giliomee & Schlemmer, 
1994:72) and thus most of the appointments of the high-profile political actors on whose 
performance it is assumed that Brazilian and South African respondents would have 
based their opinions. 
 
For this reason it is a pity that confidence in the President is not directly comparable due 
to shortcomings of the WVS data31. Nevertheless, the following is evident.  
 
Support for political actors had increased quite substantially between 1990 and 1995, 
although it must be remembered that President Collor was forced to resign following the 
instigation of impeachment procedures against him on charges of corruption32less than a 
year after the Brazilian 1990 WVS survey was taken. What is interesting is how quickly 
mass confidence in him and especially his government dropped33, particularly when he 
was so favoured at the beginning of his term in comparison to Sarney, his predecessor34. 
What is interesting is that Collor, despite being the leader of the government, did not 
                                                 
29 On his inauguration, the president relinquishes membership of Parliament, but towing the party line 
ensures that the president retains a reasonable amount of influence.    
30 An example of this is President Mbeki’s ill-advised stand over HIV/AIDS, of which South Africa has one 
of the highest infection rates in the world. His insistence that the HIV virus did not cause the epidemic had 
huge repercussions on the capacity to treat the pandemic in South Africa, as well as the country’s global 
reputation (Mail & Guardian, 09/04/2004).  
31 The ability to poll confidence in the president was only available in the 2001 survey wave and thus it has 
no comparative value.  
32 These were brought against him by the Brazilian lower house. Even before this, however, he was an 
unpopular president – among the political elite for trying unilaterally to fast-track economic liberalization, 
and among the masses for failing to control hyper-inflation (Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 
2003:478).  
33 This is according to comparison of a survey measuring confidence in Collor as president, which shows a 
drop from 68.3% to 58.3%. Interestingly, this is better than confidence in the government, which dropped 
32.3%, from 59.9% to 27.6% in the same period.  
34 In January 1990 confidence in Sarney was only 14.4%, whereas confidence in Collor was 68.3% in a 
survey conducted by CESOP. 
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seem to be associated with other government officials in the respondents’ view35, and 
thus the government did not lose as much confidence.       
 
Cardoso, on the other hand, was a vastly more successful president, not least because he 
managed to eradicate hyper-inflation. So successful was he that the Constitution was 
amended so that he could serve another term as president, which he did from 1999 to 
2003. Interestingly, this ostensible difference in these political actors is not reflected in 
the measured support of respondents, although results at this level in Brazil have been 
compromised in terms of comparability36 . Although only 29.6% of Brazilian respondents 
have a positive response to political actors in 1990, as opposed to 57.3% in 1995, the 
latter had no ‘neutral’ category whereas the neutral category (“average”) of the former 
made up 45.1%, calling what seems to be such large disparity into question. 
  
It is interesting to note in terms of South African political actors that satisfaction with and 
support for them increases slightly in the period under study. But it seems that, this 
notwithstanding, South Africans have a similar opinion of their political actors to the 
Brazilians. They are moderately supportive and, while a fair percentage is not that 
enthusiastic about political actor performance, enough are to prevent too pessimistic a 
picture being painted for the political future. This is especially when one considers that 
Nelson Mandela, a national hero, stepped down in 1999 to allow his successor as head of 
the ANC, Thabo Mbeki, to assume the presidency. At the time this caused much 
consternation about the political future of South Africa, among whites especially, due to 
Mbeki’s reputation as rather a dark horse  (Mail & Guardian, 09/04/2004). The fact that 
support for the political leaders has increased slightly is encouraging37.    
 
The fact that in both South Africa and Brazil just under half the respondents have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the government is troubling in one sense. It also shows, 
                                                 
35 This is statistically backed as a factor analysis of confidences levels in politicians, political parties, state 
governors, municipal prefects and Collor showed that the latter loaded only weakly (0.362) into the single 
factor compared to the other components. The survey used was conducted by CESOP in December 1990.      
36 This is because a different measuring instrument and sample was used, as well as the fact that the 1990 
survey included a ‘neutral’ response category. 
37 It was nevertheless noted that the difference between white and black support for the incumbents has 
increased, and the overall increase in political actor support is probably due to the increase in black support.  
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however, that respondents are willing to express their discontent with the government, 
and this in turn illustrates an implicit trust that their political attitudes will not endanger 
them, as had been the case during both the previous regimes (Fiechter, 1975:146; Marx, 
1998:196). Another possibility to consider, however, is that social desirability bias may 
have a strong influence on respondents in their efforts to seem discerning by criticizing 
the government. In the case of Brazil, this is especially in terms of the Latin American 
tendency of simpatia38  (Johnson & Van de Vijver, 2003:198).   
 
It can thus be seen that in both South Africa and Brazil levels of diffuse support remain 
fairly high, considering what has been observed as relatively low levels of specific 
support. This would suggest that South Africa and Brazil are indeed showing similar 
trends to those present in Western democracies.   
                  
5.4 Mitigating Factors: The Current Global Context and Political Legacies  
Thus, although specific support may not be very high, diffuse support is healthy, thus 
prompting relatively favourable comparison with trends in specific and diffuse support in 
the Western consolidated democracies. There are several factors present, however, to 
warn against hasty conclusions that South Africa and Brazil may share the necessary 
trends in diffuse and specific support to warrant classification with other, more mature 
democracies.  
 
The first, and perhaps the most important to consider, is the global context in which these 
democratic consolidations must take place. Both South Africa and Brazil, due to their 
circumstantial isolation, have had to simultaneously undergo both political and economic 
transformation39. Both of the new democratic regimes were burdened with significant 
                                                 
38 See Chapter Three.   
39Przeworski (quoted in Bratton & Mattes, 2000b:3) maintains that it is not possible to undergo both 
economic and democratic transformation simultaneously, as the necessary economic reforms will come up 
against strong popular opposition. It is an interesting point to consider that it was perhaps the intention of 
the previous regime in Brazil, according to their initial mandate, to instigate the economic transformation 
first, in preparation for the eventual democratic transformation envisaged. This did unfortunately not occur 
and both were simultaneously attempted with abertura, begun in the late 1970s (Friedman & De Villiers, 
1996:262).  
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public debt and soaring inflation40, significantly restricting the new governments’ room 
to manoeuvre. It is true that the Mandela administration was successful in reducing both 
foreign debt and inflation (Shaw, 2001:73) and that Finance Minister Cardoso under the 
Franco administration crushed hyper-inflation (Roett, 1999:164), ultimately benefiting 
the poorer citizens. Nevertheless, the prioritization of these issues over much needed 
social service improvement and redress of inequalities is liable to weaken the support of 
the masses, who want to know what democracy can do for them in concrete terms.  
 
Indeed, although both Brazil and South Africa are ranked as middle-income countries and 
considered as regional hegemons, this masks the fact that both Brazil and South Africa 
have large percentages of the population below the poverty line as a consequence of 
severe inequalities41.    Research suggests that sections of the population that are 
concerned with basic needs will evaluate democracy through the performance of the 
democratic regime (Bratton & Mattes, 2000:5, Broderick, 2000). This suggests that they 
do not cognitively differentiate between specific and diffuse support for democracy42. 
Consequently, should the government fail to deliver sufficiently, both specific and diffuse 
support will decrease, throwing the baby out with the bath water, so to speak. Indeed, the 
fact that support for regime performance was the weakest of the three indicators of 
diffuse support could be interpreted as a warning that democracy’s performance and 
delivery are dangerously weak. Considering that South Africa and Brazil have some of 
the highest rates of inequality in the world, it is very possible that the government, 
however hard they may try, will not satisfy the urgent need for mass service delivery. 
Consequently, as has been seen, both diffuse and specific support will decline.  
 
What is interesting is that those who do show high support are concentrated in the 
echelons of society with low incomes and minimal basic education, thus seeming to 
contradict the above explanation. On closer examination, however, it can be seen that this 
                                                 
40 In the case of Brazil, this was hyper-inflation (Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:471).  
41 According to Nascimento & Nascimento (2001:106), in 1995 43% of Brazil’s population was below the 
poverty line, whereas, according to Nation-master, (available: www.nationmaster.com ), in 2000 50% of 
South Africa’s population was under the poverty line. These figures are cited because they are 
chronologically relevant to time points measured in the study.    
42 The ability of respondents to differentiate between diffuse and specific support warrants further research 
(see below). 
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is not necessarily so. In the case of South Africa, all those who were previously 
discriminated against under apartheid were very supportive of the new regime in 1995, as 
it afforded them equal political rights for the first time43 – blacks exceptionally so, as 
under the democratic principle of majority rule they have enormous political power. In a 
mere six years, while most levels of support for the various political objects are still 
relatively high, a marked decline is noticeable. In the case of the Indian, coloured, and 
white minorities, there has been a severe decline in most levels of support. These groups 
possibly fear the ‘tyranny of the majority’44.  
 
In terms of Brazil, the relatively declining levels of support in terms of regime 
performance, regime institutions and possibly political actors, are corroborated by 
acknowledged declines in support for democracy across the South American continent 
(Lagos, 2001;2003).  
 
It has also been observed at many of the levels in Brazil that the poorest and most 
uneducated respondents, as in South Africa, are those that support the government and 
the regime most fervently. While this may seem to be a contradiction of the above 
explanation, it must be remembered that political and voter education is almost non-
existent in Brazil (Bresser-Pereira, 1990:206). This was initially a deliberate government 
policy in order to ensure that the newly enfranchised masses would not upset the political 
balance of power in 1988 (Roett, 1999:26).  As such, these people are possibly more 
susceptible to the populist claims and campaign promises of politicians45. It can be 
noticed, however, that the lower and middle classes and those with relatively more 
education are often the most unsupportive of the regime and government. This is possibly 
because they are dissatisfied with the government and have not been swayed by 
                                                 
43 While it is true that coloured people were on a separate voter’s role until 1952, this is the first time that 
all South Africans were given the same rights politically (Giliomee, 1994:4).  
44 This fear was realised in the 2004 elections, when the ANC receive 70% of the vote, technically giving 
them the right to unilaterally change the Constitution. 
45 It must be also remembered that, while Vargas was a ruthless dictator, he was much loved by the 
working class, whom he claimed to represent and hold dear. Vargas started the Worker’s Party in 1945 and 
used this as a vehicle for re-election in 1950 (Roett, 1999:39, see Chapter Two). General Castello Branco, 
on the other hand, who genuinely attempted to prepare Brazil for civilian democratic rule within a 3-year 
mandate, was very unpopular, because he did not put on a public face and woo mass popularity (Fiechter, 
1975:41). Thus popularity cannot always be equated with an effective executive. 
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misleading propaganda and are more critical of the government in terms of the Brazilian 
democracy’s performance measured against its principles46. The richer respondents, on 
the other hand, while previously heavily protected by the patriarchal structure of the state 
(McDonough, 1981:18; Roett, 1999:22) may resent the novo sindicalismo47 and interest 
politics that are slowly developing and mobilizing, the top-down corporatist privileges 
previously afforded to big business (Faro de Castro & Valladao de Carvalho, 2003:472). 
 
In essence, while it is true that the results of this study’s analysis could point towards 
South Africa and Brazil following in the footsteps of more mature democracies in terms 
of trends in democratic support, the socio-political circumstances of these two case 
studies differ in several ways from those of the Western democracies, as has been shown 
above. In addition, as has been pointed out, there are also several alternative explanations 
for the observed trends. Consequently, these results should be interpreted with care.  
 
5.5 Future Political Development     
Following the above analysis of the levels of diffuse and specific support in Brazil and 
South Africa, several questions regarding the implications for future political 
development in both case studies arise. How have the results manifested in the analysis 
tied in with the most recent political development in both case studies? What are the 
implications for further democratic consolidation? What are the implications of both 
South Africa and Brazil’s political future for the regions over which they hold hegemonic 
influence? It may be possible to suggest the beginnings of answers to these questions. 
Suggestions will be made in terms of the data analyzed 48.  
 
                                                 
46 Those Brazilian respondents with higher education were more supportive of ‘having a democratic 
system’ (see Chapter Four). 
47 ‘New unionism’. This movement developed as a social force in the build-up to democratic transition. It 
was a kind of grassroots activism that was strongly supported by church-based communities which 
challenged the traditionally top-down organisation of labour movements in the Brazilian corporatist 
environment. Lula da Silva was heavily involved in its activities and it became important in the 
mobilisation of pro-democratic forces in the 1970s (Faro de Castro & Valladão de Carvalho, 2003:472).   
48 The above questions will be touched upon by an elaboration of the interpretation of the data in an attempt 
to place the research within its historico-political context. It must be acknowledged, however, that it is 
beyond the capacity of this study to provide conclusive answers to the above questions. They warrant 
further and more in-depth research which could draw from this study as a starting point. 
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In terms of consolidation of democracy, it does not seem that South Africa or Brazil is 
experiencing complete retrogression in terms of support for democracy. What remains to 
be seen is whether they are going to move any closer towards democratic consolidation49.   
 
With regard to Brazil, many believe after the third wave of democratic transition that it is 
endemic to South American countries that they are doomed to remain only partially 
consolidated (Schmitter, quoted in Friedman & De Villiers, 1996:16; Lagos, 2001, 2003).  
The fact that many countries in Latin America have been democracies for several decades 
without managing to deepen their democracy is called upon as evidence. It is speculated 
that this is due to certain characteristics of what has been classified by some, according to 
Schmitter (1998), as ‘Latin American political culture’. It is undoubtedly true that what 
vestiges of democratic political institutions and practices remained during the previous 
regime in Brazil were corrupted and often manipulated to benefit the rich and powerful 
(Roett, 1999:16; O’Connell & Birdsall, 2001:290). Attributing a lack of political 
consolidation to a weakly ingrained democratic political culture is, however, making an 
assumption in a chicken and egg situation. The fact is, however,  that Brazil’s democracy, 
however tenuous it may seem, has survived the death of the first democratically elected 
presidential candidate, years of soaring inflation and the impeachment of a president 
(Hunter, 2003:155; Lagos, 2003:163). No popular revolution or military coup d’état has 
occurred, despite the country having a history of military interference. In addition, 
although admittedly several levels of political object support remain low, support for 
regime principles remains high.  
 
As a member of the African continent, South Africa, on the other hand, has been held up 
as a shining example of a working democracy for the region, especially as the potential 
volatility during political transition due to severe ethnic tensions was diffused. 
Admittedly, South Africa’s path to democratic transition was much smoother than 
Brazil’s. This is in part perhaps because, unlike in Brazil, tragedies such as the equivalent 
                                                 
49 It would, of course, be fallacious only to take into consideration the attitudes and opinions of the masses 
collected at a few points in time as an indicator of the consolidation of democracy. 
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of Tancredo Neve’s death, did not occur50. South Africa’s transition cannot, however, 
solely be attributed to happy circumstance. It was achieved by effective institutional 
design and forward planning, as well as the political will on both sides of the negotiation 
table to make the transition work. It has been and will only continue to be maintained by 
the continued efforts of all concerned.   
 
5.6 Recommendations for Further Research 
Although this study has made an attempt to broaden our knowledge of democratic 
consolidation in developing countries by looking at levels of support for democracy, 
many questions have been raised during this research. There are several aspects which 
this study has touched upon, but which would greatly benefit from further research. 
 
In looking at the attitudes of South Africans and Brazilians over ten years, it must be  
acknowledged that the examination of data with only two points of chronological 
reference is not sufficient to suggest trends in democratic political support in, in this case, 
either South Africa or Brazil (Weisberg & Bowen, 1977:86; Bratton & Mattes, 2003:8). 
This will be the task of researchers who have at their disposal World Values Surveys 
covering more years than have as yet been surveyed. With only two points of reference it 
is difficult to distinguish between the beginning of a long-term attitudinal trend and the 
short-term period effects of singular events51. In addition, given that the democratic 
transition and what amounts to a complete systemic political overhaul have occurred only 
recently52, it will possibly be some time before political opinions and attitudes stabilize.   
 
                                                 
50 It must be mentioned here that Chris Hani, a popular anti-apartheid activist, was assassinated in 1993, 
shortly before the first South African democratic elections. He was the Secretary-General of the SACP at 
the time of his death and his murder was calculated to derail negotiations between the NP and the ANC 
(Lodge, 1999). While such a derailment was avoided due to the diplomatic skill of the South African 
political actors, the only tragedy comparable to Neve’s death in Brazil would arguably have been 
Mandela’s death on the eve of his inauguration.        
51 This is apparent, for example, in the fluctuating results of Brazilian respondents’ ‘willingness to fight’ 
(see Chapter Four). According to Inglehart (1990:79-82), among others, there are short-term periodic 
cycles in attitudes and there are attitude shifts over the long durée. 
52 This is reference to the democratic transitions which occurred in Brazil and South Africa in 1985 and 
1994 respectively. 
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Democratization and democratic consolidation have been recognized as a process (Parry 
& Moran, 1994a:1-3; Schmitter, 1998:23). As such, an attempt to provide conclusive 
findings on the state of regime consolidation in two such newly democratized states as 
South Africa and Brazil is at best presumptuous. Rather, this study should be perceived as 
the initiation of an ongoing project of monitoring their democratic progress. This in turn 
implies that further waves of the World Values Survey should be utilized to observe 
emerging trends in both diffuse and specific support. The tracking of statistically reliable 
long-term trends in democratic consolidation will be possible only once data have been 
collected over several more decades. These trends can be continually compared to those 
of the Western publics and the interplay of socio-demographic variables observed. Such 
questions as, for example, whether Inglehart’s (1990, 1998) generational displacement 
theory53 applies to developing countries in terms of the transmission of democratic values 
and the possible deepening of a democratic political culture with democratic 
consolidation can be tested. In addition, to complement the assessment of mass attitudes, 
it would be very beneficial to be able to compare the attitudes of elites regarding 
democratic political support54. This is especially so, considering the substantial role that 
political elites specifically have played in democratic transition and continue to play in 
both South Africa’s and Brazil’s political arenas (Friedman, 1995:547; Giliomee & 
Simkins, 1999:67-68; McDonough, 1981:130; Roett, 1999:1). Ascertaining whether elites 
in both these countries are consolidating a democratic politic culture within their ranks 
will be instrumental in assessing chances for democratic consolidation.  
 
Furthermore, this study has picked up on a significant weakness in terms of measuring 
support for democracy. While it may be possible to assess the strength of support for 
democracy (as attempted here), it is more difficult for a researcher to determine what the 
                                                 
53 This refers to Inglehart’s theory that the environment present at the pre-adolescent stage of each 
generation gradually prompts a generational change in values following the changing nature of the 
environment (Inglehart, 1990:77).  
54 As yet, there exists little quantitative data on elite values and beliefs. While South Africa is part of the 
African Opinion Leaders’ Survey, headed by Hennie Kotzé at the Centre for International and Comparative 
Politics at Stellenbosch University, conducted almost annually since 1991, there is no known Latin 
American equivalent.     
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respondent actually means by the concept ‘democracy’55. This has implications not only 
for comparative research but also in terms of the validity of the study itself. It is 
recommended that further research with regards to actually determining the meaning of 
democracy be conducted at a mass and an elite level. Following from this, it will be 
easier to assess whether respondents can distinguish between intrinsic democratic support 
(‘democracy in principle’) and instrumental democratic support56 (‘democracy in 
practice’) (Bratton & Mattes, 2000b; Doh & McDonough, 1999). This will provide 
further insight into both democratic support and democratic consolidation.  
 
Lastly, another avenue of research involves an attempt to explain the results of this 
essentially descriptive study. Although possible reasons for emerging patterns have been 
suggested, these have been based solely on an interpretation of each case study’s 
historico-political context and have no statistical grounding. It seems that in many cases 
demographic variables cannot conclusively explain attitudinal phenomena here, 
suggesting the need to explore other possible causal variables. It is only once several of 
these issues are addressed that a more concrete understanding of South Africa and 
Brazil’s potential for democratic consolidation will be realized.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
Despite a hesitation to make sweeping statements, it would seem from the trends in 
diffuse and specific support that South Africa and Brazil do indeed retain high levels of 
diffuse support despite low levels of specific support, allowing tentative comparison with 
the democratic paths of Western democracies. 
 
South Africa and Brazil, however, have only begun the process of consolidating their 
democracies. Having both only inaugurated truly democratically elected presidents in the 
1990s, a decade is too short a space of time in which to assess progress in this regard 
conclusively.  
                                                 
55 Questions which do attempt to gauge the respondent’s understanding of democracy are present both in 
the Afrobarometer (see Bratton & Mattes, 2000b) and Latinobarometro (see Lagos, 2000; 2003) but have 
not yet been utilized for cross-continental comparative research. 
56 Again, this has been attempted by Bratton & Mattes (2000b), but theirs is not a longitudinal study, nor 
does this type of research extend to other developing regions.   
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 What is evident as well is that, despite high levels of support for political community and 
regime principles, support for regime performance is declining. This suggests that the 
‘reservoir’ of diffuse support is potentially being eroded by the sustained weak levels of 
support for regime institutions and political actors. These democracies, while tenacious, 
especially in Brazil’s case, are perhaps not robust enough to weather successively low 
levels of specific support indefinitely.     
  
It is agreed that democratic political norms need to be institutionalized and absorbed into 
the national political culture in order to further democratic consolidation. In terms of 
respondents at the mass level in both Brazil and South Africa, support for democracy as a 
system is high. What is necessary to gauge, as mentioned above, is support for 
democracy at an elite level57. Elite political will was instrumental in beginning the 
democratic transition process and, although mass support for democracy is imperative to 
sustain the system’s legitimacy, political elite support and reinforcement are required as 
well. By virtue of Brazil’s ‘delegative’ model of democracy (Schmitter, 1996) and South 
Africa’s closed party list system, there is arguably a certain ‘distancing’ of the elites from 
the masses following election. Elites must be willing to submit themselves to the rule of 
law, rather then holding themselves above it. 
 
This is especially the case now in both the case of Brazil and South Africa. In Brazil Lula 
of the PT has recently been elected as Brazilian president, marking a significant break 
with past leaders in terms of both his socio-economic background and his ideological 
leanings58. Many believe he was elected because the Brazilian masses are feeling the 
pinch of Cardoso’s neo-liberal policies. Interpreted within the context of this study, 
therefore, the observed decline in support for regime performance and institutions has led 
to a dramatic upheaval within the Brazilian political elite. In terms of South Africa, 
having recently re-elected the ANC and thus President Mbeki, several questions 
pertaining to the future of competitive democracy also are hanging in the balance. Having 
                                                 
57 Huntington (1996:9) identifies a weakness of democratic values in political elites as a contributing factor 
to a reversal of the democratic transition.  
58 Lula is the first working-class president to be elected in Brazil.  
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achieved more than a two-thirds’ majority, the ANC can legally change the Constitution 
and Mbeki could thus seek a third term. This could have been safely predicted following 
the indicators inherent in high levels of support for the regime’s political future, 
institutions and especially political actors. Voices have been raised about the safety of 
democracy with the beginnings of a one-party dominant state seeming to emerge. 
Whether the ANC abuses its position of power and whether the Lula administration can 
address the incredible inequalities in Brazil where those before have either ignored them 
or failed, will only be seen in time. Whether they do so or not will undoubtedly influence 
the strength of both the South African and the Brazilian democracies.             
 
Although this study has only introduced the beginning of South Africa and Brazil’s 
process of democratic consolidation, it is significant in that has broadened horizons 
regarding knowledge of developing democracies. It must be recognized that, while the 
particular characteristics of these two case studies are what originally prompted choosing 
them, aspects of this study may not be completely inapplicable to other studies of 
developing democracies. In terms of Brazil and South Africa specifically, this study is 
significant because it has shed light on the state of democratic support in these two 
countries, as was its purpose, as well as providing a starting point for the continued 
analysis of their path towards further democratic consolidation.     
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Appendix 1: Cross-tabulations of Social Demographic Variables1 
 
Brazil 1990 
4.4.1.1.1 Political Community: Pride to be Brazilian (see chapter four, p.92) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years 45-54 years 55+ years Total 
Very proud 54.2% 51.7% 62.5% 67.9% 81.3% 64% 
Quite 
proud 
26.8% 32.1% 23.2% 19.9% 11.4% 22.2% 
Not very 
proud 
10.3% 8.3% 8.1% 6.1% 2.8% 7.2% 
Not at all 
proud 
8.7% 7.9% 6.2% 6.1% 4.5% 6.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
Very proud 73.7% 68.3% 48.2% 50% 65.1% 
Quite 
proud 
14.5% 20.9% 28.9% 21.9% 21.8% 
Not very 
proud 
3.9% 5.3% 14.5% 9.4% 6.7% 
Not at all 
proud 
7.9% 5.5% 8.3% 18.8% 6.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
Very proud 67.5% 62.7% 46.9% 55% 64.5% 
Quite 
proud 
20.4% 25.3% 27.3% 25% 22.2% 
Not very 
proud 
6.1% 4.8% 14.8% 15% 6.5% 
Not at all 
proud 
6.1% 7.2% 10.9% 5.0% 6.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.2.1 Political Community: Geographical Groups (see Chapter four, p.95) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years 45-54 years 55+ years Total 
town 38.3% 33.9% 38.8% 33.1% 36.5% 36.7% 
region 12.8% 10.7% 9.0% 10.6% 12.4% 11.2% 
country 26.0% 31.8% 31.1% 35.9% 30.6% 30.5% 
S. America 1.9% 2.9% 1.9% 0.4% 1.3% 1.7% 
                                                 
1 All cross-tabulations have a large chi-squre and significance to the level of 0.000 unless stated. 
 ii
World  21.1% 20.7% 19.2% 20.0% 19.2% 20.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no 
schooling 
primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
town 48.5% 37.9% 33.0% 18.8% 37.2% 
region 5.9% 11.5% 13.0% 9.4% 11.4% 
country 20.6% 31.5% 27.0% 34.4% 30.4% 
S. America  1.6% 2.6% 9.4% 1.8% 
World  25.0% 17.5% 24.3% 28.1% 19.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Explains 99% of the variance, chi-square=32.257   
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
town 37.4% 33.8% 36.2% 20.0% 36.2% 
region 11.1% 11.3% 11.0% 5.0% 11.0% 
country 31.2% 31.9% 27.6% 30.0% 31.1% 
S. America 1.8% 1.4% 1.6% 5.0% 1.7% 
World  18.5 21.6% 23.6% 40.0% 20.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.3.1 Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one’s Country (see chapter four , p. 98).  
 
AGE 
 16-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years 45-54 years 55+ years Total 
yes 39.3% 42.4% 37.0% 34.1% 28.8% 36.0% 
no 60.7% 57.6% 63.0% 65.9% 71.2% 64.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
yes 40.0% 32.8% 46.4% 54.8% 35.7% 
no 60.0% 67.2% 53.6% 45.2% 64.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
yes 33.8% 40.0% 39.8% 28.6% 35.7% 
no 66.2% 60.0% 60.2% 71.4% 64.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 iii
4.4.2.1 Regime Principles:  Support for Regime Principles (see chapter four, p. 101) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years 45-54 years 55+ years Total 
very 
supportive 
81.6% 80.5% 87.3% 84.9% 85.1% 84.1% 
fairly 
supportive 
7.7% 7.9% 2.9% 5.4% 2.2% 5.0% 
neutral 9.8% 10.8% 9.5% 8.8% 10.1% 9.8% 
fairly 
unsupportive 
 0.4% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 
very 
unsupportive 
0.9% 0.4%  0.4% 2.2% 0.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very 
supportive 
95.0% 85.4% 82.4% 71.9% 85.0% 
fairly 
supportive 
 4.9% 6.6% 12.5% 5.1% 
neutral 3.3% 9.0% 9.3% 15.6% 9.0% 
fairly 
unsupportive 
 0.1% 0.9%  0.2% 
very 
unsupportive 
1.7% 0.5% 0.9%  0.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Explains only 38% of the variance, chi-square=20.293 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very 
supportive 
84.4% 85.7% 80.3% 57.9% 84.1% 
fairly 
supportive 
4.8% 5.6% 8.7%  5.3% 
neutral 9.9% 7.5% 10.2% 42.1% 9.7% 
fairly 
unsupportive 
0.2% 0.5%   0.3% 
very 
unsupportive 
0.7% 0.7% 0.8%  0.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.3.1 Regime Performance: Feelings in Terms of the Future of Brazil (CESOP)(see chapter four, p. 108) 
 
AGE 
 16-25 years 26-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years 51+ years Total 
Very 
optimistic 
8.0% 5.0% 4.8% 4.7% 8.3% 6.4% 
optimistic 35.1% 35.4% 37.5% 41.3% 39.3% 3.7% 
 iv
neutral 23.8% 29.2% 21.8% 21.2% 17.2% 22.5% 
pessimistic 16.7% 16.0% 16.4% 14.8% 12.1% 15.4% 
Very 
pessimistic 
7.9% 5.5% 8.1% 5.8% 4.5% 6.6% 
Don’t know 8.4% 9.0% 11.5% 12.2% 18.5% 11.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
some 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
some 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
Very 
optimistic 
6.3% 6.3% 7.4% 4.8% 6.4% 
optimistic 35.8% 36.9% 39.7% 39.6% 37.4% 
neutral 15.7% 22.2% 27% 28.4% 22.5% 
pessimistic 8.6% 16.5% 17.1% 16.4% 15.4% 
Very 
pessimistic 
3.9% 7.4% 6.4% 7.2% 6.6% 
Don’t know 29.6% 10.7% 2.5% 3.6% 11.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The income variable was not available for cross-tabulation 
 
4.4.4.1 Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four, p. 119)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 years 25-34 years 35-44 years 45-54 years 55+ years Total 
strong 
support 
10.6% 12.1% 12.4% 13.8% 26.3% 15.2% 
medium 
support 
58.1% 55.8% 53.3% 51.8% 52.4% 54.4% 
weak 
support 
31.3% 32.1% 34.3% 34.4% 21.2% 30.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
strong 
support 
43.2% 16.3% 4.8% 3.1% 15.6% 
medium 
support 
37.8% 55.7% 57.1% 34.4% 54.6% 
weak 
support 
18.9% 28.0% 38.1% 62.5% 29.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
strong 20.5% 7.0% 3.9%  15.5% 
 v
support 
medium 
support 
52.7% 57.3% 56.7% 50.0% 54.1% 
weak 
support 
26.8% 35.7% 39.4% 50.0% 30.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.5.1 Political Actors: Opinion on Collor’s government (CESOP)(see chapter four, p. 125)   
 
AGE 
 16-25 years 26-30 years 31-40 years 41-50 years 51+ years Total 
excellent 7.4% 7.2% 6.9% 7.2% 9.2% 7.6% 
good 18.5% 22.7% 20.8% 21.0% 29.0% 22.0% 
average 49.3% 42.1% 43.9% 46.8% 41.1% 45.1% 
bad 9.1% 9.2% 9.6% 8.4% 7.6% 8.8% 
terrible 15.4% 17.6% 16.2% 14.4% 9.6% 14.6% 
don’t know 0.3% 1.2% 2.6% 2.3% 3.4% 1.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
some 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
at least some 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
excellent 9.0% 8.3% 5.0% 4.6% 7.6% 
good 36.5% 19.5% 18.3% 22.8% 22.0% 
average 32.5% 46.7% 50.1% 44.7% 45.1% 
bad 7.3% 8.4% 9.8% 14.2% 8.8% 
terrible 8.6% 15.8% 16.2% 12.8% 14.6% 
don’t know 6.1% 1.3% 0.6% 0.9% 1.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The income variable was not available for cross-tabulation 
 
Brazil 1995 
4.4.1.1.1 Political Community: Pride to be Brazilian (see chapter four, p. 92.)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
Very 
proud 
63.4% 62.9% 63.3% 67.3% 67.0% 74.4% 64.5% 
Quite 
proud 
17.6% 17.6% 22.5% 18.2% 22.7% 20.5% 19.2% 
Not 
very 
proud 
17.6% 17.6% 12.1% 11.5% 9.3% 2.6% 14.3% 
Not at 
all 
proud 
1.5% 1.8% 2.1% 3.0% 1.0% 2.6% 1.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 vi
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
Very proud 57.9% 69.6% 62.9% 62.3% 64.5% 
Quite 
proud 
26.3% 15.8% 20.4% 20.6% 19.2% 
Not very 
proud 
10.5% 11.3% 15.1% 16.0% 14.3% 
Not at all 
proud 
5.3% 3.3% 1.6% 1.1% 1.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Explains 69% of the variance, chi-square=19.702 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
Very proud 66.9% 63.3% 58.3% 53.3% 65.0% 
Quite 
proud 
17.8% 17.5% 29.2% 30.0% 18.8% 
Not very 
proud 
13.2% 17.5% 11.1% 16.7% 14.3% 
Not at all 
proud 
2.2% 1.7% 1.4%  1.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.2.1Political Community: Geographical Groups (see chapter four, p. 95.) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years  
65+ 
years 
Total 
town 29.8% 35.3% 26.7% 29.9% 28.0% 38.5% 30.9% 
region 13.5% 10.6% 11.9% 11.0% 13.0% 5.1% 11.6% 
country 22.9% 26.7% 32.6% 30.5% 38.0% 25.6% 28.5% 
S. 
America 
1.8% 2.4% 1.7% 3.0% 1.0% 5.1% 2.2% 
World  32.0% 24.9% 27.1% 25.6% 20.0% 25.6% 26.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no 
schooling 
primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
town 22.2% 34.9% 32.5% 27.9% 30.9% 
region  14.3% 10.6% 10.8% 11.6% 
country 16.7% 26.3% 28.9% 30.1% 28.5% 
S. America  1.5% 3.7% 2.0% 2.2% 
 vii
World  61.1% 23.0% 24.4% 29.0% 26.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Explains 99% of the variance, chi-square = 33.269 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
town 32.6% 31.2% 16.7% 20.0% 30.8% 
region 12.1% 12.8% 8.3% 10.0% 12.0% 
country 27.6% 29.9% 37.5% 16.7% 28.6% 
S. America 2.2% 2.7%  6.7% 2.3% 
World  25.6% 23.5% 37.5% 46.7% 26.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.3.1 Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one’s Country (see chapter four, p. 98)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
yes 70.1% 67.2% 73.4% 77.7% 71.3% 89.5% 71.8% 
no 29.9% 32.8% 26.6% 22.3% 28.7% 10.5 28.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
yes 94.7% 79.9% 73.1% 65.3% 71.8% 
no 5.3% 20.1% 26.9% 34.7% 28.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
yes 74.9% 68.2% 60.0% 63.3% 71.8% 
no 25.1% 31.8% 40.0% 36.7% 28.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.2.1Regime Principles: Having a democratic system (see chapter four, p. 101.) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very good 25.0% 27.2% 28.0% 27.6% 28.0% 31.8% 27.1% 
fairly good 59.0% 57.7% 57.3% 60.0% 56.8% 47.7% 57.9% 
fairly bad 11.5% 9.1% 10.0% 8.6% 8.5% 11.4% 9.8% 
very bad 4.5% 6.0% 4.7% 3.8% 6.8% 9.1% 5.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least at least completed Total 
 viii
primary 
school 
some high 
school 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
very good 33.3% 19.7% 28.3% 30.7% 27.1% 
fairly good 42.9% 60.1% 56.9% 57.4% 57.9% 
fairly bad 23.8% 13.8% 9.0% 7.6% 9.9% 
very bad  6.4% 5.8% 4.2% 5.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very good 23.7% 29.5% 41.5% 38.9% 26.9% 
fairly good 59.6% 57.0% 45.7% 55.6% 57.8% 
fairly bad 11.0% 9.1% 7.4% 2.8% 10.0% 
very bad 5.7% 4.4% 5.3% 2.8% 5.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Principles: ‘Winstonian Hypothesis’: Democracy is better than other forms of government despite 
its problems (see chapter four,p. 101)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+  
years 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
42.4% 46.2% 52.3% 63.7% 58.8% 50.0% 50.1% 
agree 41.2% 36.4% 28.2% 21.1% 30.7% 36.4% 33.2% 
disagree 8.2% 9.1% 9.7% 6.4% 3.5% 6.8% 8.1% 
strongly 
disagree 
8.2% 8.4% 9.7% 8.8% 7.0% 6.8% 8.5% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
22.2% 48.7% 40.1% 56.3% 50.2% 
agree 55.6% 34.2% 39.7%% 29.2% 33.2% 
disagree 5.6% 6.5% 9.1% 8.5% 8.0% 
strongly 
disagree 
16.7% 10.6% 11.0% 6.0% 8.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
46.4% 53.6% 63.8% 65.0% 50.1% 
agree 35.7% 32.8% 19.1% 20.0% 33.3% 
disagree 7.7% 7.3% 12.8% 7.5% 7.9% 
 ix
strongly 
disagree 
10.2% 6.3% 4.3% 7.5% 8.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.3.1 Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Previous Regime (see chapter four, p. 108)  
 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 20.7% 28.5% 29.2% 22.7% 27.8% 18.9% 25.5% 
fairly bad 48.9% 42.7% 38.5% 33.1% 38.9% 24.3% 41.1% 
fairly good 20.4% 20.9% 20.8% 26.6% 17.8% 37.8% 21.9% 
very good 10.0% 7.9% 11.5% 17.5% 15.6% 18.9% 11.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very bad 22.2% 26.5% 25.1% 25.2% 25.5% 
fairly bad 33.3% 32.0% 40.2% 47.1% 41.1% 
fairly good 22.2% 21.4% 25.1% 20.7% 21.9% 
very good 22.2% 20.1% 9.6% 7.0% 11.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 23.7% 29.3% 31.9% 28.6% 25.9% 
fairly bad 41.1% 41.8% 36.1% 42.9% 41.0% 
fairly good 21.9% 19.5% 27.8% 25.0% 21.7% 
very good 13.3% 9.4% 4.2% 3.6% 11.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Present Regime (see chapter four, p. 108) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 30.1% 34.2% 31.8% 32.1% 28.1% 16.2% 31.3% 
fairly bad 42.6% 41.8% 40.8% 38.4% 40.6% 18.9% 40.5% 
fairly good 22.8% 19.1% 19.7% 21.4% 21.9% 32.4% 21.1% 
very good 4.4% 4.9% 7.7% 8.2% 9.4% 32.4% 7.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
 x
very bad 15.8% 33.9% 33.1% 29.5% 31.3% 
fairly bad 10.5% 35.1% 44.1% 43.0% 40.5% 
fairly good 36.8% 19.1% 20.4% 22.1% 21.1% 
very good 36.8% 11.9% 2.4% 5.4% 7.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 30.7% 32.3% 30.6% 33.3% 31.2% 
fairly bad 39.7% 42.8% 44.4% 30.0% 40.6% 
fairly good 20.4% 20.9% 20.8% 36.7% 21.0% 
very good 9.3% 4.0% 4.2%  7.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Future Regime (see chapter four, pg. 108)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 16.7% 14.8% 23.1% 22.0% 18.3% 16.7% 18.4% 
fairly bad 23.6% 32.2% 25.8% 28.7% 25.6% 23.3% 27.5% 
fairly good 34.5% 28.3% 28.1% 25.3% 35.4% 26.7% 29.9% 
very good 25.2% 24.7% 23.1% 24.0% 20.7% 33.3% 24.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very bad 50.0% 24.9% 18.1% 14.2% 18.4% 
fairly bad 12.5% 27.9% 27.3% 27.5% 27.5% 
fairly good 25.0% 19.2% 32.6% 34.9% 29.9% 
very good 12.5% 27.9% 22.0% 23.4% 24.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 21.1% 14.5% 8.5% 20.0% 18.4% 
fairly bad 27.1% 28.3% 28.2% 20.0% 27.3% 
fairly good 26.0% 33.7% 45.1% 43.3% 30.0% 
very good 25.7% 23.6% 18.3% 16.7% 24.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four,p. 119.) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
strong 
support 
15.4% 13.4% 12.8% 16.8% 23.0% 35.6% 15.8% 
 xi
medium 
support 
55.5% 58.2% 58.2% 60.4% 60.3% 55.6% 57.9% 
weak 
support 
29.1% 28.4% 28.9% 22.8% 16.7% 8.9% 26.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
strong 
support 
25.0% 22.7% 14.6% 12.0% 15.8% 
medium 
support 
50.0% 54.5% 56.3% 60.8% 57.9% 
weak 
support 
25.0% 22.7% 29.1% 27.2% 26.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Explains 97% of the variance, chi-square= 19.702 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
strong 
support 
19.9% 8.1% 7.4% 12.8% 15.6% 
medium 
support 
54.2% 64.6% 71.6% 35.9% 57.7% 
weak 
support 
25.9% 27.3% 21.1% 51.3% 26.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.5.1 Political Actors: Satisfaction with Incumbents (see chapter four, p. 125) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
8.4% 12.5% 13.6% 19.4% 20.6% 21.1% 13.7% 
fairly 
satisfied 
42.7% 41.8% 42.8% 47.3% 41.2% 60.5% 43.6% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
23.4% 22.0% 19.1% 15.2% 16.5% 15.8% 20.0% 
very 
dissatisfied 
25.5% 23.8% 24.6% 18.2% 21.6% 2.6% 22.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
16.7% 17.6% 9.8% 13.1% 13.7% 
 xii
fairly 
satisfied 
66.7% 43.6% 43.9% 42.6% 43.6% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
5.6% 19.4% 22.4% 19.9% 20.0% 
very 
dissatisfied 
11.1% 19.4% 24.0% 24.4% 22.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Explains 85% of the variance, chi-square=20.518 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
14.3% 13.5% 8.3% 16.7% 13.7% 
fairly 
satisfied 
43.6% 41.4% 52.8% 40.0% 43.5% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
19.8% 20.9% 19.4% 10.0% 19.8% 
very 
dissatisfied 
22.4% 24.2% 19.4% 33.3% 23.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
South Africa 1995 
4.4.1.1.2 Political Community: Pride to be South African (see chapter four,p. 93)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
Very 
proud 
83.4% 83.4% 83.7% 79.2% 77.7% 83.5% 82.1% 
Quite 
proud 
12.2% 11.1% 13.8% 16.5% 15.0% 10.1% 13.1% 
Not 
very 
proud 
4.0% 2.6% 1.4% 3.3% 4.9% 5.5% 3.5% 
Not at 
all 
proud 
 0.7% 0.3% 0.8% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
Very proud 85.8% 62.6% 83.2% 81.8% 81.8% 
Quite proud 9.9% 29.8% 15.7% 14.9% 13.6% 
Not very 
proud 
3.4% 3.3% 0.8% 3.3% 3.2% 
Not at all 
proud 
0.3% 1.4% 0.4%  0.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
Total 
 xiii
tertiary 
education 
Very proud 84.9% 82.6% 84.0% 66.4% 81.8% 
Quite 
proud 
10.0% 12.6% 12.6% 24.9% 13.6% 
Not very 
proud 
3.6% 3.3% 2.5% 5.5% 3.2% 
Not at all 
proud 
0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 0.9% 0.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
Very proud 86.0% 80.7% 74.7% 56.2% 82.7% 
Quite 
proud 
10.3% 16.1% 18.9% 36.1% 13.3% 
Not very 
proud 
2.6% 2.8% 3.5% 1.2% 2.6% 
Not at all 
proud 
0.3% 0.1% 1.9% 1.2% 0.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.2.2 Political Community: Geographical Groups (see chapter four,p. 96)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years  
65+ 
years 
Total 
town 26.8% 32.2% 36.0% 28.3% 27.8% 35.8% 30.6% 
region 17.9% 12.7% 12.8% 14.0% 20.5% 14.5% 15.5% 
country 42.9% 46.3% 44.6% 47.3% 42.3% 41.4% 44.3% 
Africa 6.6% 4.0% 3.0% 3.5% 3.6% 2.4% 4.2% 
World  5.0% 4.9% 3.1% 6.9% 3.0% 5.9% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
town 31.7% 37.3% 30.5% 27.0% 32.4% 
region 16.1% 10.5% 11.0% 8.2% 14.6% 
country 42.4% 41.8% 50.5% 56.1% 43.3% 
Africa 4.9% 1.8% 1.7% 2.5% 4.1% 
World  3.7% 8.4% 6.3% 5.9% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no 
schooling 
primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
town 49.4% 31.2% 28.6% 34.9% 32.4% 
region 10.3% 18.9% 14.1% 8.9% 14.6% 
country 31.1% 41.3% 47.8% 42.0% 43.3% 
Africa 2.9% 3.8% 4.7% 3.3% 4.1% 
 xiv
World  1.9% 4.1% 4.6% 10.5% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
town 32.6% 29.3% 37.9% 34.4% 32.6% 
region 17.0% 11.2% 9.4% 9.4% 15.0% 
country 41.1% 50.1% 43.9% 38.9% 42.8% 
Africa 4.6% 4.0% 3.3% 2.2% 4.3% 
World  3.6% 5.2% 5.2% 15.1% 4.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.3.2 Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one’s Country (see chapter four,p. 99)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
yes 70.6% 60.8% 63.7% 58.5% 57.5% 56.1% 62.6% 
no 18.3% 26.3% 19.6% 26.9% 27.9% 28.5% 23.5% 
don’t 
know 
11.2% 13.0% 16.7% 14.5% 14.5% 15.4% 13.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
yes 58.6% 59.7% 61.4% 74.5% 59.4% 
no 26.5% 31.7% 23.4% 20.6% 26.9% 
don’t know 14.9% 8.5% 15.2% 4.9% 13.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
yes 49.7% 51.8% 65.4% 64.5% 59.4% 
no 32.7% 30.8% 22.7% 28.6% 26.9% 
don’t know 17.5% 17.5% 11.9% 6.7% 13.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
yes 57.9% 68.1% 67.0% 58.9% 60.4% 
no 27.3% 21.9% 24.7% 31.6% 26.4% 
don’t know 14.8% 10.1% 8.3% 9.5% 13.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.2.2 Regime Principles: Support for having a democratic political system (see chapter four,p. 104.) 
 
AGE 
 xv
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very good 52.1% 51.8% 43.0% 49.3% 42.9% 44.2% 49.3% 
fairly good 31.9% 31.3% 34.5% 31.0% 35.8% 35.9% 31.0% 
fairly bad 3.8% 4.5% 6.9% 1.9% 4.1% 3.2% 1.9% 
very bad 1.2% 2.0% 2.0% 4.3% 2.3% 1.7% 4.3% 
don’t know 11.0% 10.5% 13.6% 13.5% 14.9% 15.0% 13.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very good 51.0% 31.4% 36.3% 37.2% 46.4% 
fairly good 29.1% 39.9% 34.3% 36.4% 31.5% 
fairly bad 3.1% 12.7% 3.2% 5.1% 4.7% 
very bad 1.8% 8.4% 3.0% 2.0% 2.9% 
don’t know 14.9% 7.6% 23.1% 19.3% 14.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very good 43.7% 44.6% 46.8% 52.4% 46.4% 
fairly good 29.3% 32.1% 31.5% 31.9% 31.5% 
fairly bad 2.8% 3.1% 5.7% 6.5% 4.7% 
very bad 2.4% 1.7% 3.5% 4.3% 2.9% 
don’t know 21.9% 18.5% 12.6% 4.9% 14.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very good 47.4% 42.8% 38.0% 51.0% 46.1% 
fairly good 30.4% 36.4% 35.1% 36.6% 32.1% 
fairly bad 3.6% 5.3% 13.3% 6.8% 4.8% 
very bad 1.7% 5.2% 8.6% 2.5% 2.9% 
don’t know 16.9% 10.3% 5.0% 3.1% 14.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Principles: ‘Winstonian Hypothesis’: Democracy as the best system despite its problems (see 
chapter four,p. 104) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
45.3% 37.6% 30.7% 40.3% 34.2% 32.8% 38.0% 
agree 34.9% 35.7% 42.2% 36.4% 38.8% 36.5% 37.2% 
disagree 5.6% 7.4% 8.7% 6.3% 5.7% 7.7% 6.8% 
strongly 
disagree 
1.4% 2.2% 1.4% 0.9% 0.7% 1.9% 1.4% 
 xvi
don’t know 12.8% 17.1% 17.0% 16.2% 20.7% 21.1% 16.6% 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
strongly agree 42.1% 19.6% 21.4% 22.3% 36.3% 
agree 32.0% 49.1% 42.6% 45.7% 35.9% 
disagree 4.7% 16.3% 9.1% 8.5% 7.0% 
strongly 
disagree 
0.9% 5.3% 1.4% 2.1% 1.6% 
don’t know 20.3% 0.1% 25.5% 21.3% 19.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
36.8% 36.4% 36.7% 33.8% 36.3% 
agree 25.9% 32.5% 38.2% 45.8% 35.9% 
disagree 4.2% 4.8% 8.5% 9.7% 7.0% 
strongly 
disagree 
 0.8% 1.9% 4.8% 1.6% 
don’t know 33.2% 25.5% 14.8% 6.0% 19.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
39.0% 33.2% 27.1% 27.5% 36.5% 
agree 32.3% 44.1% 44.6% 46.2% 36.0% 
disagree 4.5% 9.0% 15.6% 16.3% 6.7% 
strongly 
disagree 
1.2% 2.4% 4.4% 4.0% 1.8% 
don’t know 22.9% 11.3% 8.3% 6.0% 18.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.3.2 Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Previous Regime (see chapter four,p. 113.) 
 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 60.8% 54.5% 53.8% 55.8% 59.5% 66.3% 58.1% 
fairly bad 25.0% 26.5% 28.2% 26.8% 24.2% 18.8% 25.4% 
fairly good 10.2% 14.0% 12.5% 13.3% 12.7% 9.3% 12.0% 
very good 4.0% 4.9% 5.5% 4.1% 3.7% 5.6% 4.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 xvii
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very bad 66.1% 16.6% 47.0% 54.3% 56.3% 
fairly bad 21.9% 35.7% 37.1% 29.6% 25.6% 
fairly good 8.5% 35.7% 11.4% 13.0% 13.2% 
very good 3.5% 12.1% 4.5% 3.2% 4.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very bad 68.6% 66.2% 51.4% 37.9% 56.3% 
fairly bad 20.7% 24.3% 25.6% 33.7% 25.65 
fairly good 6.2% 5.9% 17.2% 22.7% 13.2% 
very good 4.5% 3.6% 5.7% 5.6% 4.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 64.0% 52.5% 23.0% 35.2% 57.3% 
fairly bad 23.9% 24.1% 28.7% 34.4% 24.8% 
fairly good 8.5% 15.6% 35.9% 23.6% 12.7% 
very good 3.6% 7.8% 12.5% 6.8% 5.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Present Regime (see chapter four,p. 113) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 6.1% 9.7% 7.9% 13.1% 9.3% 9.3% 8.9% 
fairly bad 31.9% 34.3% 35.7% 35.5% 42.5% 42.2% 35.9% 
fairly good 44.6% 39.7% 39.4% 37.4% 39.3% 34.55 40.0% 
very good 17.4% 16.3% 17.0% 14.0% 8.8% 14.0% 15.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very bad 4.9% 26.7% 24.6% 19.2% 10.4% 
fairly bad 32.6% 50.2% 38.9% 43.0% 36.2% 
fairly good 43.3% 22.2% 25.4% 29.4% 38.1% 
very good 19.1% 0.9% 11.1% 8.4% 15.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
Total 
 xviii
education 
very bad 7.0% 8.7% 11.1% 15.7% 10.4% 
fairly bad 34.3% 33.65 35.9% 46.8% 36.2% 
fairly good 28.9% 41.2% 39.1% 34.2% 38.1% 
very good 29.8% 16.5% 13.9% 3.4% 15.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 7.2% 14.7% 22.7% 17.2% 10.3% 
fairly bad 32.0% 39.1% 49.8% 49.7% 35.5% 
fairly good 42.8% 35.1% 23.7% 28.8% 39.2% 
very good 180% 11.2% 3.9% 4.3% 15.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Future Regime (see chapter four,p. 113) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 6.6% 8.5% 8.4% 9.8% 11.0% 9.1% 8.6% 
fairly bad 14.0% 13.95 13.1% 18.0% 15.9% 14.8% 14.8% 
fairly good 24.9% 28.8% 25.9% 27.8% 26.2% 32.1% 27.1% 
very good 54.5% 48.8% 52.6% 44.5% 46.8% 44.0% 49.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very bad 3.8% 35.0% 10.2% 21.1% 10.3% 
fairly bad 11.3% 31.0% 22.0% 18.1% 15.7% 
fairly good 26.2% 27.7% 29.5% 28.0% 26.8% 
very good 58.7% 6.3% 38.2% 32.7% 47.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very bad 4.0% 4.0% 12.5% 21.5% 10.3% 
fairly bad 12.4% 12.9% 16.6% 21.8% 15.7% 
fairly good 21.1% 29.8% 24.8% 32.4% 26.8% 
very good 62.5% 53.2% 46.2% 24.3% 47.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 5.1% 13.9% 29.0% 22.5% 9.7% 
fairly bad 12.0% 15.0% 28.8% 25.6% 14.8% 
fairly good 25.5% 25.9% 24.5% 37.3% 26.2% 
 xix
very good 57.4% 45.2% 17.6% 14.5% 49.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.4.2 Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four,p. 121) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
strong 
support 
43.5% 37.6% 34.8% 34.8% 32.5% 30.6% 36.9% 
medium 
support 
49.8% 54.2% 52.5% 52.1% 56.6% 60.0% 53.3% 
weak 
support 
6.7% 8.2% 12.8% 13.1% 10.9% 9.5% 9.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
strong 
support 
46.0% 8.7% 18.7% 22.0% 36.4% 
medium 
support 
47.8% 66.3% 61.1% 69.9% 52.8% 
weak 
support 
6.2% 25.1% 20.2% 8.1% 10.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
strong 
support 
42.2% 45.8% 35.1% 16.1% 36.4% 
medium 
support 
49.7% 47.1% 53.3% 66.0% 52.8% 
weak 
support 
7.9% 7.1% 11.6% 17.9% 10.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
strong 
support 
44.6% 29.3% 13.9% 9.9% 36.9% 
medium 
support 
47.8% 56.4% 66.0% 68.1% 52.3% 
weak 
support 
7.6% 14.3% 20.1% 22.0% 10.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.5.2 Political Actors: Satisfaction with Incumbents (see Chapter four,p. 127) 
 
 xx
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
12.1% 11.4% 11.6% 8.9% 8.3% 4.0% 10.0% 
fairly 
satisfied 
43.3% 43.0% 40.4% 40.4% 39.6% 37.4% 41.2% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
31.35 32.1% 32.9% 32.4% 35.6% 35.0% 32.9% 
Very 
dissatisfied 
9.3% 10.2% 9.7% 12.8% 12.5% 16.0% 11.2% 
don’t know 4.0% 3.3% 5.4% 5.5% 3.8% 7.7% 4.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very satisfied 12.1% 1.2% 4.9% 6.2% 9.6% 
fairly satisfied 43.9% 31.1% 30.9% 33.8% 40.6% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
30.1% 38.9% 43.1% 41.4% 32.9% 
Very 
dissatisfied 
8.3% 27.0% 15.9% 15.4% 12.1% 
don’t know 5.6% 1.4% 5.1% 3.1% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
10.7% 9.4% 11.3% 1.8% 9.6% 
fairly 
satisfied 
46.1% 40.3% 39.9% 38.8% 40.6% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
25.9% 33.4% 32.6% 39.4% 32.9% 
Very 
dissatisfied 
9.0% 9.1% 13.2% 18.9% 12.1% 
don’t know 21.9% 18.5% 12.5% 4.9% 14.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
11.5% 8.1% 3.0% 1.2% 9.7% 
fairly 
satisfied 
42.5% 39.9% 33.5% 33.0% 40.9% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
31.8% 31.9% 41.2% 42.6% 33.1% 
Very 
dissatisfied 
8.1% 18.9% 21.6% 21.0% 11.7% 
 xxi
don’t know 6.1% 1.2% 0.6% 2.2% 4.6% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
South Africa 2001 
4.4.1.1.2 Political Community: Pride to be South African (see chapter four, p. 93)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
Very 
proud 
78.4% 71.7% 78.6% 72.2% 64.9% 76.5% 74.6% 
Quite 
proud 
17.5% 19.6% 17.8% 22.7% 31.9% 19.1% 19.9% 
Not 
very 
proud 
3.8% 3.6% 1.5% 4.1% 2.1% 4.4% 3.2% 
Not at 
all 
proud 
0.3% 4.9% 0.3% 1.0% 1.1%  1.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
Very proud 78.1% 48.6% 72.1% 52.2% 65.7% 
Quite proud 18.3% 38.7% 22.6% 40.1% 27.3% 
Not very 
proud 
2.8% 9.0% 4.4% 6.0% 5.3% 
Not at all 
proud 
0.6% 1.6% 0.4% 1.7% 1.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
Very proud 70.5% 70.7% 67.0% 54.3% 65.9% 
Quite 
proud 
25.9% 24.7% 26.1% 35.3% 27.2% 
Not very 
proud 
2.7% 4.4% 5.2% 6.9% 5.2% 
Not at all 
proud 
0.9% 0.2% 1.1% 1.3% 0.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
Very proud 72.2% 72.5% 56.5% 52.5% 67.2% 
Quite 
proud 
23.7% 22.75 32.6% 36.9% 26.6% 
Not very 
proud 
3.3% 3.7% 8.4% 7.6% 4.7% 
 xxii
Not at all 
proud 
0.7% 0.7% 2.1% 1.4% 0.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.2.2 Political Community: Geographical Groups (see chapter four, p. 96)   
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years  
65+ 
years 
Total 
town 28.7% 29.1% 30.1% 36.1% 20.4% 29.6% 29.6% 
region 6.7% 13.8% 16.3% 14.9% 22.6% 11.8% 13.3% 
country 40.9% 48.4% 34.0% 36.1% 45.2% 48.5% 41.7% 
Africa 9.6% 2.3% 11.4% 2.6% 3.2% 2.9% 6.1% 
World  12.9% 5.9% 6.0% 7.7% 6.5% 4.4% 7.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
town 27.5% 38.6% 38.5% 24.1% 32.3% 
region 15.1% 8.6% 8.4% 11.7% 11.7% 
country 43.7% 39.6% 41.1% 55.5% 43.2% 
Africa 7.2% 2.7% 4.2% 3.0% 4.9% 
World  3.8% 8.6% 7.6% 5.4% 6.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no 
schooling 
primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
town 25.9% 31.1% 32.4% 35.3% 32.4% 
region 23.2% 14.7% 10.9% 8.7% 11.8% 
country 33.0% 41.9% 44.5% 42.6% 43.3% 
Africa 0.9% 6.7% 4.9% 3.9% 4.9% 
World  4.5% 3.7% 5.9% 8.4% 5.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
town 30.3% 30.7% 35.8% 31.8% 31.3% 
region 15.7% 11.5% 7.4% 10.1% 12.3% 
country 41.3% 46.7% 43.9% 43.8% 43.9% 
Africa 5.4% 5.9% 3.5% 3.9% 5.1% 
World  3.8% 4.4% 7.4% 9.2% 5.3% 
don’t know      
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.1.3.2Political Community: Willingness to Fight for one’s Country (see chapter four,p. 99)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+ Total 
 xxiii
years years years years years years 
yes 62.3% 59.0% 60.8% 61.3% 45.2% 30.9% 58.3% 
no 28.4% 25.9% 20.8% 25.3% 39.8% 51.5% 27.3% 
don’t 
know 
9.4% 15.1% 18.4% 13.4% 15.1% 17.6% 14.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
yes 56.3% 57.5% 56.1% 44.8% 55.5% 
no 26.7% 29.1% 34.7% 37.8% 29.9% 
don’t know 17.0% 13.3% 9.2% 17.4% 14.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
yes 41.1% 47.9% 58.4% 56.5% 55.4% 
no 43.8% 34.6% 27.4% 30.3% 29.8% 
don’t know 15.2% 17.5% 14.2% 13.2% 14.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
yes 52.9% 56.9% 54.7% 61.3% 56.0% 
no 30.3% 28.8% 31.9% 26.5% 29.3% 
don’t know 16.8% 14.3% 13.3% 12.2% 14.7% 
Total      
 
4.4.2.2 Regime Principles: Having a democratic system (see chapter four,p. 108)  
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+  
years 
Total 
very good 34.4% 48.7% 42.0% 53.9% 46.6% 57.2% 44.5% 
fairly good 53.3% 34.5% 36.8% 35.8% 28.2% 26.6% 39.3% 
fairly bad 3.6% 6.0% 10.2% 4.0% 10.1% 3.1% 6.1% 
very bad 2.2% 3.1% 4.2% 2.3% 3.4% 1.1% 3.0% 
don’t know 6.5% 7.7% 6.9% 4.0% 11.7% 11.9% 7.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very good 46.9% 37.6% 36.5% 45.0% 44.5% 
fairly good 39.9% 32.9% 43.3% 39.6% 39.3% 
fairly bad 4.5% 14.9% 6.3% 5.7% 6.1% 
very bad 2.6% 6.3% 0.8% 2.5% 3.0% 
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don’t know 6.1% 8.2% 13.1% 7.1% 7.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very good 39.3% 47.6% 45.7% 36.8% 44.4% 
fairly good 41.6% 34.9% 36.0% 56.9% 39.4% 
fairly bad 3.5% 5.7% 7.2% 2.8% 6.1% 
very bad 1.2% 4.6% 2.9% 1.7% 2.9% 
don’t know 14.3% 7.2% 8.2% 1.8% 7.2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very good 47.4% 41.5% 46.3% 43.7% 44.5% 
fairly good 32.3% 48.5% 40.9% 32.6% 39.8% 
fairly bad 4.0% 5.6% 5.4% 15.6% 5.9% 
very bad 4.3% 1.0% 2.7% 5.0% 2.9% 
don’t know 12.05 3.4% 4.6% 3.2% 7.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Principles: Winstonian Hypothesis: Democracy is the best political system despite its problems 
(see chapter four,p. 108) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
24.6% 34.0% 38.4% 28.1% 29.2% 34.7% 31.5% 
agree 40.0% 40.3% 46.6% 45.6% 36.0% 43.4% 42.1% 
disagree 25.4% 17.3% 6.3% 10.3% 12.9% 6.3% 15.4% 
strongly 
disagree 
0.7% 3.0% 1.2% 3.6% 7.2% 1.0% 2.3% 
don’t know 9.2% 5.4% 7.5% 12.5% 14.7% 14.7% 8.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
strongly agree 34.6% 22.3% 21.5% 34.1% 31.5% 
agree 40.8% 47.3% 46.6% 34.5% 42.1% 
disagree 14.5% 16.1% 20.4% 17.0% 15.4% 
strongly 
disagree 
2.3% 2.8% 0.8% 4.6% 2.3% 
don’t know 7.8% 11.5% 10.7% 9.8% 8.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 xxv
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
23.2% 31.0% 33.6% 24.9% 31.4% 
agree 42.4% 45.5% 43.3% 34.3% 42.2% 
disagree 10.6% 8.8% 12.8% 33.3% 15.4% 
strongly 
disagree 
1.9% 1.9% 2.4% 2.5% 2.3% 
don’t know 21.9% 12.8% 7.9% 5.0% 8.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
strongly 
agree 
35.0% 29.7% 32.4% 33.4% 32.4% 
agree 40.6% 40.5% 41.9% 40.5% 40.7% 
disagree 10.7% 21.0% 16.1% 17.1% 16.1% 
strongly 
disagree 
2.6% 2.1% 1.4% 2.7% 2.3% 
don’t know 11.1% 6.6% 8.3% 6.3% 8.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.3.2 Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Previous Regime (see chapter four,p. 113) 
 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 53.2% 53.1% 49.7% 58.2% 52.1% 47.8% 52.7% 
fairly bad 24.8% 26.2% 31.5% 26.8% 28.7% 25.4% 27.3% 
fairly good 16.6% 16.0% 12.7% 12.4% 14.9% 17.9% 14.9% 
very good 5.4% 4.7% 6.1% 2.6% 4.3% 9.0% 5.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very bad 60.4% 18.5% 33.5% 28.8% 50.7% 
fairly bad 22.9% 31.1% 43.2% 26.3% 26.3% 
fairly good 13.1% 42.3% 16.6% 32.2% 18.1% 
very good 3.6% 8.1% 6.8% 12.8% 4.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very bad 74.1% 53.8% 53.2% 34.6% 50.7% 
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fairly bad 14.3% 29.6% 27.3% 20.3% 26.3% 
fairly good 8.0% 11.2% 15.0% 39.2% 18.1% 
very good 3.6% 5.4% 4.5% 5.9% 4.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 57.7% 51.4% 45.6% 24.9% 50.7% 
fairly bad 31.2% 19.3% 23.4% 32.3% 26.3% 
fairly good 7.9% 24.2% 20.3% 38.0% 18.1% 
very good 3.2% 5.2% 10.7% 4.9% 4.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Present Regime (see chapter four, p. 113) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 28.2% 12.6% 12.1% 12.3% 17.4% 11.5% 16.6% 
fairly bad 29.9% 34.6% 43.2% 36.8% 43.1% 46.9% 36.6% 
fairly good 33.7% 31.8% 34.2% 28.9% 34.2% 20.7% 32.1% 
very good 8.2% 21.0% 10.5% 22.0% 5.3% 20.9% 14.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very bad 7.1% 29.5% 19.1% 24.4% 17.6% 
fairly bad 33.6% 57.6% 42.4% 54.2% 44.4% 
fairly good 43.0% 12.6% 30.8% 15.7% 29.1% 
very good 16.3% 0.2% 7.7% 5.7% 9.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very bad 6.3% 12.9% 18.9% 20.7% 17.6% 
fairly bad 33.3% 34.6% 45.8% 52.0% 44.1% 
fairly good 36.0% 40.0% 26.8% 24.3% 29.3% 
very good 24.3% 12.5% 8.5% 3.0% 9.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 8.9% 18.7% 23.6% 25.8% 16.9% 
fairly bad 34.3% 42.3% 50.0% 58.1% 43.0% 
fairly good 41.3% 29.7% 22.5% 15.4% 30.6% 
very good 15.5% 9.4% 3.9% 0.7% 9.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Regime Performance: Evaluation of the Future Regime (see chapter four,p. 113) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very bad 10.0% 14.1% 9.4% 10.9% 8.0% 19.0% 11.5% 
fairly bad 36.1% 18.7% 30.7% 21.6% 31.6% 33.1% 27.4% 
fairly good 24.6% 33.1% 29.6% 30.0% 45.4% 25.4% 30.2% 
very good 29.4% 34.1% 30.4% 37.5% 15.0% 22.4% 30.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
very bad 5.4% 26.7% 12.0% 29.1% 15.4% 
fairly bad 18.6% 43.6% 28.7% 37.2% 29.8% 
fairly good 35.6% 25.9% 38.2% 24.8% 31.9% 
very good 40.5% 3.8% 21.1% 8.9% 22.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very bad 1.0% 8.5% 16.8% 20.8% 15.4% 
fairly bad 20.4% 23.6% 30.3% 36.2% 29.7% 
fairly good 26.5% 35.9% 31.1% 31.9% 32.0% 
very good 52.0% 32.0% 21.7% 11.2% 23.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very bad 6.9% 14.9% 19.1% 24.0% 14.2% 
fairly bad 18.5% 28.9% 35.6% 42.2% 28.3% 
fairly good 35.2% 32.9% 33.5% 28.5% 33.0% 
very good 39.4% 23.2% 11.9% 5.3% 24.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.4.2 Regime Institutions: Index of Institutional Support (see chapter four,p. 121) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
strong 
support 
29.9% 29.3% 37.2% 41.5% 40.9% 37.3% 33.5% 
medium 
support 
60.2% 48.8% 50.9% 43.9% 43.1% 45.7% 51.2% 
weak 
support 
10.0% 22.0% 11.9% 14.6% 16.0% 17.0% 15.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 xxviii
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
strong 
support 
42.7% 2.0% 16.6% 16.5% 33.5% 
medium 
support 
50.1% 49.9% 59.3% 53.7% 51.2% 
weak support 7.1% 48.1% 24.0% 29.8% 15.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling primary 
school 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
strong 
support 
48.7% 55.8% 33.4% 12.2% 33.6% 
medium 
support 
45.5% 37.4% 49.7% 69.5% 51.1% 
weak 
support 
5.8% 6.9% 17.0% 18.2% 15.3% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
strong 
support 
47.7% 32.3% 27.1% 2.9%  
medium 
support 
41.2% 60.5% 46.6% 50.8%  
weak 
support 
11.1% 7.2% 26.3% 46.3%  
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
4.4.5.2 Political Actors: Satisfaction with Incumbents (see chapter four, p. 127) 
 
AGE 
 16-24 
years 
25-34 
years 
35-44 
years 
45-54 
years 
55-64 
years 
65+ 
years 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
7.1% 4.6% 10.3% 14.4% 10.1% 19.1% 8.6% 
fairly 
satisfied 
34.7% 51.4% 44.1% 47.4% 48.0% 23.6% 43.7% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
39.7% 25.9% 27.3% 14.4% 21.5% 22.9% 27.9% 
Very 
dissatisfied 
13.0% 14.8% 15.3% 16.7% 16.0% 20.6% 15.0% 
don’t know 5.5% 3.2% 3.1% 6.9% 4.4% 13.8% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
ETHNICITY 
 Black  White Coloured Indian Total 
 xxix
very satisfied 10.1% 2.9% 6.1% 8.8% 8.6% 
fairly satisfied 50.5% 23.3% 28.8% 25.2% 43.7% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
24.3% 33.7% 45.8% 27.0% 27.9% 
Very 
dissatisfied 
10.2% 36.2% 13.8% 35.9% 15.0% 
don’t know 4.9% 4.0% 5.6% 3.2% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 no schooling at least 
primary 
school 
at least 
some high 
school 
completed 
high school, 
possible 
tertiary 
education 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
10.4% 12.4% 8.7% 4.6% 8.7% 
fairly 
satisfied 
40.2% 51.6% 45.5% 29.5% 43.8% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
13.7% 21.0% 25.1% 48.8% 27.9% 
Very 
dissatisfied 
8.7% 8.9% 16.5% 15.4% 14.8% 
don’t know 27.1% 6.0% 4.2% 1.8% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
INCOME 
 working-
class income  
lower 
income  
middle 
income 
higher 
income 
Total 
very 
satisfied 
11.9% 8.1% 2.6% 6.6% 9.1% 
fairly 
satisfied 
48.6% 42.2% 39.9% 28.5% 43.3% 
fairly 
dissatisfied 
22.7% 33.1% 28.7% 29.0% 28.2% 
very 
dissatisfied 
10.1% 12.5% 27.9% 32.9% 14.6% 
don’t know 6.7% 4.2% 0.9% 3.1% 4.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Survey Items used in Operationalization and Index 
Construction 
 
Political Community: (Brazil,1990,1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS 
1990: v320 
1995: v80 
2001: v215 
“To which of these geographical groups would you say you belonged to first of all?” 
 
1990: v322 
1995: v82 
2001: 216 
“How proud are you to be South African/Brazilian?” 
 
1990: v263 
1995: v43 
2001: 126 
“Of course we hope that there will not be another war, but should it come to that, would 
you be willing to fight for your country?.” 
 
Regime Principles: (Brazil 1990) WVS 
 
Support for Regime Principles Index: Alpha= 0.34121
“I am going to read out some statements about the government and the economy. For 
each one, could you tell me how much you agree or disagree?..”  
• Our government should be made much more open to the public (v336) 
• We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government allows more 
freedom for individuals to do as they wish (v337) 
 
Proposed Regime Principles: (Brazil 1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS 
Support for Regime Principles Index: Alpha=    .5821    (Brazil 1995) 
                                                                                  .7394    (South Africa 1995) 
                                                                                  .7130    (South Africa 2001)  
1995: v58@1-4 
2001: v169-v172 
 
                                                 
1 It is noted that this Alpha score is very poor and should discourage use of the index. Due to restrictions of 
the data, however, this is the only possibility for measurement of regime principles. Results are 
consequently interpreted with caution.   
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“I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about 
each as a way of governing the country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, 
fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing the country?..”  
• Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections 
• Having the army rule 
• Having a democratic system 
 
Consolidated Support for Democracy Index: Alpha2=    .4270       (Brazil 1995) 
                                                                                               .5716       (South Africa 1995) 
                                                                                               .6196       (South Africa 2001)  
1995: v55@1-4 
2001: v164-167 
 
 “I’m going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic 
political system. Could you please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or 
strongly disagree..”   
• In a democracy, the economic system runs badly 
• Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling 
• Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order 
• Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government   
 
Due to the low Alpha scores of the indexes constructed above, it was deemed more 
appropriate to use to single items to measure support for regime principles for the 
1995 and 2001 waves. These are: 
• Having a democratic system             
(1995=q55@4; 2001=q167) 
• Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government  
(1995=q58@4; 2001=q172) 
 
                                                 
2 The low Alpha of this index against suggests that it is not statistically a good instrument of measurement. 
It could be interpreted to mean that respondents do not necessarily see support of an alternative form of 
government as diametrically opposed to support for democracy. This could be a fault of the survey question 
wording, or merely a trend in respondent conceptualization. The strengthening of the Alpha between 1995 
and 2001 could suggest that respondents are perhaps crystallizing the perception that these forms of 
government are in fact opposed to support for democracy.  
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Regime Performance: (Brazil 1990) CESOP (January) 
P1 
In a general way, how would you say you feel about the future of Brazil?  
 
Regime Performance (Brazil 1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS 
1995: v54@1-3 
2001: v162,X3,X4 
 
Where on this scale would you put the political system: 
• as it was [in apartheid times/before abertura]?  
•  as it is today? 
• as you expect it will be ten years from now?” 
 
Regime Institutions (Brazil 1990,1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS 
 
Support for Institutions Index: Alpha=                   .7665 (Brazil 1990) 
                                                                                     .8048 (Brazil 1995)  
                                                                                     .8090 (South Africa 1995)  
                                                                                     .8593 (South Africa 2001)   
1990: v273,v275, v278-v280 
“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?3”   
• The armed forces 
• The legal system 
• The police 
• Parliament 
• Civil Service 
All variables were recoded whereby all values 1-4 were copied and all others classified as 
‘system missing’.   
                                                 
3 In all the surveys where the items ‘trade/labour unions’ and ‘political parties’ were available, these items 
also loaded in the same factor as the items used for the regime institutions index. They have been excluded, 
however, for the following reasons. ‘Trade/labour unions’, while having had a close relationship with the 
government in South Africa since 1994 (Lodge,1999), are not a democratic regime institution. Similarly, 
while it may be argued that ‘political parties’ are such an institution, the question was considered too 
ambiguous to be used. (Are the respondents for the system of multi-party politics, political parties in 
general, or a specific political party?)        
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Strong support = 5-9 recoded as 1 
Medium Support = 10-15 recoded as 2 
Weak Support= 16-20 recoded as 3 
 
1995: v53@2-3, v53@7-11 
“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?”4   
• The armed forces 
• The legal system 
• The police 
• The government in Brasilia/Pretoria  
• Parliament 
• Civil Service 
All variables were recoded whereby all values 1-4 were copied and all others classified as 
‘system missing’.   
Strong support = 6-11 recoded as 1 
Medium Support = 12- 18 recoded as 2 
Weak Support= 19-24 recoded as 3 
 
2001: v148, v151-v156, X1,X2 
“I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how 
much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence, not very much confidence at all?”   
• The police 
• The government in Brasilia/Pretoria  
• Parliament 
• Civil Service 
• The legal system 
• The president 
All variables5 were recoded whereby all values 1-4 were copied and all others classified 
as ‘system missing’.   
                                                 
4 The indexes differ slightly from wave to wave as some of the items were not available in the earlier waves, 
but were included in the index as they became part of the survey questionnaire.   
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Strong support = 6-11 recoded as 1 
Medium Support = 12- 18 recoded as 2 
Weak Support= 19-24 recoded as 3 
 
Factor analyses of the Items used for Regime Institutions 
All items necessarily loaded onto one factor. The factor loadings of the principle 
component analysis for each wave are displayed below. 
Brazil 1990  
Component matrix 
Questionnaire Item  Component 1 
Confidence in the Armed Forces 0.626 
Confidence in the Legal System 0.778 
Confidence in the Police 0.782 
Confidence in Parliament 0.787 
Confidence in the Civil Service 0.668 
 
51.940% of variance explained 
 
Brazil 1995 
Component matrix 
Questionnaire Item  Component 1 
Confidence in the Armed Forces 0.604 
Confidence in the Legal System 0.732 
Confidence in the Police 0.766 
Confidence in Parliament 0.760 
Confidence in the Civil Service 0.624 
Confidence in the National Government 0.774 
 
50.924% of variance explained 
 
South Africa 1995 
 
Component matrix 
Questionnaire Item  Component 1 
Confidence in the Armed Forces 0.670 
Confidence in the Legal System 0.739 
Confidence in the Police 0.634 
Confidence in Parliament 0.804 
Confidence in the Civil Service 0.748 
Confidence in the National Government 0.771 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 ‘The army’  was excluded from the 2001 battery because its factor loading was too weak (0.496) 
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53.262% of variance explained 
 
South Africa 2001 
 
Component matrix 
Questionnaire Item  Component 1 
Confidence in the Legal System 0.801 
Confidence in the Police 0.654 
Confidence in Parliament 0.840 
Confidence in the Civil Service 0.659 
Confidence in the National Government 0.810 
Confidence in the President 0.789 
 
53.309% variance explained 
 
Political Actors: (Brazil 1990) CESOP (December) 
P10 
In your opinion, do you think Collor is making a(n): i) excellent ii) good iii) average iv) 
bad v) terrible government?    
 
Political Actors (Brazil 1995 & South Africa 1995,2001) WVS 
1995: v60 
2001: v174 
 
“How satisfied are you with the way the people now in national government are handling 
the country’s affairs?” 
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